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ABSTRACT
Cunningham, Gideon C. M.A., School of Public and International Affairs, Wright State
University, 2021. The State and Cannabis: What is Success? A Comparative Analysis of
The United States of America, Uruguay, and Canada.

Globally, the policies that states engage in concerning the cultivation, production,
distribution, and sale of recreational cannabis in the 21st century is changing rapidly.
Three countries have now legalized, regulated, and implemented recreational cannabis
frameworks, albeit in starkly different ways. These countries are The United States of
America, Uruguay, and Canada. This research identifies the contradictory nature of
cannabis policy goals and compares the similarities and differences of each countries’
recreational cannabis framework. It proposes a theory of understanding the contradictory
nature of creating cannabis policies post-legalization and presents a framework from
which to analyze the success of individual cannabis frameworks to contribute to
furthering policymakers and the broader public’s understanding of best practices.
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO CANNABIS POLICY
Introduction
This research analyzes the similarities and differences in the recreational cannabis
regulatory policies in three case study countries. The case studies researched include the
United States, Uruguay, and Canada. Each country has experienced different pathways to
legal adult-use cannabis markets, different histories implementing cannabis prohibition,
varying levels of public approval for the legalization of cannabis, different political
cultures, and different systems of governance over their cannabis markets. Despite this,
all three countries have established cannabis markets that regulate recreational cannabis
from seed to sale. On the contrary, the cannabis policies established in each country that
regulates cannabis from seed to sale has manifested itself in different ways in each case
study country. Legal global cannabis sales currently are approximately 26 billion dollars,
a number that will grow to 43 billion dollars by 2024 (Conway 2021). This number is
expected to continue to grow as more countries establish their own legal cannabis
markets, and existing markets continue to mature. With billions of dollars in economic
activity and taxation revenue at stake, the research into the policies that make-up
recreational cannabis markets in the first three countries that have decided to establish
them is increasingly important.
Seed to sale cannabis regulation is the process of establishing a governmental
regulatory body to track the life cycle of the cannabis plant at government owned or
licensed cultivation, production, or dispensary facilities, this includes keeping track of the
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manufacturing, transport, and distribution of the whole of the cannabis plant to maintain
compliance (Weedmaps 2021). In addition to this, regulations are established to regulate
where cannabis is stored and consumed. This process is utilized to ensure that the
cannabis produced is sold only within the jurisdiction of an individual legalized cannabis
market, rather than falling into the hands of young people or ending up in the interstate
illicit market. In addition to this, each of the countries researched have allowed for the
homegrown cultivation of cannabis, either at the national level or within specific
subnational jurisdictions. This method of cannabis distribution does not match the
definition of seed to sale cannabis regulation in most cases – excluding the regulations
established in Uruguay concerning homegrown cultivation of cannabis – but it plays a
role in analyzing a cannabis regulatory system comprehensively due to its existing
“unregulated” nature alongside seed to sale regulation.
The regulatory apparatuses established in each case study to regulate recreational
cannabis were created to ensure the state met its stated goals in legalizing cannabis.
These goals broadly consist of maintaining strict regulation of cannabis to minimize
negative public health externalities (youth use of cannabis, cannabis induced
hospitalizations, over-consumption of cannabis, driving while under the influence of
cannabis, etc.), rectifying the social harms of cannabis prohibition (minimizing the arrests
for use of cannabis, racial discrimination in the enforcement of cannabis prohibition) and
eliminating both domestic and interstate illicit cannabis markets. In addition to this, some
policymakers have also sought to boost economic growth through the creation of
cannabis jobs, and to garner revenue for their state either for boosting general funds, or
using this money to fund public health education, social programs, or to fund

2

reinvestment programs in communities harmed by the War on Drugs. Additionally,
cannabis legalization and regulation provide an opportunity for the use of cannabis in
medical research and treatment. Further complicating this, is establishing what level of
government should have authority in overseeing these new cannabis markets, and what
amount of autonomy subnational governments or municipalities have in establishing their
own policies. For this, policymakers have largely relied on a combination of policies
found in their country or jurisdictions’ concerning the regulation of alcohol and tobacco,
but unlike these two substances, cannabis has a long-standing illicit market and unique
challenges of its own. Furthermore, the constitutional political structure plays a role in
how regulatory authorities are established in the governance of recreational cannabis,
which in turn creates different avenues that the illicit market exploits, depending on the
specific structure. States that maintain their cannabis prohibition and states that have
legalized recreational cannabis have a vested interest in the strict regulation of
recreational cannabis in other legalizing nation-states, both in examining how each
regulatory model operates for future potential legalization or reform of current policies,
and to ensure recreational cannabis does not cross international borders. States that have
legal recreational cannabis markets wish to avoid having their markets spill over
international borders, and states that do not have legalized recreational cannabis wish to
avoid having legal cannabis spillover into their jurisdiction Balancing of these goals in
cannabis regulation has created a competition of priorities, particularly from the view of
the nation-state.
To meet the challenge of balancing goals, policymakers have established different
systems across the three case study countries. The different sets of regulatory policies
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established in each country allow for a natural comparative policy analysis to examine if
the cannabis policies enacted within a country are meeting their respective goals in
legalizing cannabis. To do this, this research analyzes how each country came to have
regulated recreational cannabis (pathway to legalization, and history with cannabis
prohibition) and the policies enacted in each country that encompass the regulation of
recreational cannabis (taxation, market regulation, and centralization of cannabis policy).
Next, this research will follow with an examination of the illicit market in each case
study, a synthesis of the public health questions that come with the legalization of
cannabis in each country, and the specter of achieving social equity in the regulation of
cannabis. Ultimately, this research asks: What constitutes successful recreational
cannabis regulatory policy at the national level? The conclusion of this research will
discuss how we should define success at the national level.
Background on Cases
The United States, a federal system of government, continues to enforce a
cannabis prohibition at the national level, but allows subnational governments to legalize
and regulate recreational cannabis, if this cannabis does not cross jurisdictional lines and
follows subnational laws established. Cannabis policy in the United States has diffused
from the “bottom-up” utilizing subnational governments as “laboratories of democracy”
(Hannah and Mallinson 2018). Early adoptions were enacted by ballot initiatives, but
state legislatures have increasingly moved to pass recreational cannabis laws in recent
years that are like the regulatory apparatuses established by ballot initiatives in other
states. The pressure to push through a national reform of cannabis policy will only
continue to grow as more states continue to legalize recreational cannabis, including
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more states with conservative representatives in the federal government (Mallinson,
Hannah, and Cunningham 2021).
The United States represents the most decentralized regulation of cannabis
markets of the three case studies, with the national government having little input in the
regulation of cannabis, in addition to cannabis markets being confined to legalizing
jurisdictions. It also represents the most “bottom-up” pathway to legalization of the case
studies, where citizens often defied their legislators to legalize cannabis followed by
legislatures beginning to legalize cannabis at the state level much later. The distribution
of cannabis has been privately cultivated, and privately distributed under strict regulation
of legalizing states. Most states have allowed for the presence of homegrown cultivation,
with their own set of laws regulating this method of distribution. The state-by-state
legalization effort has allowed for several regulatory similarities and differences, of
varying restrictiveness depending on the state. By in large, states have coalesced around
similar regulatory models based on other earlier legalizing states’ experiences with
cannabis implementation and regulation.
In Uruguay, a unitary state, cannabis policies have diffused from the “top-down”.
The regulation and legalization of recreational cannabis was passed and led by national
political figures, with the support of activists, but without the broad approval for
legalizing cannabis that is found in the United States or Canada. The regulation of
cannabis in Uruguay represents the most centralized and strict form of regulation.
Overseen by a national regulatory body, access to cannabis is restricted to user’s presence
on a national registry. Wholesale cultivation of cannabis is government owned and
operated, and cannabis products are limited to flower with government contracted
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growers expected to produce a set number of cannabis flower. There are limited number
of cannabis strains available, all of which fall under the THC potency threshold
established by the government. In addition to this, registered users can only utilize one
method of distribution established by the government at a time, this includes: pharmacyretail, homegrown cultivation, or cannabis social clubs (non-profit cannabis cooperatives,
users pay fees and are allotted a specific amount of cannabis per week). The latter two
methods of distribution are accessed by obtaining government approved cannabis seeds,
but all methods have the intended effect of allowing for 40g of cannabis a month (10g
weekly).
Canada, another federally governed country, was the second country to legalize
cannabis at the national level. This was achieved by a national political party including
cannabis legalization in its policy platform and then, at least in part, being elected on it
and legalizing cannabis. It represents both “bottom-up” influence (broad approval to
legalize cannabis) and “top-down” (political support by political elites). In addition to
this, the national government established non-compulsory guidelines for cannabis
regulation to its provinces, as well as allowing subnational governments autonomy in
certain aspects of legalization and regulation-based authorities worked out over the past
century dealing with alcohol. Commercial cultivation and production are permitted
anywhere in Canada, barring provincial, territorial, or municipal zoning restrictions,
under a federally obtained license which can then be sold to any public or private
provincial wholesale entity, this is a stark difference from the United States who only
permits state cultivators to sell within their own state. It is the intergovernmental
cooperation of implementing cannabis regulation that differentiates the Canadian system
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from that of Uruguay or the United States. Provinces and territories in Canada had the
option to adopt public, private, or a public-private hybrid in how they chose to distribute
cannabis. All but one Canadian province, Saskatchewan, maintains private wholesale
only, all other provinces and territories decided to adopt public wholesale distribution of
cannabis. Provinces and territories were also permitted to opt out of homegrown
cultivation laws, so as to not potentially run afoul of constitutional law. Canada is unique
in allowing the delivery of cannabis nationally. Further regulations surrounding the
distribution of cannabis are varied among the provinces. Canada represents the middleground of the three case studies in their pathway to legalization, and in their organization
of their regulation of cannabis.
Table 1: Background on Cases

Country:

Legalization

Cultivation

Cultivation

Wholesale

Retail

Retail

Homegrown

and

Model:

Licensing

Distribution:

Distribution:

Distribution

Cultivation

Licensing

Allowed:

Regulation:

Body:

Body:
The

Subnational

Private

Subnational

Private

Private

Subnational

Varies by

United

state, some

States

have
prohibited
the practice.

Uruguay

National

Private (on

National

Public

Publicly

state

licensed

property or

pharmacies,

not for

or not for

profit)

profit
cooperatives
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National

National

Canada

National and
Subnational

Private

National

Public or

Public or

Subnational

National,

Private, but

Private, or

Provinces

mostly

both.

can opt out.

Public.

Sources: Pardo 2020; Queirolo 2020a; Obradovic 2019; Fischer, Russell, and Boyd
2020; MPP 2020; Lancione et al. 2020; Shanahan and Cyrenne 2019.
Case Selection
The above section lays out the differences in the pathways to legalization, the
organization of recreational cannabis governance, and the different distribution models
found in each country. This research will utilize a qualitative “most different systems”
case study approach to determine what policy decisions were enacted, why they were
enacted, and what role the structure and political culture of the state has had in crafting
cannabis policy (Lancione et al. 2020; Obradovic 2019; Pardo 2014; Kilmer et al. 2013;
Felbab-Brown 2021). The decision to utilize a most different systems model was chosen
based on the differences found in the above three criteria. In short, the system being
analyzed is the structure of cannabis regulation from the point of view of the national
government, and what impact this has on the legalization and regulation of cannabis. In
other studies, the United States and Canada are often included in most similar systems
research due to a shared history, several similar political characteristics, and religious
demographics (Przeworski and Teune 1970). For this research, it is important to note that
Canada is an ethnofederal country, which raises different questions for cannabis
regulation than in that of the United States (an argument could be made that when
accounting for Mormons in Utah or the inclusion of Puerto Rico that the United States is
also an ethnofederal country) or Uruguay. This research instead focuses on the
differences in systemic cannabis governance between the two countries, in addition to the
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inclusion of the differences in Uruguay, which could not fall under the most similar
systems research design with the other two case studies. The inclusion of the United
States, who has not legalized recreational cannabis use on the national level and has
allowed for states to create their own cannabis legalization and regulatory frameworks
can only better serve to enhance this comparative analysis, particularly when analyzing
their position as the world enforcer of the international drug framework, and tier one
global superpower.
Research Methodology
This research identifies three areas of cannabis policy that can be analyzed for
similarities and differences between the three case studies. The research collected will
utilize primary and secondary sources, as well as public scholarship, public media,
academic articles, and books. The research analyzed will focus on a couple different
aspects of each case study. These are taxation (how recreational cannabis is taxed),
market regulation (wholesale distribution, distribution model, licensing, age of
consumption, possession limits, homegrown cultivation regulations, cannabis operation
regulation, purchasing regulations, advertising, and consumption regulations), and
centralization of cannabis policy (organization of cannabis regulatory authorities).
Additionally, this research analyzes the factors contributing to the origins of cannabis
regulation in each case study and analyzes the effect policies have had on public health,
social equity, and participation in the illicit cannabis market in each case study, a deeper
discussion over these aspects will be included in the conclusion of the paper.
The goal in these comparisons is framing what constitutes a successful national
cannabis regulatory policy, and how the goals laid out by countries’ policymakers may
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run into the inherent contradictions of their goals. The section covering the United States
will diverge from the other two case studies in two important ways. It will address the
discrepancies between laws at the national and subnational level and the subsequent
problems stemming from this, and it will analyze the consequences of an exclusively
subnational legalization effort and the implications this has for cannabis policymaking on
a national level.
The conclusion will address this research’s analysis of the question of “What
constitutes successful cannabis regulatory policy at the national level?”. In addition to
this, it will address how the focus of accomplishing certain goals in the regulation of
recreational cannabis impacts the success of other goals such as social equity, public
health, and the illicit market. Finally, this research will posit that the success of cannabis
policy at the national level may be country specific, or potentially even politically
specific.
Theory
The history of cannabis prohibition shows that cannabis policy is a national issue,
and one that does not respect political boundaries. This is an important factor when
considering the organization of cannabis regulation and its impacts on the goals
policymakers have laid out when justifying the legalization of cannabis. Each country has
a desire to produce policies that incapsulate all goals they are attempting to achieve when
legalizing and regulating cannabis, in general, these goals are similar across national
borders (concerns over public health, adequate market regulation and taxation, reducing
illicit market participation, and adequate decentralization of cannabis regulatory
authority), but take on different manifestations in each country legalization appears in
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due to the specific political context legalization occurs in. This context includes countries
with different political structures, international positions, different political climates, and
different histories concerning the prohibition of cannabis. This has created different
prerogatives of what can define success from which the balancing of competing goals has
taken shape. The comprehensive balancing of goals in the legalization and regulation of
cannabis has created different challenges in each case study when examining the question
of ‘success’ in cannabis policymaking. Lastly, this research posits that there may not be a
‘universal’ regulatory model that satisfies the prerogatives of all policymakers in every
country that has legalized and regulated cannabis, particularly when cannabis regulatory
models are compared internationally. Instead, success may be only defined based on the
specific conditions inside a country from which legalization has occurred.
Definitions
This research will contain a number of terms that are specific to cannabis policy.
Therefore, it is appropriate to define terms that may be unfamiliar or give specific
definitions on terms that have disputed definitions for this research. The terms “Nonmedical cannabis”, “recreational cannabis”, “adult-use cannabis” will be used
interchangeably. The term “cannabis market” will be used in the broadest application
possible. This is due to concerns that the term “market” doesn’t adequately capture
cannabis policies that don’t have the characteristics that are associated with markets.
Uruguay, for example, limits the amount of cannabis cultivators can produce, and limits
the amount of cannabis individuals can buy per week at a government set price point.
Other regulations in Uruguay dictate that excess cannabis grown via homegrown
cultivation or cooperatives must be sold back to the government.
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•

Recreational cannabis market: A state-approved cannabis legalization effort
that attempts to incorporate and regulate the cultivation, production, distribution,
possession, and consumption of cannabis for adults in a non-medical capacity into
the wider economy.

•

Medicinal Cannabis: A state-approved cannabis legalization effort that regulates
the cultivation, production, sale, possession, and consumption of cannabis for
persons with an unspecified number of medical conditions.

•

Prohibition of Cannabis: The outright ban of the cultivation, production,
distribution, possession or use of cannabis for recreational or medicinal use.

•

Criminalization of Cannabis: The outright ban of the cultivation, production,
distribution, possession or use of cannabis for recreational or medicinal use,
failure to comply results in jail time or fines.

•

Decriminalization of Cannabis: Cultivation may or may not result in criminal
fines (depending on government policies) distribution by sale is criminalized,
individual possession and use are allowed (or not criminally enforced) up to an
unspecified amount.

•

Grey market: Legal cannabis that is bought or sold on the unregulated market,
either across subnational borders, or outside the scope of the regulatory apparatus.

•

Seed to Sale Cannabis Regulation: The process of establishing a governmental
regulatory body to track the life cycle of the cannabis plant at government owned
or licensed cultivation, production, or dispensary facilities, this includes keeping
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track of the manufacturing, transport, and distribution of the whole of the
cannabis plant to maintain compliance.

Literature Review
Research covering the different aspects of cannabis policy in different countries
has begun to speed up as studies concerning the regulation of cannabis has now widely
been normalized and is an area of research that is necessitated as policymakers look for
the best cannabis regulation policies. This section represents a review over some of the
different avenues of that research. The amount of academic research published on
cannabis legalization frameworks is growing, particularly in a comparative manner, both
domestically and internationally, a trend that will continue as new countries join in on the
regulation of recreational cannabis. Kilmer et al. (2013) compared domestic cannabis
policies internationally and noted the changing heterogenous nature of cannabis policies
globally. They also compare how policies have been developed in different case study
countries, and how they fit into the international drug policy framework. Armstrong and
Seaborn (2021) highlights that cannabis policy comes with numerous trade-offs and
highlights the contradictions in U.S. state and federal law, including how the U.S. could
learn from the clarity of the Canadian model in a future national legalization scenario.
Brown (2021) points to how countries looking to potentially legalize recreational
cannabis have observed the impacts of previously legalizing countries, and how the
different political, economic, and social context in different countries may lead to policy
changes from existing models in future legalizing countries to better address their own
challenges. Pardo (2014) conducted a comparative analysis of the policy models of two
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U.S. states (Colorado and Washington) and Uruguay. The author concluded that
policymakers should emulate the strengths in different recreational cannabis policy
frameworks internationally and avoid the weaknesses in different cannabis policy
frameworks. The more cases with different regulatory models from which to draw
analysis from, the better the research in policy decision making covering the different
aspects of cannabis supply reform. The author also highlights that it is important to keep
in mind the different problems different policy models are trying to address, and how that
shapes the context in which cannabis markets mature. Shanahan and Cyrenne (2019)
compared the policies of the provincial governments in Canada and posited the question
of ‘how will we know which is best?’. The authors highlighted the importance of
establishing cost-benefit analyses of the impacts of specific policies and the need to
further quantify indicators that could provide valuable information to policymakers.
Lancione et al. (2020) compared the recreational cannabis regulatory approaches of legal
U.S. states and Canadian provinces, they found that subnational governments in both
countries are consistent in many respects to other subnational governments within their
country, with some variety on certain policies (homegrown cannabis for example). The
authors highlighted the existing harmony between the two countries concerning the goals
of cannabis policymaking in North America (ending the illicit market, preventing
adolescent use, and further public health concerns like drugged driving, overconsumption, and hospitalizations). Firth et al. (2020) compared two U.S. states, Oregon
and Washington, and their cannabis markets’ performance and maturation relative to their
different regulatory structures. The authors call for further research covering the
development of different policy models when being controlled for different policy
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decisions (tax rates, age, price, potency) and how these decisions impact public health.
As new comparative analyses are conducted in the future, both domestically and
internationally, policymakers and researchers alike will be able to narrow down the best
policy choices for individual countries and be better able to address what frameworks
will adequately balance and cover all the goals policymakers have laid out to their
populations.
Papers have also increasingly focused in on case study countries and highlighted
the complexity of the development of cannabis policies in individual countries. Pardo
(2020) discussed the uneven repeal of cannabis prohibition in the United States,
providing background on the historical context of cannabis prohibition in the U.S., the
different pathways to legalization in the U.S., their importance to legalization
frameworks, evolving public opinion, and a comparative analysis of regulations found in
U.S. States. Cox (2018) introduced the Canadian Cannabis Act, laying out the general
policy framework on cannabis in Canada, and comparing the potential advantages and
disadvantages of different types of supply models. Fischer, Russell, and Boyd (2020)
researched the history of cannabis prohibition in Canada, how medical cannabis laid the
groundwork for recreational cannabis, and what the different impacts of cannabis
legalization might be. The authors also provided a comparative analysis of the
heterogenous nature of cannabis regulation by Provincial and Territorial governments in
Canada. Queirolo (2020a) provided a comprehensive review of the pathway to
legalization in Uruguay, the regulatory system of cannabis supply reform, strengths and
weaknesses of the system, and lessons to be learned by the Uruguayan state. Cerdá and
Kilmer (2017) discussed the different options of cannabis supply reform and contends
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that Uruguay’s not for profit organization of cannabis policies is a serious viable
alternative, and one that should be considered. Hudak, Ramsey, and Walsh (2018)
provided background on the context of Uruguayan recreational cannabis legalization, the
goals in legalizing cannabis in Uruguay, and the appearance of a ‘grey market’ due to this
specific policy model. The authors pointed to a couple recommendations that could solve
persistent issues, and highlights that the changing international context could be more
favorable to the success of Uruguay legalization, including in banking due to the United
States abandoning its commitment to uphold current international drug law when it
comes to cannabis. Walsh and Ramsey (2016) provided a comprehensive review of the
Uruguayan recreational cannabis system, the pathway to legalization, the challenges
facing the system, and potential future policy solutions to these challenges. They find that
Uruguayan policymakers should remain flexible when it comes to key variables such as
market price, potency, and types of cannabis products. In addition to this, they
recommend that both regulatory officials and the broader population needs to be better
educated on the current cannabis policies of the country and find better policies that
discourage youth use while not discouraging adult consumers from registering with
government regulators. Cruz, Boldi, and Queirolo (2017) measured the changing support
for legalization and regulation in Uruguay four years after legalization, finding the
support was increasing for the Uruguay model of cannabis supply reform, but that most
people still do not support the law, but this is primarily due to the pharmacy retail
provision, homegrown cultivation maintains majority support. Case study research is a
highly valuable research tool when it comes to recreational cannabis policy research, it
allows policymakers to understand the complexities of each countries’ cannabis markets,
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consumer base, illicit and licit market comparisons, and the historical, social, political,
and economic conditions from which cannabis goals and policies can be based on.
Research has also addressed the international questions of the legalization of
recreational cannabis. Faubion (2013) analyzes the Uruguayan effort to legalize cannabis
and posits that the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs is outdated, and a new
international vehicle is needed to address the changing nature of drug policy. The author
notes that legalizing was a difficult, positive step forward in ending the War on Drugs in
a region that has been torn apart by drug conflict, and that this could be an influential
policy model in the future. The Transnational Institute (2021) described the impact of
Uruguay legalizing internationally, and how the country was subject to verbal conflict
with the International Narcotics Control Board, but ultimately ignored the body and went
ahead with legalization. Hammond et al. (2020) conducted a longitudinal international
cannabis policy survey across U.S. legal states, U.S. illegal states, and Canada. This
project was conducted to separate out secular changes in society and the impact of policy
positions in different places. The authors noted the difficult methodological nature of
gauging the impact of cannabis policies, due to a lack of data or underreporting of use
prior to legalization. They concluded noting that the history of tobacco control shows that
the process of legalization and its impacts on society are not one event but are decided by
how the legal market is regulated over time. Tinasti (2020) argues that the international
drug control regime needs reform in a time where countries are legislating polarized
policies on the ground. The author argues that for the international drug control regime to
be relevant again it must account for past harms and uneven impacts. Panicker (2015)
explored the conflict with international law and legalizing cannabis countries, ultimately
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arguing that countries must work together to reform the international drug control order
and establish best practices to limit harm and that new legalization movements should
focus on creating less expensive enforcement options and reduce illicit market profit.
Despite what policymakers may assert, recreational cannabis legalization is an
international issue, and its impacts are hardly ever contained to just legalizing states.
Cannabis prohibition has shown that cannabis markets have no borders and international
cooperation, and an updated international framework is needed to address changing
policies of the 21st century. In addition to this, it benefits states to learn from the
experiences of prior legalizing states to adopt best practices in an objectively new policy
field with its own set of unique challenges.
Recent research on the pathways to legalization have highlighted the role
these pathways have played in the establishment of recreational cannabis policies in
individual countries. Queirolo, Rossel, Álvarez, and Repetto (2018) describes how
recreational cannabis legalization in Uruguay was achieved by tying cannabis legalization
to a demand for public safety, and that the presence of pro-legalization political figures in
strategic positions led to accomplishing legalization. Hoffman (2020) weighed in on the
discussion of whether Uruguay’s pathway to legalization was a bottom-up or top-down
process. The author concludes that it was both and reducing it to either or would diminish
the complexity of how Uruguay came to legalize recreational cannabis. This analysis
over the complexity of the conditions that lead to legalization can be abstracted to other
countries as well, outside of use for academic research and debate, the top-down or
bottom-up dichotomy at times fails to adequately address the level of complexity it took
for specific countries to get to cannabis legalization and regulation. Wesley (2019)
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provided the pathway to legalization in Canada, as well as laying out the general
framework and the political context of the national legislation that legalized cannabis.
Rolles (2017) highlighted the differences between advocacy led development of cannabis
policy and legislative led development of cannabis policy. The author found notable
differences between the interventionist legislative led cannabis reform in Uruguay and
Canada, and the activist led cannabis reform of the United States’ states. Pathways to
legalization are important to understand because it locks in the basic framework from
which cannabis supply reform takes place and lays the foundation from which policy
goals are created and policy decisions are made. For example, in some states in the
United States, certain policy decisions were locked into the constitution of legalizing
states by ballot initiatives.
Other research has focused on cannabis as a commodity and cannabis policy
research more generally. Ours (2020) discussed some of the methodological challenges of
analyzing the impact of cannabis legalization and argues that legalization offers the
chance to further study the benefits of cannabis and all its potential uses and impacts.
Flynn (2021) highlights how future national cannabis legalization in the U.S. could drive
innovation. Rogeberg (2018) utilized a cost-benefit analysis on different cannabis policy
trade-offs and concluded that a regulated market is preferable to an illicit one. Middle
ground policies ensuring public health considering commercialization are preferable.
Warf (2014) overviewed cannabis’ history as a commodity, analyzing what political,
economic, and cultural context cannabis has existed in throughout time and across
geographies. Duke (2010) studied the history of prohibition in the United States and the
changing view of cannabis domestically and internationally. Research over the status of
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cannabis as a commodity highlight that the status of cannabis has changed over time in
different countries in relation to the historical, social, political, and economic conditions
of specific countries, as well as internationally.
Other analysts focus on the question of taxation in developing a legal recreational
cannabis market. Humphreys (2018) highlights how falling cannabis prices in the United
States has led to declining tax revenue in some states. Boesen (2020) compared U.S state
tax laws and discussed the different faults and successes of different ways of taxing
cannabis. The author found that states taxed cannabis on either price, weight, potency, or
a combination of the three. The author also found that high taxes may limit adoption by
minors and non-users, but that low taxes would allow easy conversion for consumers
from the illicit to the licit market. Taxation by price was vulnerable to price fluctuations,
taxation by weight could encourage the use of high-potency THC, and taxation by
potency could lead to difficult taxation implementation complications, raising costs on
both businesses and tax collectors. In addition to this, he found that changes in federal
law or the price of cannabis would have implications for state taxation frameworks and
could lead to significant over taxation. Finally, he recommended that excise taxes on the
use of cannabis should target negative externalities, raise sufficient revenue for
enforcement, and not to be used as a general revenue tool due to the limited taxation base.
Davis (2021) notes the innovative nature of New Jersey’s cannabis taxation plan that
keeps taxes low when prices are high, and taxes high when prices are low to address
preventing over-consumption and youth use through taxation, as well as providing a
stable revenue stream that isn’t subject to the revenue shocks that occur when cannabis
prices drop under the ad-valorem tax frameworks of other states. Boesen (2020a) notes
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that this development still relies on price as an indicator for taxation and argues that it
does not account for future federal developments, as well as pointing out again that
general fund revenue should not be a short-term concern for cannabis legalization
priorities. Irvine and Light (2020) explore the tax revenue consequences of cannabis
legalization and its effects on the alcohol and tobacco markets in Canada. They find that
cannabis taxes (excise and sales) should offset the losses from a decline in tax revenue
from alcohol and tobacco as people substitute cannabis for alcohol and tobacco. The
authors also found that new revenue will come through corporate and personal income
taxes, an area of taxation policy that is often not discussed. Hansen et al. (2020)
conducted an analysis of tax policy in Washington state and found that marijuana demand
is more sensitive to price than demand for specific cannabis potency products, and that a
potency tax would decrease the consumption of higher potency products but would not
produce the same high revenues as the current ad-valorem taxation system. The authors
also are skeptical that higher THC potency products represent more negative public
health externalities due to research being mixed on the subject. They also noted that THC
potency tests are liable to tax avoidance strategies, which could lead to companies
misrepresenting how much THC is in a product leading to a consumer unknowingly
ingesting too much or more than desired decreasing the chances of achieving a central
policy goal of legalization, consumers being well-informed over what they are consuming
and putting into their bodies. Studies over cannabis taxation policy will continue to be of
the utmost importance because taxation frameworks represent the most heterogenous of
cannabis policies domestically and internationally as well as best highlighting the
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inherent contradictions that occur when trying to balance the numerous policy goals in
cannabis supply reform.
Research on recreational cannabis policies and how states and subnational
governments regulate their markets are also increasingly common. Pardal et al. (2019)
described the main characteristics of Uruguayan Cannabis Social Clubs five years after
the introduction of a regulated market. The research found that it is indeed an efficient
cannabis supply channel, as well as being well regulated and without a profit incentive
involved. The authors describe positive indicators, as well as issues with cannabis social
clubs more broadly, which has been represented in Uruguay and have appeared in the
Spanish legalization context as well, this is primarily the tendency towards becoming
quasi-dispensaries. In addition to this, they describe other issues in the Uruguayan
context. Wesley and Murray (2021) analyzed the role of public institutions in the
distribution of cannabis, and how they should market recreational cannabis when their
primary function is ensuring public health, as well as providing a commodity that must
compete with an entrenched illicit market. Armstrong (2021) analyzed the first year of
recreational cannabis in Canada and approximated that one third of the cannabis
consumption in Canada was from licit sources. The author notes that supply issues could
have played a substantial role in maintaining the illicit market’s grip on cannabis demand,
and that Canada has a long way to achieving success, but it is certainly achievable. The
study also notes that different provinces and territories did better at competing with the
illicit market than others for different reasons, with some provinces like Alberta having
high retail density compared to the population, and Quebec having less retail stores, but
lower prices. The author concludes that legalization is a long-term project, and with the
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right policy ‘ingredients’ the licit market can dominate the illicit market, and legalizing
jurisdictions should continue to compare legalizing jurisdictions different policies. Rup,
Goodman, and Hammond (2020) analyzed the role of advertising in the licit and illicit
markets of Canada and the United States. The authors concluded that exposure is highest
in licit markets and stated the need for an ongoing examination of the role of cannabis
advertising and its impact in different jurisdictions. Market regulation policies will
continue to play a central role in all countries who legalize recreational cannabis, finding
the right cannabis policies are essential to defeating the illicit market, as well as ensuring
equitable economic growth, all while at the same time best preserving public health for
the broader population.
Other research has focused on the question of cannabis policy as it exists within
federalism, and what role this plays in policy diffusion. Wesley and Salomons (2019)
found that time and resource constraints were critical in understanding the recreational
cannabis policies at the provincial and territorial level in Canada. A lack of time to
adequately engage in policy innovation caused provincial authorities to rely heavily on
existing alcohol and tobacco regulatory and distributional systems. Mallinson and
Hannah (2018) demonstrated how U.S. states adopting medical marijuana laws have
engaged in ‘defiant innovation’ in legislating a practice that is explicitly prohibited by the
federal government. In doing so, states willing to undergo this process learned from each
other’s policies when crafting medical marijuana policies (Hannah and Mallinson 2020),
which ultimately laid the policy frameworks for future recreational legalization. Train
and Snow (2019) discussed the diffusion of policy among provinces (Ontario and New
Brunswick) in Canada and found that three mechanisms led to policy similarities in the
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provinces: federal coercion over goals, instruments, and precise settings that limited
policy innovation. This includes learning from the failures of Colorado and Washington,
and cannabis policies being shaped by existing tobacco and alcohol legislation and
regulations, both constituted learning in different forms. The authors conclude that
although cannabis legalization was presented as a collaborative intergovernmental effort,
the federal government was the real driving force, which has certainly not been the case
in the United States. Crosby (2019) explored the jurisdictional disputes in Canada over
assertions of sovereignty by the Federal government over the regulation of cannabis in
Indigenous territories, and how Indigenous communities were not included in the creation
of cannabis policy frameworks. Mallinson, Hannah, and Cunningham (2020) highlighted
the contradictions between national and state laws in the United States, and what
difficulties this has produced in implementing a state-led cannabis policy. Research
conducted on recreational cannabis policies in federal systems of governance add an
additional layer of complexity to policy decisions in comparison to a unitary system of
governance. In part, this research attempts to highlight that added complexity by
comparing two federal systems with different cannabis organization frameworks as well
as a unitary system, and to further address how the centralization of authority (or lack
thereof) and questions of sovereignty over cannabis regulation has complicated creating a
comprehensive cannabis framework.
The legalization and regulation of cannabis also comes with numerous questions
of how to answer the question of social equity. Snapp and Valderrábano (2021) discusses
the possibility of achieving a social justice framework upon legalization in the United
States, Uruguay, and Canada. It also highlights how history has shaped the conditions
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from which legalization has occurred, and how these countries have walked the line of
remaining compliant with the international drug control framework and legalizing
recreational cannabis. Clara (2018) described the ‘nuts and bolts’ of cannabis policy
reform in Uruguay, the international and moral context this innovation occurred in, how
cannabis policy is framed by political leaders, and identifies the need for alternative
cannabis supply reform models like Uruguay that contrasts other policy models. Austen
(2021) argues that legalization of cannabis in Canada has largely led to more equitable
outcomes for a diverse citizenry. But Canada struggles with eliminating unlicensed shops
or the sale of illicit cannabis, as well as a lack of expungement of past cannabis
convictions, and the inclusion of Indigenous authorities in the regulatory process being a
continued work in progress. Hudak (2020) highlighted the need for social equity and
social justice in reforming and regulating cannabis in the U.S., and how the United
States’ racist history with the enforcement of cannabis prohibition, and the War on Drugs
more broadly necessitates this. The author also provides the historical and statistical basis
for determining that prohibition was enforced unevenly. The analysis also provides some
policy solutions to achieve social equity and social justice for past harms in postlegalization (automatic expungement, reinvestment in communities harmed by the War
on Drugs, better access to business licensing to harmed communities, and help in
remaining competitive in the recreational cannabis market). Jelsma et al. (2019)
highlights the long-running tensions between drug control and development, particularly
in the global South, and how future regulation internationally will determine whether the
licit cannabis market remains a niche market, or one that benefits the world more broadly.
It also discusses the need for domestic regulation to consider the need for global North-
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South cooperation, environmental sustainability, public health, social justice, security,
and economic development. The question of what social equity in cannabis is differs
country by country, in the United States and Canada, an uneven enforcement of drug
prohibition has primarily been the product of racial and class disparities in the criminal
justice system. Due to the severe degree of harm inflicted on citizens, particularly racial
minorities in both countries, social equity should be a paramount priority for
policymakers in both countries. On the contrary, Uruguay had a much less militant stance
to cannabis use, but this does not discount the fact that some citizens fell through the
cracks and were adversely impacted by the War on Drugs, particularly those of lower
class standing. Every country who has engaged in the War on Drugs has a duty to rectify
the harms committed throughout cannabis prohibition, as this research shows, some more
than others. Additionally, it is important to not neglect that the economic benefits of
cannabis legalization thus far have primarily been dominated by the elite classes of the
United States and Canada. States that wish to engage in a profit centered, commercial
model of cannabis supply reform should ensure that the economic benefits of cannabis
legalization not only benefit those that once advocated for cannabis prohibition and now
hold cannabis licenses, and instead should benefit the working-class in equal proportion
to license holders, particularly because it was the working class that disproportionally
was harmed during cannabis prohibition.
Studies have also been conducted on the illicit market and how it impacts the
development of a regulated recreational cannabis market. Detrano (2021) described the
persistent issues in eliminating the illicit market, and the burden on law enforcement in
implementing regulated cannabis enforcement in the U.S. States. (Walsh 2020)
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highlighted the incorrect assumptions (consumers would prefer legal cannabis over illicit
cannabis, and that entrepreneurs would rush into the market and crowd out illicit
competitors) made by legalization advocates and how the decentralization of cannabis
policy, and over regulation of recreational cannabis in the U.S. has perpetuated the
continued existence of the illicit market. Wadsworth and Hammond (2020) found that
15% of U.S. cannabis users nationally purchased cannabis ‘out of state’ on average, and
that this practice is more prevalent in states that recreational cannabis is illegal. U.S.
cannabis users in states with a longer history of legal recreational cannabis status were
less likely to purchase ‘out of state’ cannabis than their peers in states that do not have
legal recreational cannabis. Mahamad and Hammond (2019) studied the illicit market in
Canada the year before legalization, highlighting the need to keep data on price
discrepancies between the licit and illicit market, and adjusting taxation rates
accordingly. Monitoring the illicit market will continue to be an essential part of
measuring how successful a cannabis policy framework is well into the future. Thus far,
all legalizing states have stated that this is a primary goal of legalization and
policymakers should continue to look to academic research on best practices in other
countries to inform and guide their own policies. To a certain degree, it may be
impossible to eliminate the illicit market in the short-term, but policy decisions will
continue to be important part of decreasing participation as much as possible for the time
being.
Some researchers have focused specifically on the impact of cannabis legalization
on public health. Fischer (2017) stated that effective regulation of cannabis supply and
distribution is the pivotal determinant of success in public health outcomes, and balanced
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policies between availability and restrictions are key to preferrable outcomes. Fischer et
al. (2020) looked at the initial public health impacts of cannabis legalization in Canada.
The authors found that there has been an increase in the use of edibles or vaping since
legalization and that use of cannabis is still primarily located among young adults. The
authors concluded that it may be too early to conclude the public health impact of
legalization and that current indicators are mixed on their results. They noted that the
illicit market remains resilient, and that Canada has shifted from a ‘public health’ first
model to a more commercialized one, contradicting the initial goals laid out by the
Canadian government. They also suggest that money from the tax revenue collected on
recreational cannabis should at least in-part be put towards a more rigorous evaluation of
the impacts of cannabis legalization, including on illicit market participation, and how the
heterogenous nature of provincial and territorial cannabis regulation in Canada impacts
outcomes. Hall and Lynskey (2020) described Canada, Uruguay, and states in the United
States as a large-scale policy experiment, whose effects may not be known for a decade
or more. As well as noting the impacts of recreational cannabis legalization in the U.S.
(an increase in the regular number of cannabis users, an increase in cannabis related
hospitalizations in both children and adults for either mental or physical health, and that
the link between cannabis legalization and motor vehicle crashes are inconsistent. This
analysis included an examination on how legalization has decreased prices, and raised
potency, and how this may be remedied (minimum prices, tighter regulation of youth
access, consumer warnings about daily cannabis use, and potency caps. The pair argues
that it may be too early to conclusively study impacts, but that initial monitoring of public
health outcomes is still important.
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Other research has focused more on the technical analysis of specific public
health indicators. Rehm and Manthey (2020) identifies prevalence and patterns of
cannabis use as being potentially linked to health and social problems. The pair disagrees
that treatment demand is a good indicator for analyzing the public health outcomes for
cannabis legalization, and that it is not too early to analyze the public health outcomes of
cannabis legalization. The authors highlight the methodological challenges to analyzing
public health outcomes, due to the difficult nature of identifying a casual variable. They
also note that legalization with ‘strict control’ is slowly being conquered by a loosening
of regulations due to market forces, and that public health experts can only take note of
public health impacts. Their article also highlights the differences in obtaining cannabis
from the licit market and illicit market, and how this leads to consumers choosing the
latter. Lensch et al. (2020) found that risky driving and riding behaviors were higher in
legal states, but so were protective attitudes. Their article highlights the need for a
broader public health education awareness campaign, and more targeted campaigning of
cannabis users to ensure consumers refrain from using cannabis while driving. Lanquer
(2020) found that legalization in Uruguay did not correspond with an increase in selfreported use, but that adolescents did perceive it as easier to obtain, a result similar to
results researchers in other legalizing countries have found. Measuring and identifying
public health indicators and the impact of legalization may be the most complicated area
of cannabis policy due to significant methodological constraints, there are no shortage of
academic debates over best policy practices or which indicators provide the most insight
into outcomes. Despite this, it will be important that research into these areas continue to
find the best policy practices that lead to the most preferrable outcomes. Unfortunately,
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this may be not known for at least a decade or more, particularly because markets have
not developed to their full potential nor have the broader populations or policymakers of
legalizing states adequately been normalized to what existing in a society with legalized
recreational cannabis. Tough debates over the merits of different trade-offs of cannabis
policy will continue well into the future and are certainly needed.
Foundations of Research
The influence of three research papers, at least in part, generated the thesis
question of “what constitutes national success in cannabis regulatory policy?” and led to
the framework presented in this paper from which researchers can analyze the
contradictions of cannabis policy. This research contends that cannabis policy is a
national issue and one that consists of a competition of goals, and the broad lens
assessment of what constitutes successful national cannabis policy may be country or
politically specific. This theory on cannabis policy relies on four assumptions: cannabis
prices will continue to fall in the future, different cannabis regulatory organization and
frameworks will produce different outcomes, the goals of countries legalizing and
regulating recreational cannabis are largely similar, and that the goals policymakers have
in regulating cannabis markets could be or are contradictory and could impact the success
of other policy goals.
First, Queirolo (2020) highlighted how different policy models in the United
States, Uruguay, and Canada have shaped the public health outcomes differently, and the
need for specific indicators internationally to measure the impacts of legalization.
Particularly highlighting that the lack of access to edibles or concentrates in Uruguay
have correlated with much lower cannabis hospitalization rates. The author also describes
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how the goals of cannabis legalization can be contradictory, and how different policy
models may limit or increase the chances of achieving different goals. Second, Obradovic
(2019) compared Washington, Colorado, and Uruguay and discussed the challenges of
‘building the plane in the air’ when developing cannabis policy, noting that initial
cannabis regulatory models have been established as ‘de facto’ models for other
countries. The author notes that Canada’s established regulations seem to be the halfway
point between Uruguay’s policy model and the U.S. states. The author also contends that
the diversity of models that have appeared across borders are only one step in the ongoing legalization process, and that models will continue to evolve in the future. Third,
Kilmer (2019) highlighted the ’14’ Ps of cannabis policy, and how different countries
have crafted different policies in these areas (Production, Profit motive, Power to
regulate, Prevention and treatment, Promotion, Policing and enforcement, Penalties, Prior
criminal records, Potency, Product Types, Purity, Price, Preferences for licenses,
Permanency. The author describes how regulatory choices in the ’14 Ps’ may impact
health, safety, and social equity outcomes. How states go about decisions in these areas
will largely determine the success of the cannabis policy framework in individual
countries.
This research combines elements of all three of these research papers by
comparing three countries with cannabis regulation from seed-to-sale to explore different
organization and policy choices and how these choices impact their policy goals in
legalization. To do this, this paper provides an analysis of the history of prohibition, the
pathway to legalization, taxation, market regulation, and centralization of cannabis
policy. It concludes with a discussion of illicit market competition, public health, and
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social equity, and what context these take shape in each country. This research serves not
to make conclusive examinations of outcomes, although it does broach this topic in
numerous, but to broaden the discussion of what successful cannabis policy can be
describes as, and how other countries may learn from the choices of prior legalizing
countries. In addition to this, the most different system design allows policymakers to
observe how cannabis legalization has taken shape in different systems of governance, as
well as different historical, social, political, and economic conditions. In a way, this
research serves as an a la carte of policy choices and how these policy choices can at
times contradict different policy goals of legalization.
Cannabis as a Commodity
In many ways, cannabis supply reform is unique in the sphere of public policy,
even when compared to alcohol or tobacco. This can be understood a number of different
ways. First, cannabis takes little technical skills to grow quality cannabis, and can be
grown nearly everywhere on the planet. Second, there are no policy precedents for how a
recreational cannabis regulatory apparatus should be crafted, and what consequences this
might have for the overall success of domestic cannabis regulatory policies at the
international level. Third, countries have pushed forward in their regulation of nonmedicinal cannabis despite international law explicitly dictating that they do not do so.
Fourth, the legalization of recreational cannabis is a polarizing political issue, eliciting
passionate defense of people of varying political stripes both in the debate on whether to
legalize recreational cannabis, and how to go about regulation post-legalization. Fifth,
legalizing and crafting regulatory recreational cannabis policies takes input and concerns
from a broad variety of interested parties: elites, the broader public, law enforcement,
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subnational governments, local governments, departments of health, activists, and
consumers. The sheer number of interested parties, all of which have a different hierarchy
of concerns and priorities that they wish to see realized in the regulation of recreational
cannabis. Sixth, recreational cannabis must contend with an entrenched illicit market for
cannabis, a market that has developed and refined itself over the past century, displacing
it will take considerable effort and creative, as well as innovative policy approaches.
After legalization, a subnational government or country must devise regulatory
policies that are concerned with ways to grow, process, test, and sell cannabis. At all of
these stages, there is considerable negotiation about what role the national, subnational,
and local governments should play in taxation, market regulation, oversight, and
licensing. To compound this, each country has a number of policy options of which they
can use to make cannabis supply available. These are: privation commercial enterprises,
non-profit commercial enterprises, non-profit cooperatives, homegrown cultivation, and
state-owned and operated enterprises.
In the United States, these issues have been negotiated and crafted by interest
groups, activists, and supportive subnational policymakers, with little input from the
central government, and broad political support. In Uruguay, these issues have been
primarily negotiated and crafted by political elites, with some activist input, and little
public support. In Canada, it has been a synthesis of the former two countries’
experiences. Political elites added cannabis to their policy platform and then were at least
in part, elected on it. In addition to this, the central government set the agenda by
establishing the Task Force on Cannabis Legalization and the date of legalization in all of
Canada and cooperating with provincial and territorial officials to establish the regulatory
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apparatus across Canada. Broad political support, activists, political elites, medical
professionals, business interests, subnational governments, all had input in hammering
out the framework of what would become the national Canadian cannabis policy
framework.
The Changing International Context of Cannabis Regulation
Policymakers at the national level are no longer constrained to a narrow set of
policy choices regarding cannabis. Attitudes surrounding the policies that govern the
cultivation, production, distribution, sale, possession, and use of cannabis in the 21st
century have shifted in a stark way from the previous century. After nearly a century of
global demonization, criminalization, and prohibition, recreational cannabis uses and its
acceptance as a legal commodity are both trending upward in a number of different
countries with different political systems and cultures. Globally, it is estimated that nearly
200 million people worldwide now use cannabis (UNODC 2019) Cautiously, countries
have begun the process of establishing regulated recreational cannabis markets in an
attempt to incorporate them into the general economy in a way similar to other drugs like
tobacco or alcohol. Since the legalization of recreational cannabis in Washington and
Colorado, sub-national states and territories in the United States have continued their
expansion of recreational cannabis markets, despite federal inaction and subsequent
continued contradictions with cannabis policies at the national level. Uruguay became
the first country globally to legalize and regulate recreational non-medical cannabis from
“seed to sale” at the national level in 2013. In 2018, Canada became the second country
to legalize and regulate the production and consumption of recreational cannabis on the
national level from “seed to sale”. Each of these countries has had a different political
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and cultural history involving cannabis and the policies associated with it. Despite this,
policymakers from each country have determined that it would be advantageous to the
state, in one way or another, to create a regulated recreational cannabis market from
“seed to sale”, albeit in radically different ways.
Figure 1: Examples of options that policymakers have in dealing with the supply of
cannabis (Chart adapted from Caulkins et al. 2015)

Questioning the prohibition of cannabis is no longer taboo for policymakers, and
policymakers have begun subsequent debates over which policies would most
appropriately fit their country. This includes deciding what supply model best fits their
country’s needs. This trend will continue in the future as more countries adopt a myriad
of new cannabis policies and the acceptance of cannabis (presumably) continues to rise.
In the past decade alone, global marijuana use rose by 60% (UNODC 2019). What
cannabis policies countries decide to adopt, for what reason they have decided to adopt
particular cannabis policies, and the outcome of said policies will continue to be pertinent
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policy questions stretching into the future as other countries look to further liberalize
their own cannabis policies. This is particularly true for countries located in the
Americas, Europe, and Oceanian countries, where the acceptance and use of cannabis are
the highest (UNODC 2019). Dozens of countries have legalized medical cannabis, and or
cannabis-derived pharmaceuticals, and some have engaged in the international trade of
medical cannabis. Dozens more have decriminalized the individual possession and use of
cannabis. Countries like the United States (at the subnational level), Canada, and
Uruguay have legalized recreational cannabis markets and have adopted regulatory
programs that regulate cannabis from “seed to sale”, the first three countries to do so.
This has been a clear shift from past countries attempt to engage in cannabis supply
reform, like the Dutch “coffee-shop” model or Spain’s “cannabis social clubs”. All three
countries are openly violating international drug law, opening themselves up to
international condemnation and potential economic sanctions (Tinasti 2020; Panicker
2015; Kilmer, et al. 2013). Many countries around the world still have a no-tolerance
cannabis prohibition and criminalization policy, with fines and lengthy sentences for the
cultivation, distribution, possession and use of cannabis. Despite this being the case, the
debate is trending more towards what cannabis policies to adopt on the national level and
not if the possibility of some form of legalization is an option.
Attitudes and policy options concerning the regulation of cannabis have come a
long way since the days of cannabis prohibition in the 20th century. In the previous
century, prohibition and criminalization of cannabis were the status quo globally. These
policies were enshrined into international law through three treaties: The Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances
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(1971), and the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (1988) (Tinasti 2020; Panicker 2015). The vast majority of countries globally
are party to these treaties. The domestic policies that culminated from these three
respective treaties have broadly become known as the “war on drugs” which was pursued
to a varying degree in individual countries, and often at the behest of the United States.
As countries have begun their liberalization of cannabis policy, it has created the room
necessary for policymakers in other nations to consider their own laws and what policies
would best suit their nation. Most notably, this includes the global hegemon, world’s
largest economy, and global spearhead in the War on Drugs, the United States. The once
staunch proponent of the War on Drugs now finds itself in violation of international laws
it once propagated.
The international tide on the regulation of cannabis is continuing its march
towards change. In 2020 alone, citizens approved four more U.S state ballot initiatives
legalizing recreational cannabis and bringing the total number to 19 U.S States, the
District of Columbia, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam (Cooper and Thompson
2020). Four in ten Americans now live in a state with legal access to recreational
cannabis (Cooper and Thompson 2020; Lopez 2021). The United States House of
Representatives voted and approved the decriminalization of cannabis at the national
level, and although Republicans did not ultimately take up the cannabis legalization bill
passed by the House of Representatives while in the majority, momentum for national
legalization continues to grow in the Senate (Edmondson 2020; Angell 2021a). As
Democrats have now gained control of all levers of power at the national level, industry
advocates certainly hope that Democrats may be more sympathetic to urgent calls for
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legalization (Demko and Fertig 2021). Mexico is on track to become the largest regulated
recreational cannabis market in the world and the third country to legalize recreational
cannabis at the national level (Flannery 2020; Linthicum 2020). The legislation is still
being written and debated, but the Supreme Court of Mexico has ensured that legalization
will occur by ruling prohibition of cannabis unconstitutional and instructing the
legislature to pass subsequent bills legalizing the use and production of cannabis
(Flannery 2020). Colombia’s legislature is considering multiple initiatives to legalize the
production and consumption of recreational cannabis and the establishment of a formal
marketplace (Delgado 2020). Citizens of New Zealand narrowly shot down a referendum
to legalize recreational cannabis at the national level, failing by only 67,662 votes out of
2,415,547 votes cast (MBD 2020). Luxembourg and Israel are also reportedly weighing
the legalization and regulation of recreational cannabis (Pascual 2020a; Sullum 2021)
The impact of these movements has begun to spill over into international institutions. The
United Nation’s Commission for Narcotic Drugs recently voted in favor of reclassifying
medicinal cannabis as a less dangerous drug, paving the way for further cannabis research
(Kwai 2020).
The changing international views over the merits of the prohibition of cannabis is
revolutionary in its scope and has the potential to fundamentally alter the way countries
approach illicit substances. Comparing the initial countries that have went forward with
legalization, and how they have went about crafting regulatory policies have the potential
to shape the debate around cannabis supply reform for many years to come. Recreational
cannabis regulatory policy is indeed an area of public policy that necessitates further
research, and this research looks to add to that body of work.
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II. CASE STUDY – THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
After a century of public demonization, the public perception of cannabis as a
legal commodity and its use recreationally have shifted in a remarkable way in the United
States of America. Having once led the global War on Drugs, the United States of
America now finds itself with the largest non-medicinal regulated cannabis market on the
planet, albeit 22 legally separate, disconnected domestic markets. This includes 19 U.S
States, the District of Columbia, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam, which in total
represents approximately 4 in every 10 Americans (World Population Review 2021). It is
estimated that there are around 43 million average regular consumers in the United
States, with a potential market value of $30 billion in 2023 (Booker 2020; Bieber 2021).
Current estimates of the size of the American recreational cannabis market are estimated
at $17.5 billion but estimates of the approximate size of the licit and illicit market
combined reach nearly $100 billion (Yakowicz 2021). First, this chapter will discuss the
history of cannabis prohibition inside the United States, the pathways to recreational
cannabis legalization at the subnational level Second, this chapter will analyze the
recreational cannabis policies of the United States in three categories: taxation, market
regulation, and centralization of cannabis policy. Next, this chapter will discuss the state
of the illicit market in the United States. Lastly, this chapter will discuss the
complications that have arisen from the differences in cannabis policy at the national and
subnational level.
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Background of Case Study
The development of non-medicinal cannabis markets at the subnational level has
originated and been refined at the state level with little involvement of the national
government in creating, regulating, and managing these new markets. Consequently, this
has relegated cannabis policy in the United States to a system of “federal forbearance”
(Mallinson, Hannah, and Cunningham 2020). Federal forbearance can be defined as the
federal government maintaining its prohibition on cannabis nationally but having decided
against enforcing the federal law on subnational governments’ cannabis markets, with no
clear written law at the national level, the federal government still maintains the ability to
shut down the whole of the cannabis markets throughout the United States at any time.
This puts states, as well as state compliant cannabis industries in perpetual legal limbo.
This has placed the national government in the position of primarily ensuring statecompliant cannabis businesses remain state-compliant, as well as ensuring no spillover of
recreational cannabis occurs in jurisdictions that have not legalized recreational cannabis.
Due to this development, the federal government has largely played a reactive, rather
than a proactive role in the choice of policies from which cannabis supply reform has
been enacted at the subnational level.
Thus, innovation of cannabis policy has been led by the states, which until
recently, was to the chagrin of state legislators. Supportive policymakers, interest groups
(National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), Marijuana Policy
Project (MPP), medical cannabis enterprises) and recreational cannabis industry
advocates have been the primary force in policy innovation in the U.S states that have
legalized non-medicinal cannabis, often with calls to “regulate cannabis like alcohol”.
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This was accomplished by organizing state populations to petition the government for a
ballot initiative that citizens to vote directly on, bypassing state legislatures. This uneven
development of cannabis regulatory models led to a variety of different regulatory
frameworks, with some consensus on a number of cannabis regulatory policies (minimum
age on consumption, private distribution of cannabis, possession limits of roughly an
ounce, etc.). The movement to legalization has been driven by changing cultural values in
the broader public (concerns over the racialized policing of cannabis, and normalization
of cannabis more broadly), a desire to increase the public health outcomes of cannabis
users (and drug users more broadly), curbing adolescent use, displacing the illicit market,
a desire to utilize cannabis as an economic tool for growth, and tax revenue for local,
subnational, and national governments.
The broader conceptual goals that shaped policy decisions in creating a regulated
non-medicinal cannabis market are important factors in understanding how policymakers
reached certain regulation decisions and what can be deemed “successful” cannabis
regulatory policy. Cannabis regulation, like other policy areas, consists of several policy
trade-offs that contain conflicting values in what should be prioritized when engaging in
cannabis supply reform (Rogeberg 2018).
Cannabis by Popular Democracy
The “bottom-up” approach to cannabis legalization in the United States is
consistent with the idea that subnational units inside the United States are “laboratories of
democracy” (Hannah and Mallinson 2018), and that state policymakers will enact the
policies most effective in regulating cannabis and most in line with their constituent’s
views, experiment with new regulatory policies, and learning from other state regulatory

41

approaches’ mistakes. Until recently, subnational legislatures have fought against
recreational cannabis legalization, which allowed ballot initiatives to take the role of
creating policy, rather than policymakers themselves. In some cases, state legislatures
have attempted to preempt less restrictive ballot initiatives with more restrictive
regulatory approaches (Mallinson, Hannah, and Cunningham 2020a). Due to different
state constitutional structures, the ballot initiative method of legalization was only
possible in certain states.
There is no reason to believe that future national cannabis reform will deviate in
any significant way from the existing development of the retail model in the states, as of
now only Washington D.C. and Guam have opted for cannabis legalization that is not
based on the retail model of cannabis supply, but plan to open dispensaries in the future.
In fact, some cannabis policies have been enshrined into the constitution, making it more
difficult for legislators to change later on. At first, state legalization served as a “pressure
valve” (off-loading pressure to legalize recreational cannabis nationally) to the legal nonmedicinal cannabis movement, but as more states continue to liberalize their cannabis
laws, it has only served to increase the pressure on the national government to act on
legalization questions (Mallinson, Hannah, and Cunningham 2021). The prospect of
national decriminalization and legalization stokes questions of what this future system of
cannabis regulation might be shaped by at the national level, what regulatory power
would be delegated to existing state authorities, and what factors might influence these
decisions.
The development of a non-medicinal regulated cannabis market in the United
States must also be analyzed from the “bottom-up” to understand the broader conceptual
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goals of cannabis supply reform in the United States, and the areas of cannabis policy
subnational policymakers have reached consensus on. This can be observed by recent
state level legalizations enacted through their legislatures, which have broadly followed
the regulatory examples that have legalized recreational cannabis before them (Pedini
2021). Consensus across states on cannabis regulation will serve as the basis for future
national legalization, constituting a form of “bottom-up” learning (Mallinson and Hannah
2020), in the same way the diffusion of tobacco polices in the United States occurred
(Shipan and Volden 2006).
The History of Cannabis Prohibition in The United States of America
Around the world, cannabis has long been subject to the politics of moral
regulation and associated with societal degradation (Warf 2014). The case is no different
in the United States, cannabis use and drug use overall in the United States has long been
the subject of moral panic, since as early as the beginning of the 20th century. In the early
1900s, Protestant missionaries lumped cannabis into its war on a wide variety of
substances, which reached its height in the 1920s with the prohibition of alcohol (Duke
2010). Mexican immigrants fleeing the violence of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1911)
are thought to have been the first to have introduced the burning of cannabis leaf for
consumption to the United States, and these immigrants were also the first to experience
thinly veiled racist attacks for its use (Warf 2014). This began cannabis’ long history of
racist association with marginalized minority communities in the United States,
particularly Mexican Americans and African Americans. The demonization of cannabis
in turn furthered the demonization of these communities. Millions of arrests for cannabis
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possession have been detrimental to the economic and social well-being of these
communities, a trend that persists to this day (Earlenbaugh 2020; ACLU 2020).
After the prohibition of alcohol was lifted in 1933, the federal government soon
turned its attention to cannabis use. Upon the creation of the Bureau of Narcotics in 1930,
Bureau chief, Harry Anslinger began a campaign of demonization of cannabis, often
describing it as worse than heroin or cocaine (Duke 2010; Warf 2014). For the next three
decades, Anslinger became the central figure of cannabis prohibition, successfully tying
cannabis demonization to a variety of groups he and others perceived as threatening the
United States. First, he associated its use with Mexican immigrants, and then African
American jazz musicians, then to the Japanese during WW2, and finally to the
Communists (Warf 2014). Anslinger was particularly interested in going after African
American jazz musicians, which he pursued through racist messaging and outright
propaganda of the harms of cannabis (Schlosser 2003). Despite prohibition of cannabis
occurring at the local and state level in the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, federal prohibition
of cannabis first occurred in 1937 with the passing of the Marihuana Tax Act (Weed
Maps 2021). Outside of the moral prohibitionists, prohibition of cannabis was also
strongly supported by cotton growers, who feared the competition hemp provided
(Bonnie and Whitebread 1970; Galliher and Walker 1977).
During World War 2, the United States military utilized nearly 400,000 acres for
hemp production to assist in the war effort, despite this, cannabis remained prohibited for
commercial use. In the 1950’s, cannabis use began to be associated with a burgeoning
countercultural movement, artists and writers of the “Beat Generation” outside of the
traditional communities whom cannabis had previously been associated with began to
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experiment with cannabis, as well as other psychoactive substances. This led to the
passing of the 1951 Boggs Act, which dictated that cannabis possession sentences would
align with heroin possession sentences (Duke 2010; Schlosser 2003) In the 1960’s,
cannabis use expanded to include more affluent white suburban users, and became
negatively associated with anti-war protestors, hippies, and urban African-American
populations.
In the 1970s, the cultural tides began to change in the United States. A backlash to
these movements began to form and led to the Nixon administrations “War on Drugs”.
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), passed in 1971, established federal United States
drug policies, placing cannabis in its top tier of most dangerous substances. Substances
are placed in the tightly restricted top tier if there is no currently accepted medical value,
which ironically still includes cannabis to this day. The early 1970s saw a sustained
period of growth in the incarceration rates, as well as the beginning of growth in the rate
of drug arrests (National Research Council 2014). The drug policies passed by the Nixon
administration were described by one former Nixon aide as explicitly designed to go after
his enemies the “antiwar left and black people” (Lockie 2019). After the passing of the
CSA, incarceration rates soon exploded, unsurprisingly, this burden disproportionately
fell on minority communities (National Research Council 2014). As the federal
government moved towards harsh drug control laws in the 1970s, the beginning of the
first wave of subnational governments moving towards decriminalization of cannabis ran
concurrently.
In conjunction to this, the 1970s also saw the rise of the conservative parent’s
movement, who lobbied for stricter regulation of cannabis and prevention of drug use by
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teenagers, and often touted the “gateway theory of drug abuse” which explained cannabis
use would ultimately end up leading to use of harder drugs like crack or heroin. With
allies like the DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) and NIDA (National Institute on Drug
Abuse), these groups became powerful in their own right, essentially laying the
groundwork for Nancy Reagans “Just say no” campaign and the Reagan administration’s
1980s War on Drugs. In the 1980s, two new drug laws were enacted, the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act (1984), which raised federal penalties for cannabis cultivation,
possession, and distribution, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1986) instituting mandatory
sentencing for drug crime and establishing the “three strike and you’re out” rule. After
the Reagan Administration’s departure, the election of George Bush Sr. solidified the
United States militarization of drug policies. The Solomon-Lautenberg amendment
(1990) was passed, which tied state’s funding of federal highways to the passing of laws
that removed the driver’s license for anyone convicted of drug possession.
Drug policies in the United States continued their trend towards more
criminalization throughout the 1990s. The Violent Crime Control Act (1994) passed
during and with the support of the Clinton Administration. The ‘Crime bill’ as it is better
known furthered the acceleration of incarceration rates and raised the number and length
of prison sentences, as well as increased the number of state and local jails (Chung,
Hunter, and Pearl 2019). When combined with the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the
passing of this law was instrumental in increasing the disproportionate incarceration rate
of African American men, particularly when it came to drug possession or drug
trafficking (Ray and Galston 2020).
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As the U.S moved towards tough on crime policies, the United States saw its first
rapid growth of the opioid overdose epidemic, particularly pharmaceutical opioids,
pharmaceutical opioid overdoses culminated in 1999 (CDC 2021). Additional waves of
the opioid epidemic continue to this day via primarily heroin or fentanyl. In the 1990s
and early 2000s the federal government moved towards tough on crime drug policies, the
opposite was true in states throughout the United States. California legalized medicinal
cannabis in 1996, which in turn provoked other states to begin to flirt with idea of
medicinal cannabis, and cannabis as significantly less dangerous than other “hard drugs”.
Ultimately, five states and D.C legalized medicinal cannabis throughout the 1990s (Duke
2010).
This trend continued throughout the 2000s as eight more states legalized
medicinal cannabis, the importance of this cannot be understated, this was an essential
element to laying the foundation for the adoption and legalization of recreational
cannabis in the following decade. The perception of cannabis legalization also began to
soften significantly, jumping from 32% in favor of legalization in the mid-2000s to nearly
a majority by 2010 (Daniller 2019). In addition to this, the United States had begun to see
a continued rise of opioid deaths, with rapid increases in 2010, particularly due to an
increase in heroin overdoses. The rise of opioid overdoes continues to the present day, at
the same time, cannabis legalization approval is at an all-time high (Gallup 2020; CDC
2021). The rise of the opioid crisis in the United States is instrumental to understanding
changing perceptions of cannabis, it made clear that cannabis was not the clear and
present danger it had been perceived the previous 70 years. The sheer number of
overdoses of opioids in comparison to the relative social harm cannabis consumption
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produces has demonstrated broadly to the public that these two substances should not be
considered in the same category of danger.
Despite this, cannabis arrests still make up 43% of drug arrests, and 9 out of 10
are for cannabis possession (ACLU 2020). In 2019, 545,602 people were arrested for
cannabis related crimes, 9% higher than the number of people arrested for violent crimes
(495,871). An absurd fact when considering recreational cannabis is available or will
soon be available to 4 in and 10 Americans. It is hard to overstate the costs of the
demonization of cannabis in the United States, which resulted in the militarized War on
Drugs that was created to enforce cannabis prohibition. Since 1971, the War on Drugs
has cost the United States more than $1 trillion dollars, tens of millions of people have
been arrested and incarcerated for cannabis offenses, and the racial disparities in arrest
and incarceration rates exacerbated by cannabis prohibition have been detrimental to
these communities, both economically, socially, and psychologically (Pearl 2018; ACLU
2020; Earlenbaugh 2020). A 2018 ACLU report found that African Americans were 3.6
times more likely to be arrested for cannabis prohibition (ACLU 2018). A more striking
example found that Black and Latino New Yorkers made up 94% of marijuana related
arrests by the New York police department in 2020, despite white residents reporting that
they used cannabis at nearly double the rates of either racial group (Mendez 2021).
Undoing these harms will play a central role in future national legislation and will be one
of many metrics in judging how future national recreational cannabis policies are
perceived by the public.
Shifting the cultivation, production, and supply of cannabis to the mainstream
economy has become a salient issue in the United States in the 21st century. One that will
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continue to be up for fierce public policy debates, particularly as the push for national
legalization and regulation continues to grow, and national regulatory concerns become a
central issue in how the future system should be shaped. Understanding how cannabis
policies have played out over the past century should inform future policy decisions and
will be crucial to understanding how regulatory policy choices may fail to bring the
desired results from recreational cannabis legalization and regulation.
Uneven Pathways to Legalization
The pathway to legalization in the United States has been quite different from that
of our other two case studies. Recreational legalization has primarily been a function of
ballot initiatives, pushed by interest groups, cannabis enterprises, activists, supportive
state policy makers, and the broader publics’ demand for a change to cannabis
prohibition. The collective normalization of cannabis use in the United States has
primarily been a function of grass-roots changes in cultural values percolated up to the
policymaker level, combined with a normalization of a state backed legalized and
regulated cannabis markets in the form of state level medical marijuana programs. It
seems that concerns over medical cannabis programs being a trojan horse for recreational
cannabis proved to be correct, as is the case in the United States or Canada (Kilmer and
MacCoun 2017). The changing views of cannabis use in the 21st century tracks along
other changing views on issues of moral regulation like that of gay marriage or abortion,
as all three have continued to trend upward over the past decade, but cannabis
legalization and gay marriage legalization have experienced much steeper increases than
abortion (Gallup 2020). This has led to a different framing of the issue of recreational
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cannabis use, and a different framing in the public policy sphere, as the old rules of moral
regulation increasingly no longer apply (Hannah 2018).
Recently, state legislatures have caught up to this trend and began to legalize
recreational cannabis. The reasons for doing so can be attributed to a number of different
reasons. At the policymaker level, lawmakers have seized on the idea that recreational
cannabis can improve governmental revenue, while at the same time creating new jobs
and increasing economic growth. This is combined with policymakers’ concerns over
issues of racialized policing of cannabis, regrets over tough on crime laws that have
increased mass incarceration, and a more refined focus on the issue of opioid abuse,
rather than wasting taxpayer money or time on enforcement of cannabis. As of recently,
racial justice concerns in the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement have been crucial
to an increasing push by policymakers to pass recreational cannabis supply reform
through their legislatures, thus ensuring social equity policies are included with
legalization bills. In addition to this, the persistent staying power of the opioid epidemic
and its harmful impacts has highlighted the stark differences between cannabis, and that
of more “hard drugs” like opioids.
State policymakers in the United States have been slow to respond to citizens
demands for recreational cannabis legalization. As of 2021, state governments have
legalized and regulated recreational cannabis through the legislature, as well as the
legislatures in the territories of Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Washington
D.C of the twenty jurisdictions that have legalized cannabis at the subnational level in the
United States (see Table 2). This accounts for a quarter of recreational cannabis
legalizations in the United States, despite an overall cannabis legalization national
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approval rating of nearly 68% (Gallup 2020). There is still room for more recreational
cannabis legalization efforts at the subnational level in the future, as citizens look to
continue the expansion of recreational cannabis markets, if the national government
continues to fail to act. Ballot initiatives and the subsequent cannabis policies that have
stemmed from them have created the room necessary in other subnational governments in
the United States to discuss reforming their own laws through the legislature. As time
goes on, it is expected that more states will adopt recreational cannabis programs through
their respective legislatures. A trend that has persisted in 2021, with the legalization of
recreational cannabis in Virginia, New York, Connecticut, and New Mexico.
Policymakers in non-legal cannabis jurisdictions have learned from the mistakes other
states have made in regulating and implementing their cannabis program efficiently and
have crafted their regulatory apparatuses accordingly upon legalization. This is often in
conjunction with their own experience regulating and implementing a medicinal cannabis
program. Every legalized recreational cannabis state, but one, South Dakota, had a
medicinal cannabis program before legalizing recreational cannabis. 35 U.S states now
have medical cannabis programs of varied restrictiveness, and overall, 39 subnational
governments in the United States now have medical cannabis programs when including
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
Table 2: Pathways to Legalization (The United States)
Year

State

Initiative or

Vote (either chamber

Legislature

vote by party or
popular vote)

2012

Colorado

Initiative

Yes (55.32%)
No (44.68%)
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2012

Washington

Initiative

Yes (55.7%)
No (44.3%)

2014

Alaska

Initiative

Yes (53.23%)
No (46.77%)

2014

Oregon

Initiative

Yes (56.11%)
No (43.89%)

2014

Washington D.C

Initiative

Yes (70.06%)
No (29.94%)

2016

California

Initiative

Yes (57.13%)
No (42.87%)

2016

Maine

Initiative

Yes (50.26%)
No (49.74%)

2016

Nevada

Initiative

Yes (54.47%)
No (45.53%)

2016

Massachusetts

Initiative

Yes (53.66%)
No (46.34%)

2018

Vermont

Legislature

(2020)

Two votes
Legalization: House –
81-63
Senate – Voice Vote

Commercialization:
House – 92-56
Senate – 23-6

2018

Michigan

Initiative

Yes (55.89%)
No (44.11%)
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2018

Northern Mariana

Legislature

Islands

House –
18-1-1
Senate –
6-0-2

2019

Guam

Legislature

Unicameral –
8-7

2019

Illinois

Legislature

House – 66-47
Senate – 38-17

2020

Arizona

Initiative

Yes (60.03%)
No (39.97%)

2020

South Dakota

Initiative

Yes (54.18%)
No (45.82%)

2020

New Jersey

Initiative

Yes (67.08%)
No (32.92%)

2020

Montana

Initiative

Yes (56.90%)
No (43.10%)

2021

Virginia

Legislature

House – 48-43
Senate – 20-19

2021

New York

Legislature

House – 100-49
Senate – 40-23

2021

New Mexico

Legislature

House – 41-28
Senate – 23-13

2021

Connecticut

Legislature

House –72-62
Senate – 19-17

Sources: Adlin 2020; Adlin 2020a; Adlin 2021; Baird 2020; Cannabis Tax Attorney
2018; D’ammassa 2021; DISA Global Solutions; Franz 2021; NORML 2018; NBC

53

Channel 4; Slotkin 2021; MPP 2018; MPP 2020; MPP 2021; MPP 2021a; Pardo
2020.
Factors Complicating Taxation
Determining the correct taxation formula for non-medicinal cannabis by
policymakers has demonstrated the complicated nature of establishing a new recreational
cannabis market. Some states have already made well over $1 billion dollars in revenue,
while others are yet to be fully operational and have seen lower than predicted estimates
of tax revenue (Bieber 2021). Without direction of the federal government, state
governments are expected to navigate regulating a new market that must be profitable,
environmentally sustainable, public health friendly, provide tax revenue, and undercut the
illicit cannabis market. On the one hand, policymakers and industry advocates alike have
touted the opportunity for more revenue by establishing a regulated cannabis market, a
trend that has been exacerbated by COVID-19 as subnational governments have been
starved by traditional sources of funding (Schanenman 2020). Conversely, high taxation
on recreational cannabis in some states has incentivized participation in illicit cannabis
markets when newly legal cannabis businesses are not able to compete with the low
prices of the illicit market (Linnane 2021). To further compound the complicated nature
of producing a taxation formula for these new markets, taxation on recreational cannabis
can be used to keep the prices of cannabis artificially high, which in turn will
disincentivize over-consumption of recreational cannabis, specifically in younger age
groups that are more price sensitive, both which serve to increase the chances of
achieving desirable public health outcomes (Boesen 2020). Both facts have been
demonstrated in alcohol and tobacco taxation policies in the past (Boesen 2020).
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As is the case in most businesses, cannabis businesses have the incentive to
increase their revenue base, which can be achieved by either expanding the number of
consumers, or by increasing the consumption of users already using cannabis. Since the
first recreational cannabis legalization in the United States, the cost of cannabis has
declined significantly over the past decade, with the potential of future national
legalization, access to banking, tax credits, corporatization, and interstate commerce
lowering the cost to do business in the future, the race to the bottom in cannabis prices
will certainly occur as the industry expands (Rogeberg 2018; Boesen 2020; American
Addiction Centers 2020). Extremely low cannabis prices could increase the number of
undesirable public health outcomes possible (an increase in consumption, both by young
people and current cannabis users) as well as drastically harm the amount of revenue
garnered by states, due to states tying their revenue generation to taxes based on a
proportion of the retail price sold (Humphreys 2018).
State and territorial governments have considerable latitude on how they decide to
tax cannabis, at times, disregarding the policy ramifications involved by adopting one
style of taxation over another. At other times, policymakers do not have a choice, ballot
initiatives in some states have enshrined certain taxation rates into the constitution,
highlighting the importance of the pathways to legalization. Cannabis taxation policy is
one of numerous areas of contention over the best model to utilize. One of these areas of
contention is the debate on which level of the supply chain cannabis should be taxed at
(wholesale, production, retail, all three, etc.). Another factor complicating tax policy
innovation are the variety of methods of consumption (flower, edibles, concentrates) and
what roles this plays in determining different tax rates for different categories of cannabis
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products. Further complicating this is the cannabis plant itself, should cannabis flower be
taxed at different rates than the rest of the cannabis plant, due to it having higher THC
content? The final complicating factor is deciding which metric is the appropriate way to
tax cannabis (weight, THC content, price, or some combination of the three).
Subnational state and territory policymakers in the United States have produced a
variety of ways to engage in the taxation of cannabis. The primary explanation for this is
the lack of guidance from the central government on best practices, leading states to
experiment with which policy works best. Innovation in this area of cannabis policy has
allowed for researchers to examine which form of taxation has performed better than
others while at the same time observing its effects on the wider population (Boesen 2020;
Irvine and Light 2020; Hall and Lynskey 2020). With the number of cases from which to
examine continually rising, the research conducted in a comparative manner including
across national boundaries will continue to grow. Furthermore, states should be wary of
future national legalization laws that will institute its own set of taxes and duties
respective states’ cannabis businesses will have to comply with. Further taxation by the
federal government, without setting an overall taxation limit on the cannabis industry
may have the effect of raising the price of cannabis above what the licit market can
remain competitive at with the illicit market.
Table 3: U.S Subnational Tax Structures
State

Structure

Tax Rate

General Sales

Local

Tax Applicable

Governments
Can Levy
Additional Taxes

56

Outside of Local
Sales Tax
Alaska

Specific

-$50 per ounce of

N/A

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

mature flower
(Wholesale or
Cultivation)
-$25 per ounce of
immature or
abnormal bud
(Wholesale or
Cultivation)
$15 per ounce of
trim (Wholesale or
Cultivation)
$1 per clone
(Wholesale or
Cultivation)
Arizona

Ad Valorem

16% Cannabis
Excise Tax (Retail
Price)

California

Mixed

-15% Cannabis
Excise Tax (Retail
Price)
-$9.65 per ounce
of flower at
average market
value (Wholesale
or Cultivation)
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-$2.87 per ounce
of leaves at
average market
value (Wholesale
or Cultivation)
-$1.35 per ounce
of cannabis plant
(Wholesale or
Cultivation)
Colorado

Ad Valorem

-15% Cannabis

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Excise Tax (Retail
Price)
-15% Cannabis
Excise Tax by
weight at average
market value
(Wholesale or
Cultivation)
Connecticut

Mixed

-2.75 cents per
milligram of THC
for cannabis
edibles
-0.625 cents per
milligram of THC
for cannabis
flower
-0.9 cents per
milligram of THC
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for any other
cannabis products
Guam

Ad Valorem

-15% Cannabis

No

No

Yes

Yes

Excise Tax
(Wholesale)
Illinois

Potency (Ad

-7% Cannabis

Valorem)

Excise Tax
(Wholesale)
-10% Cannabis
Excise Tax on
cannabis flower
with less than 35%
THC
concentration
(Retail Price)
-20% Cannabis
Excise Tax on
products infused
with cannabis
(Retail Price)
-25% Cannabis
Excise Tax on any
product with THC
concentration of
above 35% (Retail
Price)
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Maine

Mixed

-10% Cannabis

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

N/A

TBD

Yes

No

Excise Tax (Retail
Price)
-$335 per pound
of flower
(Cultivation)
-$94 per pound of
trim (Cultivation)
-$1.50 per pound
of seedlings
(Cultivation)
-$0.35 per pound
of seeds
(Cultivation)

Massachusetts

Ad Valorem

10.75% Cannabis
Excise Tax (Retail
Price)

Michigan

Ad Valorem

10% Cannabis
Excise Tax (Retail
Price)

Montana

Ad Valorem

20% Cannabis
Excise Tax (Retail
Price)

Nevada

Ad Valorem

15% Cannabis
Excise Tax
(Wholesale)
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New Jersey

Mixed (Excise

-33% of average

Fee)

retail price per

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

ounce for the first
nine months of
legal sales
Then:
-$10 per ounce if
the average price
of an ounce was
$350 or more
-$30 per ounce if
the average price
of an ounce was
less than $350 but
at least $250
-$40 per ounce if
the average retail
price of an ounce
was less than $250
but at least $20
-$60 per ounce if
the average retail
price of an ounce
was less than $200

New Mexico

Ad Valorem

-12% Cannabis
Excise Tax until
2025 (Retail Price)
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-Cannabis Excise
Tax raises 1%
each year until it
reaches 18% in
2030.
New York

Mixed

-9% State
Cannabis Excise
Tax (Retail Price)
-4% Local
Cannabis Excise
Tax (Retail Price)
-$0.005 Potency
Tax per milligram
of THC for flower
(Wholesale)
-$0.008 Potency
Tax per milligram
of THC for
concentrates
(Wholesale)
-$0.03 per
milligram of THC
for edibles
(Wholesale)

Northern Mariana
Islands

Ad Valorem

10% Cannabis
Excise Tax
(Cultivation)
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Yes

Yes

Oregon

Ad Valorem

17% Cannabis

N/A

Yes

Yes

TBD

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

N/A

N/A

Excise Tax (Retail
Price)
South Dakota

Ad Valorem

15% Cannabis
Excise Tax (Retail
Price)

Vermont

Ad Valorem

14% Cannabis
Excise Tax (Retail
Price)

Virginia

Ad Valorem

21% Cannabis
Excise Tax (Retail
Price)

Washington

Ad Valorem

37% Cannabis
Excise Tax (Retail
Price)

Washington D.C

N/A

N/A

Sources: Boesen 2020; Boesen 2020a; Boesen 2020b; Braun 2020; Levenson 2021; Linnane 2021;
Davis 2021; Hansen et al. 2020; National Conference of State Legislatures 2021.

The State of Taxation in the States
Subnational governments in the United States have coalesced around utilizing
Ad-valorem (taxes levied proportionate to the estimated value of the goods) cannabis
excise taxes on either the final price of retail purchases or wholesale and cultivation, with
some notable exceptions. Illinois, for example, utilizes an ad-valorem cannabis excise tax
on potency rather than price. Some states, such as Maine or California, use a mix of advalorem excise taxes on final retail price and excise taxes by weight on wholesales or
cultivation. Excise taxes are used by legalizing states and territories to levy taxation to
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ensure enforcement of regulatory policies are funded, and to off-set the negative
externalities (child and teen usage, mental health services, incapacitated driver
enforcement, etc.) brought on by legalization of cannabis, these are similar to tobacco
excise taxes or alcohol excise taxes. Each method of taxation comes baked in with its
own benefits and externalities. Taxation by price is not stable or sustainable due to price
fluctuations, taxation by weight could incentivize the use of higher THC products, and
taxation by potency can further complicate an already very complicated and highly
regulated industry (Boesen 2020).
State taxation policy can be complicated for cannabis businesses, raising the
overall cost of business to remain compliant. For example, California levies a 15% retail
excise tax, local business taxes, the state sales tax, taxation by weight on wholesale
cultivation, different taxation rates for different parts of the cannabis plant, and by the
overall numerical amount of plants at cultivation. It is not surprising to observe that
California’s illicit market is still thriving with a complicated taxation system from which
to follow (Romero 2019; Conway 2020). Business advocates would hardly find this
system sustainable in any other area of policy. Over-taxation and over complication of
taxation policy harms cannabis businesses, making it more difficult for small businesses
to remain cost-effective and compliant, guaranteeing a losing competition with the illicit
market. Alaska on the other hand, maintains a simplistic tax structure, $50 an ounce of
mature flower, $25 per ounce of immature flower, $15 per ounce of trim, $1 per clone,
and no sales tax. Despite the simplistic nature of tax policy in Alaska, cannabis
businesses in Alaska are vulnerable to price fluctuations, and can be detrimental to a
cannabis business if the price falls too low (Boesen 2020). It can be presumed that this
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issue will be exacerbated in a fully legal national cannabis market, as prices will surely
continue to fall (Rogeberg 2018).
Most of the subnational government in the United States with a regulated
recreational cannabis market utilize an ad valorem excise tax on the retail price, with
some adding an ad valorem excise tax on the wholesale or cultivation price, and others
adding the state sales tax in addition to both. As time goes on, more taxation policy
models will continue to spring up, and it will be important to continually measure the
different effects of each policy model and their impact on policymaker’s goals. Pertinent
to this point is the question of how adequately funded social equity programs, public
health programs, and enforcement can be funded by cannabis revenue, and if the revenue
garnered is enough to be sustainable for these programs, as well as keeping the taxation
rate low enough to allow cannabis businesses to compete, and high enough to keep out of
the hands of adolescents.
Market Regulation
Table 4: Market Regulation in the United States
State/Territory

Age of

Personal

Homegrown

Advertising

Limit on

Delivery

On-Site

Consumption

Possession

Cultivation

Restrictions

total # of

(Y/N)

Consumption

on Targeting

Licenses

Youth (Y/N)

(Y/N)

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Limit

Alaska

21

28g

6 plants (3

(Y/N)

mature)
Arizona

21

28g

6 plants per
resident, 12
plants
maximum per
household
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California

21

28g

6 plants per

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

household,
including
harvest from
plants
Colorado

21

56g

6 plants (3
mature) per
resident, 12
plants
maximum per
household

Connecticut

21

42g

6 plants (3
mature)

Guam

21

28g

6 plants (with
only 3
flowering)

Illinois

21

30g

Prohibited

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Maine

21

71g

15 plants (3

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

mature) and
harvest from
plants per
household
Massachusetts

21

28g

6 plants per
resident, 12
plants
maximum per
household

Michigan

21

71g

12 plants per
household

Montana

21

28g

2 plants per
resident, 4
plants
maximum per
household
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Nevada

21

28g

Only allowed

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

if there are
not retail
stores within
25 miles of
home, 6
plants per
resident, 12
plant
maximum per
household
New Jersey

21

168g

Prohibited

Yes

Yes

Yes

TBD

New Mexico

21

56g

6 mature

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

TBD

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

plants per
household
New York

21

85g

6 plants (3
mature)

Northern Mariana

21

28g

Islands

6 plants
mature, 12
plants
immature
(registry for
both)

Oregon

21

28g

4 plants per
household

South Dakota

21

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

Vermont

21

28g

6 plants, 2

Yes

No

No

No

TBD

TBD

TBD

TBD

Yes

Yes

No

No

mature per
household
Virginia

21

28g

4 plants
maximum per
household

Washington

21

28g

Prohibited
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Washington D.C

21

57g

6 plants (3

N/A

N/A

No

No

mature) per
household

Sources: Rup et al. 2020; Franz 2021; Hartman 2021; Hoffmann 2020; NORML
2021; Jaeger 2021a; Pacific Daily News 2020; MPP 2018; MPP 2020; MPP 2021;
MPP 2021A; MjBizDaily 2018; Pardo 2020; 3C Comprehensive Cannabis
Consulting 2021.
Cannabis is unique in its level of industry regulation when accounting for the low
negative externalities produced when legalizing, rivaled only by firearms,
pharmaceuticals, alcohol, and tobacco. Unlike alcohol and tobacco, the newly born legal
cannabis market is still competing with an entrenched illicit market and is still more
heavily regulated. Unlike firearms and pharmaceuticals, the level of expertise necessary
to produce quality cannabis is continually declining. It can also be contended that the
societal cost of cannabis use is exponentially lower than the costs produced by the four
examples above. Regardless, there seems to be consensus across subnational and national
borders that there should be some level of regulation in any cannabis market, outside of
Washington D.C that has operated based on the homegrown cultivation, and gift model of
cannabis supply, but plans to open dispensaries in the future. The cost of not doing so, in
Spain for example, has led to an explosion in the illicit cannabis market, not only in
Spain, but the whole of Europe (Burgen 2020; Carranco 2020). Catalonia police have
already destroyed 1 million illicit plants in 2020 (Burgen 2020). The question of how
strict these regulations should be continues to be a point of contention in the United
States. Areas of cannabis policy like licensing, employment, advertising, delivery,
consumption of cannabis and the physical cannabis business itself are highly regulated
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and have produced a wide variety of different policies at the subnational level and local
level.
The age of consumption of cannabis in the United States across the board is 21,
aligning laws with the legal age to consume alcohol and tobacco. Drugged driving is
illegal in all U.S. subnational jurisdictions, but what is considered ‘drugged driving’
varies. Consumption regulations are often tied to existing tobacco laws, like the
forbidding of consuming cannabis where tobacco is also forbidden. Some states have
allowed for ‘on site cannabis consumption’ in licensed areas, but this practice has just
begun to be implemented. This can prove helpful for a cannabis consumer that cannot
utilize cannabis in their domicile either due to children being present, or that the property
is rented and doesn’t allow for the consumption of cannabis via smoking. Most states
have adopted personal possession limits of an ounce or so (28g), but this has mostly been
an arbitrary number selection, and other states allow for much more. Also, an ounce is
often the daily purchasing limit, but consumers can go back and purchase the same
amount the next day, which could bring them into violation of household possession
limits. Until the pandemic, consumers had to physically be present in the store to
purchase cannabis, but the pandemic expanded access through the adding of online sales,
delivery, and curbside pickup in numerous states. After the pandemic, it does not seem as
if these allowances on access will be turned back, and in fact, newly legalizing states
have adopted these practices.
Cannabis businesses in the United States are protected by commercial free speech.
This has led to policymakers crafting marketing and advertising policies that comply with
this, while still attempting to limit the scope of how cannabis products are advertised. For
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example, states in the United States have mandated that cannabis be labeled with
information such as THC or CBD content, so consumers are better educated on what
exactly they are purchasing. Other regulations include how the cannabis is sold
(packaging, i.e., resealable or child resistant) and the inclusion of health and safety
warnings. Most states have included language that forbids packaging from being
“attractive to children”, the definition of what this is varies from state to state, but in
some instances includes the banning of bright colors or cartoons.
The operation of the physical cannabis retail space is highly regulated in the
United States. Most states in the United States have strict seed-to-sale tracking of
cannabis businesses, as well as inventory tracking to ensure cannabis remains in the licit
market. In addition to this, states have required testing for pesticides and potency, which
must be represented on the labeling. Policymakers have also crafted regulations that
dictate the security apparatus retail spaces must have to secure cannabis, this includes
security cameras, armed guards, logbooks, alarm and lock standards, vaults, and
employee background checks. To an extent, this is understandable due to cannabis being
a cash-only business as of now, but this is more of a defect due to the national prohibition
than policy that was crafted to serve a purpose. This can be easily remedied in the future,
but has at least in part, raised the barriers to operating in the cannabis business. The
capital alone that is necessary to obtain a license and remain compliant with state
regulations has priced potential cannabis businesses out of the market. Some states have
attempted to combat this problem by allowing for social equity licensing, and overall
lowering the cost of entry. In most instances, power has also been delegated to local
governments that can add their own regulations and zoning requirements to stay
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compliant. States have also experimented on license caps on specific types of cannabis
businesses, as well as forbidding or allowing other types of cannabis businesses. For
example, some states cap the total square footage of licensed cultivation space or number
of retail businesses, some states allow for vertical integration (cultivation, wholesale, and
retail are all owned by the same company), and others allow for cooperatives, non-profit
retail, or micro-cultivation licenses
Homegrown cultivation of cannabis is a practice that has been widely adopted in
the United States by policymakers, except for three states, Illinois, New Jersey, and
Washington. The regulations on how many plants an individual or a household can grow
varies state by state, but definitions often include how many plants can be mature at any
given time, and where on private property it can be grown (out of public site, in a
lockable area, etc.). This method of cannabis supply has been attractive to policymakers
that want to limit the commercialization of cannabis, allowing for a not-for-profit way to
get cannabis supply. But as early legalizing states have shown, enforcing limits on how
many plants a household has been difficult or impossible to enforce. In addition to this,
homegrown cultivation of cannabis can still be ‘distributed’, by allowing ‘gifts’ of
cannabis without renumeration. This could at least in part, be further fueling the crossstate sale of cannabis, as surely not everyone that grows cannabis at home is in
compliance with distribution or cultivation limits. Furthermore, it represents an
unregulated cannabis supply that contributes to undercutting the for-profit, tracked, and
regulated retail apparatus established by states. From a public health perspective, this can
be positive, as consumers aren’t exposed to the for-profit nature of the retail cannabis
industry, leading to a better relationship with cannabis as a substance. From an economic
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and revenue perspective, it could contribute to the demise of smaller cannabis businesses
that must still comply with strict regulation, which in turn lead to a decline in revenue.
This method of cannabis supply has its positives and negatives, but policymakers should
be cognizant of the effects of allowing for homegrown cultivation of cannabis. In the
future, the allowance of micro-cultivation and distribution of cannabis, which some states
like Massachusetts have allowed for, could allow small time entrepreneurs and growers
to be folded into the licit market. But lowering the barriers to entering the licit market this
way is paramount to its implementation. States like New York have explicitly designed
their cannabis regulatory framework to encourage small businesses, so as not to create an
early monopoly in the industry.
It is important to note the fact that legal cannabis markets must compete with a
more established illicit cannabis market, which, is unregulated and not subject to the
same costs. The more arbitrary barriers put up on legal cannabis businesses, the greater
the challenge of legal businesses eliminating competition from the ever-present illicit
market. On the contrary, too little regulation could be detrimental to public health in one
way or another, especially as prices plummet in the future and the number of users is
greater in the future. Eliminating the illicit market and level of market regulation are
inextricably linked. This puts the onus of policymakers to create a balanced set of
priorities, outside their respective moral analysis of consuming cannabis in the first place,
this includes by expanding access to adult users, much in the same way we have seen
during the pandemic through online ordering, delivery, and curbside pickup. As the
market matures, further discussions on the best practices are necessitated, particularly
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when considering the potential for national legalization and the establishment of federal
regulations.
Centralization of Cannabis Policy
Decentralization in the authority of policy in any given area is primarily a
function of a given state’s political culture, constitutional structures, and at times it is
dictated by law, and in others it is dictated by popular will and norms. Centralization of
cannabis policy comes in two forms, national to subnational, and subnational to local. As
is the case in any nation or state, certain geographical and political sections of the United
States will align themselves with cannabis’ militarized prohibition past, and other more
liberal jurisdictions will be utilizing a nearly free market of cannabis regulation. Due to
national prohibition, the burden of regulation has fallen to state and local governments in
the United States, on the one hand this has allowed for further experimentation in policy,
on the other, the lack of uniform regulation across the United States has made for the
uneven development of cannabis markets state by state.
In the case of the United States, subnational governments were the primary
enforcers of cannabis prohibition, the same prohibition that citizens are now attempting
to undo state by state. In fact, a supermajority of arrests for cannabis come by way of
local or state law enforcement, not by federal authorities (Way of Leaf Editorial Team
2021). To compound this, cannabis policy in the United States is governed by a tenuous
forbearance of national laws, thus creating, and constituting the most decentralized
regulatory apparatus of cannabis of the three case studies. Additionally, subnational
governments that have legalized recreational cannabis have allowed for significant
autonomy at the local level, especially regarding zoning physical cannabis businesses,
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their specifications, and licensing, including the banning of cannabis businesses. This has
led to the expected proliferation of cannabis businesses upon legalization to sputter.
Local authorities, from the county level to the municipal level have blocked the
proliferation of cannabis businesses by opting out of the cannabis market leading to
numerous areas becoming “cannabis deserts” or places that only the illicit market can fill
the void (Walsh 2020). For example, Montana is now allowing for counties that didn’t
vote for legalization to opt into the cannabis market via county legislation, instead of
automatically allowing for cannabis businesses to operate there, counties that voted for
legalization can opt out via county legislation as well (Franz 2021). This opens an avenue
for potential future research in comparing cannabis density to that of illicit market
participation, and what role counties play in holding up the expansion of the licit market.
31 states still maintain the prohibition of recreational cannabis, creating a
lucrative market for legal cannabis to spill over into states that maintain prohibition.
States where recreational cannabis is still illegal have seen in an increase in cannabis
being driven in, or mailed from licit states, but cannabis coming across the border from
Mexico has dropped significantly (Jaeger 2020; Walsh 2020). A potential future solution
to this may coalesce around a model similar to that of Canada’s, which allows for
cannabis to be shipped to citizens across subnational lines in order to prevent more profits
from falling into the illicit market. Even with a system like this, a significant “grey
market” may appear in states with highly regulated costly cannabis, as states with larger
growing capacities that are less regulated may see a spillover to these states, even in the
case of national legalization (Walsh 2020). Something similar to this can be found in
tobacco or alcohol prices across subnational jurisdictions. For example, the cost of a pack
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of cigarettes in Virginia is significantly lower than it is in New York, creating a market
for people wishing to drive tobacco north for profit (Walsh 2020). The national
government may wish to step in for future regulation in order to stabilize the price of
cannabis across the whole of the country, both to prevent an increasing price drop in
cannabis, provide uniform market regulation, and to stabilize cannabis prices across the
whole of the United States in order to prevent these so called “grey markets”.
Conclusion
A national response and guidance to the increasingly difficult challenge of
implementing a recreational cannabis market is urgently needed to meet the stated
objectives and priorities of legalization. A fact that was increasingly exposed during the
COVID-19 pandemic (Booker 2020; Mallinson, Hannah, and Cunningham 2020). The
unresponsiveness of the national government has caused great issues in both
implementing a recreational regulatory regime and sustaining it. This has placed
recreational cannabis in the United States in a unique position, both as a commodity and
in how businesses who profit from it in some ways are treated, but also politically. The
COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the bipartisan concern over the future of regulation
and legalization (Jaeger 2020; Booker 2020). Republican policymakers increasingly find
themselves in states with legal recreational cannabis programs (Mallinson, Hannah, and
Cunningham 2020). Recreational cannabis is an increasingly big business that has found
receptive bipartisan ears over concerns that include the way legal cannabis businesses are
treated as second-class businesses, without the benefits most other businesses in the
United States enjoy. In fact, recreational cannabis seen record sales during the 2020
COVID-19 pandemic in some places, and overall, the legal market is expected to hit a
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record $17.5 billion in 2021(Yakowicz 2021; Wells 2020). With neither the same
financial protection in access to bankruptcy, access to interstate commerce, nor access to
the federal tax credits, capital, or financial tools necessary to start and maintain a
cannabis business, it has made competing with the illicit market all more complicated,
especially during a pandemic (MjBizDaily 2017). The COVID-19 pandemic has reshaped
the cannabis industry, with retailers changing their behavior to offer different types of
access (delivery, curbside pickup) and State policymakers in recreational cannabis states
overall increasing the access to cannabis during the pandemic, which in part could have
contributed to the boom in sales (Mallinson, Hannah, Cunningham 2020; Schaneman
2020). On the hand, small legal recreational cannabis businesses must still compete with
the illicit market as well, one that faces no tight-regulation, taxation, or pandemic
regulations, in addition to being fueled by other state’s illicit markets. There is already
wide evidence of instances of legal cannabis businesses contributing to the illicit market
of states that haven’t legalized recreational cannabis, often just to turn a profit (Walsh
2020). Oregon, for example consistently produces a surplus of cannabis that their market
simply cannot create enough demand for (Walsh 2020). Although Oregon isn’t the only
example, this excess often ends up in illicit cannabis markets in both legal cannabis states
and illegal cannabis states, which has been exacerbated by national prohibition and a
proliferation of subnational governments with legal recreational cannabis markets. The
decentralization of cannabis policy in the United States has harmed both consumers –
both in how they are criminalized in non-legal jurisdictions and in artificially raising the
cost of consuming cannabis – and legal business owners, in turn hampering its own
objective of eliminating an illicit market through state-by-state legalization efforts. The
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decentralization of cannabis has created new avenues for the illicit market to exploit. It is
unrealistic to assume that a legal recreational market will be contained to one subnational
jurisdiction, particularly when it is much more profitable to expand to illicit cannabis
markets in states with much higher cannabis prices.
This system of cannabis supply reform is untenable over the long run and will not
meet the expected objectives of the public or policy makers. To eliminate illicit markets,
cannabis policy must be primarily crafted and led by the central government, particularly
in setting parameters when it comes to the issue of taxation and market regulation.
Ensuring states have even policies when crafting regulations is paramount to ensuring
subnational policymakers do not legislate themselves into having a competitive
advantage. It is impossible and unreasonable to expect law enforcement to enforce a
state-by-state legalization plan with porous borders between jurisdictions. Uniform
regulation of the whole of the United States cannabis market is the only solution to
disrupting the lopsided power of illicit recreational cannabis markets compared to legal
markets. In conjunction to this, central regulation can stabilize the price of cannabis
across the whole of the United States, potentially eliminating the cross-state price
fluctuations, and increasing the chances of achieving desired public health outcomes,
including pricing adolescents and teenagers out of the market. Balance in the competition
of priorities is crucial to meeting expectations set by policymakers and the wider public
and cannot be answered by a state-by-state legalization effort.
The COVID-19 induced economic downturn will certainly put pressure on federal
policymakers to reform their cannabis laws in order to remedy the contradictions with
state law and finally give cannabis businesses the same advantages other businesses
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enjoy. The national cannabis prohibition has made it exceptionally difficult for cannabis
businesses to utilize the same benefits other companies enjoy, particularly federal tax
credits on business deductions, the benefits of access to interstate commerce, and access
to banking. Other unintended consequences include the suppression of the right to own a
gun and use cannabis, a Constitutional issue that could rouse further support from
Republicans in the reform of the national cannabis prohibition (Adlin 2020). In addition
to this, the contradictory nature of cannabis laws in the United States has caught the eye
of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas who described the system as a policy of ‘half
in half out’ and questions whether national prohibition laws should remain in place
(NORML 2021). Similar pressure will be put on state policymakers in states that
maintain a prohibition on cannabis to join the other states seeing revenue from their
recreational cannabis markets, especially as they continue to see their state coffers
dwindle as the pandemic rages on. With the Democrats retaking power in all three
chambers of government in 2020, a flurry of legalization bills has appeared, with one
legalization bill being passed in the House of Representatives in 2020, and others being
prepared in the Senate (Jaeger 2021; BBC 2020). In addition to this, bills to promote
social equity in cannabis policy have begun to appear (Jaeger 2021). Senate Majority
Leader Chuck Schumer has said cannabis policy reform remains a priority for his caucus
(Angell 2021).
In conclusion, the challenges facing the newly legalized and regulated
recreational cannabis markets of the United States are numerous, and creativity in the
innovation of policy is necessary to meet the unique challenge the subnational and
national government now finds itself in. In addition to this, national policymakers must
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stop abdicating their duty to legislate solutions to pressing public policy issues and stop
kicking the problem down the road. Meeting these public policy challenges through
extensive research and regulatory experimentation are necessary to determining the
potential success or failure of recreational cannabis regulatory policy in the United States.
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III. CASE STUDY – URUGUAY
Introduction
Uruguay, a country of about three and half million in South America, made world
history in 2013 by becoming the first nation-state to legalize and regulate recreational
cannabis at the national level (World Population Review 2021). By becoming the first
country to forge ahead on legal recreational cannabis, Uruguay became the pioneer in
uncharted policy territory and of great interest to researchers and other foreign
government officials curious to observe the impact of such a move. The move to legalize
and regulate recreational cannabis was by no means accidental, government officials
deliberately set out to become a pioneer, despite international condemnation and the
potential of economic repercussions. The case of Uruguay is notable in its strict
regulation of recreational cannabis and its regulatory deviation from other recreational
cannabis systems like the ones found in the United States or Canada. In addition to this,
recreational cannabis legalization occurred despite popular opinion overwhelmingly
being against the measure, unlike in the United States and Canada. The Uruguayan
cannabis market is expected to stagnate around $3 million annual sales from 2020-2024,
which is a significantly smaller market than is present in either of our other two case
studies (Ríos 2021). First, this chapter will discuss the history of cannabis inside
Uruguay, the pathway to recreational cannabis legalization, and the role of public
approval and policymakers in shaping a non-medicinal cannabis regulatory apparatus.
Second, this chapter will analyze the recreational cannabis policies of Uruguay in three

80

categories: taxation, market regulation, and centralization of cannabis policy. Lastly, this
chapter will discuss the outlook of recreational cannabis in Uruguay in the future.
Background on Case Study
Uruguay made history by becoming the first country to ever legalize and regulate
cannabis from seed to sale in 2013, it directly brought the state back into the fold of
cannabis supply regulation, a remarkable shift from the Dutch or Spanish models of
cannabis legalization, which exist without ‘strict regulation’ that exists within Uruguay,
the United States, or Canada (Obradovic 2019). Rather than just lowering the penalties
for possession and tolerating small retail sale of cannabis like in the Netherlands, or
lightly regulating the cannabis supply of ‘cannabis social clubs’ like in Spain, the state
has done away with this completely in establishing a complete regulatory framework. By
legalizing recreational cannabis in late 2013, Uruguay, a small unitary republic located on
the southeastern coast of South America, furthered its reputation as one of the most
socially progressive countries in Latin America. By doing so, the country positioned itself
ahead of the curve in legalization efforts found internationally and solidified itself as a
potential leader in the future cannabis industry.
The impact of said national legalization and regulation of recreational cannabis
has become of great interest to policymakers and researchers globally. The decision to
buck international precedent and international drug law, despite the potential for backlash
from neighbors or U.S financial institutions, should not be understated. In many ways,
Uruguay is a leader on numerous social issues in Latin America. Uruguay became the
first country in Latin America to allow women the right to vote in 1927, later enshrined
in the constitution in 1932 (Walsh and Ramsey 2016). Uruguay was the first country in
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South America to ban public smoking in enclosed spaces in 2006 (BBC 2006). Uruguay
is also one of only three countries in South America to decriminalize abortion, as well as
the first country in South America to legalize same-sex civil unions (Walsh and Ramsey
2016). In 2018, the Uruguayan parliament also passed a law protecting the rights of
transgender people (Freedom House 2020). In addition to this, Uruguay has the largest
middle class by percentage in all the Americas, a liberal economic system, low levels of
unemployment, low levels of inequality, and the near absence of extreme poverty (World
Bank 2019). Freedom House, in its 2020 world freedom report, rated Uruguay 98/100 on
its freedom scorecard, and noted its remarkably low levels of corruption when compared
regionally (Freedom House 2020). Known for its egalitarian ethos and pioneer past in
policymaking, it should come as no surprise that Uruguay became the first country
regionally, and internationally to legalize and regulate recreational cannabis as well.
Moving past cannabis prohibition has become a point of pride to Uruguayan
policymakers and officials. On a visit to Washington D.C in 2018, director of Uruguay’s
cannabis regulatory authority, Martin Rodriguez, said “We moved the frontier of what is
possible” when speaking on the state of Uruguay’s cannabis industry (Hillin 2020). It is
notable that cannabis legalization and regulation in Uruguay has primarily been an elite
driven, top-down process, but the groundwork for legalization had been led by activists
since at least the 1980s after the return of democracy (Walsh and Ramsey 2016). In fact,
cannabis activists played an essential role of keeping cannabis on the legislative agenda
(Hoffmann 2020). Beginning in 2010, activists began to push bills to friendly MPs that
would allow for the homegrown cultivation of 8 cannabis plants and establishing
cannabis social clubs, this bill did not pass, but it laid the groundwork for further
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discussion over reform (Hoffmann 2020). Ultimately, features of this bill became part of
the later framework highlighting the contrast between the tightly regulated monopoly
over retail cannabis which was advocated for by political elites and established by the
state of Uruguay, and homegrown cultivation and cannabis social clubs, where the
control over cannabis supply is individually or socially owned.
Despite decades of activism, when recreational cannabis laws were passed, nearly
2 in every 3 Uruguayans opposed it. In spite of its unpopularity, the left-leaning Broad
Front, led by the eccentric President Jose Mujica, pushed forward on recreational
cannabis legalization. His role in advocating for legalization cannot be understated,
without his support recreational cannabis legalization would have failed or looked very
different (Hoffman 2020). Mujica, a former guerilla fighter fighting the Uruguay military
dictatorship of the 70s and 80s, and former prisoner of 14 years, has built a reputation as
a man of the people. Upon his election in 2010, Mujica would go on to donate 90% of his
presidential salary to the poor of Uruguay (Lees 2018). His charismatic nature and broad
political support, combined with the social mobilization of activists, and widespread
concern for public safety created the conditions necessary to achieve such a bold policy
project (Hoffman 2020). In fact, human rights became a central tenet of his political
platform and appeal, which led to him advocating for a wide range of social reforms
throughout his presidency, including firmly standing on the side of legalization of
recreational cannabis.
To counter international pressures, including by the International Narcotics
Control Board, Mujica’s government framed Uruguay’s recreational legislation as a
matter of human rights and Uruguay’s duty to promote the “health and welfare of
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mankind”, a sentiment the government claims is aligned with the objectives of the treaty
(Hetzer and Walsh 2014). When Uruguay was accused by United Nations officials of
acting like a “pirate state” for legalizing recreational cannabis and violating the 1961 U.N
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mujica responded by saying in an interview “tell
that old man to stop lying and showing off to the stands” (Merco Press 2013). Much like
the United States or Canada, Uruguay has also largely relied on the historical precedents
set in the tobacco and alcohol policies in their respective countries. The retail monopoly
of cannabis largely mirrors that of the former whiskey monopoly Uruguay used to
maintain.
International pressures, history, and low public support led Uruguay to adopt a
uniquely strict control of cannabis, when compared to other jurisdictions that have
adopted regulated recreational cannabis from seed to sale. Some notable features of this
are state contracted cultivation and production for retail cannabis on government
property, purchasing limits, prohibition of advertising, restricted choice in how one
acquires their cannabis, price setting, and a national registry of recreational cannabis
users. The motivations for strict regulation of recreational cannabis have been publicly
framed in numerous ways by Uruguayan officials, including concerns for public safety,
minimizing the public health impact of legalization, and complying with the international
drug framework. Officially, the text of the law that passed recreational cannabis
legalization states three reasons. These are: Reducing drug trafficking-related violence by
taking cannabis off the black market, promoting public health through education and
prevention campaigns, and eliminating the existing legal paradox that allowed for
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possession but effectively blocked users from accessing cannabis (Hudak, Ramsey and
Walsh 2018).
By listing the reasoning behind legalization, it builds a lens of which researchers
can analyze regulatory policies to see if this legislation is living up to its stated goals. It
also frames the priorities behind regulatory innovation, and thus can further explain the
strict nature of cannabis regulation from seed to sale. In Uruguay, unlike in Canada or the
United States, the profit incentive is not a theoretical motivating factor for the cultivation
or distribution of cannabis in the retail market. Rather, the system is explicitly designed
to focus on public health and eliminating the illicit market, in order to reduce criminal
activity and improve public safety (Hudak, Ramsey and Walsh 2018; Transform Drug
Policy Foundation 2018) This unique strictness of the regulation of recreational cannabis
in Uruguay when compared to Canadian or United States recreational cannabis
regulations merits analysis, both in the reasoning for specific regulations and the impact it
has had on its stated priorities. This chapter looks to further understand the motivating
factors behind the development of regulated recreational cannabis in Uruguay, as well as
the regulatory policies themselves, and how policy decisions have impacted this
development.
The History of Cannabis Prohibition in Uruguay
The history of cannabis and other narcotics in Uruguay deviates in a significant
way from that of our other two case studies – the United States and Canada. Research on
the history of drugs in Uruguay often note its liberal record on issues of drug use,
particularly when compared to other countries in Latin America (Walsh and Ramsey
2016; Hudak, Ramsey, and Walsh 2018; Pardo 2014; Musto 2018; Obradovic 2019;
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Queirolo 2020a). A tradition that persists to this day, most notably in its legalization and
regulation of recreational cannabis. The foundations of this liberal record have its roots in
the history of Uruguay, as well as the political system and culture of Uruguay. Further
exploring this history allows researchers to analyze what conditions led to the legalization
of regulated recreational cannabis, what motivations were present in specific regulatory
policies, and note how Uruguayan recreational cannabis regulation compares to other
regulated recreational cannabis systems.
Uruguay’s political history with cannabis first begins with the country’s signing
of the Hague International Opium Convention of 1912 in 1916, of which cannabis or
“Indian Hemp” had been added to the list of narcotics just four years earlier (Musto
2018). This began Uruguay’s long history of “shy, but persistent combat of controlled
substances at a political, medical, police, and mass media level, with arguments that still
resound today” (Garat 2012 p.21; Musto 2018). The intense demonization of drug users
found in the history of the United States and Canada is not found in Uruguay, rather, the
state of Uruguay opted for a more holistic approach to decreasing levels of drug use,
contrary to the other two case studies, who relied more exclusively on law enforcement
and mass media in the past. Despite the general publics’ disapproval of cannabis, the
public still viewed cannabis as less dangerous as ‘pasta base’, and legalizing cannabis to
prevent people from having to interact with drug traffickers proved to be a salient selling
point to parliamentary members. Drug users in Uruguay are often framed as sick people,
rather than exclusively as criminals that must be punished, as is the case in the history of
the United States and Canada (Musto 2018). To understand Uruguay’s long history of
“harm reduction” in the policing of drug use, a strategy that has been gradually adopted
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by the United States and Canada over recent decades, an analysis of the development of
Uruguay’s political culture over the 20th century is needed.
Uruguay began a process of secularization much earlier in the 20th century than
other countries found regionally, a process which is instrumental to understanding the
countries liberal past with drug users (Musto 2018). Unlike most surrounding countries,
the Catholic Church is significantly weaker historically in Uruguay than surrounding
countries. In 1909, religion ceased to be taught in public schools, and in 1917, the
separation of church and state was officially included in the constitution of the
Uruguayan state (Musto 2018). In absence of the church, citizens in Uruguay established
a culture and political system of “civil faith” which was antagonistic to religion (Musto
2018). This further established the state of Uruguay as the sole guarantor of the public
good, which saw itself as tasked with minimizing social harms among the population
(Musto 2018). Essential to the liberal drug history of Uruguay was the presence of a
duopoly of political power for much of the 20th century; the parties of Partido Colorado
and Partido Nacional together established a liberal understanding of social relations
within the state (Musto 2018). Instead of the church being the primary force of policing
social values, this responsibility fell to the state.
In 1931, the state of Uruguay established a state-facilitated whiskey monopoly of
alcohol production that persisted until the year of 1996, some have argued that this
precedent was the basis for future regulation of recreational cannabis (Walsh and Ramsey
2016). The first attempt to regulate narcotics through the criminal code such as opium,
cocoa leaf, hashish and their derivatives soon followed in the year 1934. Despite
measures by the state to regulate narcotics during the 1930s, drug use remained relatively
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low in Uruguay throughout much of the mid 20th century. In 1973, a civil-military
dictatorship was established which ultimately lasted until 1985, despite an authoritarian
political structure, the military dictatorship was the first to take a step away from the
punitive drug war found in other South American countries, and instead focused solely on
drug traffickers which was strictly enforced (3–15-year sentences), rather than drug users
(decriminalized). In 1974, a military decree (14294) established the allowance of “the
minimum use” narcotics, which was never explicitly defined and left up to judicial
interpretation. This lack of definition allowed for the unequal enforcement of narcotic
use, including that of cannabis. Ironically, just a year later Uruguay signed and ratified
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961).
The return of democracy in 1985 saw the return of activism concerned with
changing the contradictions between the criminalization of drug supply and allowance of
drug use. In 1987, the special commission on drug addiction was created in the chamber
of representatives as drug use began to rise in Uruguay, a trend that continued throughout
the 1990s. By 1998, 3% of the population had tried cannabis, this number jumped to
12.2% in 2006 (Walsh and Ramsey 2016). For comparison, in Canada, the number of
people who had used cannabis jumped from 8% in 1994 to 15% in 2004 (Fischer, Russel,
Boyd 2020). In the United States, the number of people who had used cannabis was
approximately 10% in 1994 and about 13% in 2004 (Yu, Chen, Chen, and Yan 2020). In
1999, drug trafficking sentences were amended and lowered to 20 months minimum, the
“minimum quantity” allowed for drug use was changed to “a reasonable quantity”, as
well as the establishment of drug rehabilitation centers (Walsh and Ramsey 2016).
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At the turn of the century, attitudes around drug use began to slowly shift further
towards harm reduction, as well as an increase in activism surrounding the contradictions
found in drug law (Queirolo 2020a). In 2004, a program increasing safe access to clean
needles was established. By 2008, The Uruguayan delegation to the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs argued that human rights concerns should be incorporated into
international drug control treaties, with an emphasis on harm reduction (Hudak, Ramsey
and Walsh 2018). In 2009, President Tabaré Vázquez announced his intention to
collaborate with Bolivian President Evo Morales to change the way the international drug
control treaties deal with coca leaf (Transnational Institute 2021).
Beginning in the 21st century, Coca leaf began to become a salient issue
domestically in Uruguay, as more people began to use the crack like drug “pasta base”,
which led to it rapidly spreading through lower income neighborhoods in the same way
crack in the 1980s had done in the United States (Walsh and Ramsey 2016). This was
inherently tied to the cannabis issue, although it is not apparent at first; cannabis users
were forced to buy low-quality Paraguayan cannabis from the same dealers who were
selling pasta base, exposing them to unnecessary risks. Later, this would become a crucial
selling point in arguing for a state regulated cannabis regime, which had the intention of
minimizing the contact of cannabis users with that of drug traffickers that sold other
substances outside of cannabis, as well as providing users with higher quality cannabis
(Walsh and Ramsey 2016).
Pathway to Legalization
Despite decades of activism by cannabis activists, and more broadly drug policy
reform advocates, the momentum around cannabis legalization began to find its political
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backing with the election of José Mujica and his congressional majority led by the Broad
Front. This led to the Addictions Commission being filled with lawmakers who were
amenable to the idea of ending the cannabis prohibition, despite its broad unpopularity.
To compound this, ending the cannabis prohibition found supporters in multiple parties,
who explored legalizing cannabis for home cultivation (Walsh and Ramsey 2016).
Initially, these initiatives failed in 2010 and 2011, only to gain more traction later on. In
early 2012, the multiparty coalition looked set to legalize homegrown cannabis
cultivation, which itself had been influenced and inspired by Uruguayan activists and the
Spanish experience with cannabis social clubs and homegrown cultivation (Müller and
Draper 2017; Musto 2018). It is not coincidental that cannabis legalization efforts began
to gain more momentum after U.S states Colorado and Washington passed their own
cannabis legalization initiatives (Hudak, Ramsey and Walsh 2018).
Despite persistent polling that showed cannabis legalization efforts were
unpopular, concerns surrounding the use of pasta base and organized crime continued to
appear as a salient political issue, even as Uruguay continued to be the one of the safest
countries in South America (Walsh and Ramsey 2016). Mujica, who was interested in
increasing his international visibility and capitalizing on his congressional majority, as
well as making human rights a central part of his political appeal, soon capitalized on this
and threw his weight behind the push to end the cannabis prohibition (Obradovic 2019).
It has been argued that this move was not Mujica’s idea, and instead was inspired by
Minister of Defence, Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro, who advocated for the end of
cannabis prohibition before Mujica (Hoffmann 2020). He argued that the state should
directly engage in competition with the illicit market in order to weaken them
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economically (Hoffmann 2020). Despite this, both of these factors led to him publishing
his “Strategy for life and Coexistence” a 15-point plan aimed at addressing insecurity in
the country, which included legalizing and controlling marijuana sales, as well as state
monopolization of retail sales. Mujica argued that this has precedent in Uruguayan
society, pointing to the state’s former monopolization of whiskey established in 1931,
which drastically improved the quality of alcohol at the time (AP 2013).
A President of a sovereign nation advocating for the state monopolization of
cannabis did indeed increase international visibility, in both positive and negative ways.
For one, the International Narcotics Control Board saw this as an afront to the
international drug framework. On the other hand, this step to move past the punitive War
on Drugs found support internationally, particularly from other South American countries
who had felt its brutal impact most prominently. Uruguay’s international position as a
small South American country made the choice to move towards cannabis legalization all
the more prominent. A move that potentially put their own national bank of having
financial ties cut to prominent international financing located in the United States. An
issue Canada wasn’t particularly concerned about as one of the world’s largest
economies. In this light, a tightly regulated system, unlike ones found in the United States
prior to Uruguay’s legalization make sense. The state of Uruguay had a vested interest in
preventing spillover to other nations, which in part, shaped how their regulatory system
was developed. Countries like the United States which possess the bulk of international
capital has had less to be concerned about.
President Mujica continued to be a prominent activist until the legislation passed,
backed by cannabis activists, who kept cannabis legalization prominent on the public
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policy agenda. As the Broad Front rallied support for the bill, it was amended and
reamended numerous times. The push to pass the bill was paused for nearly a year due to
polling continuing to show low support for the bill, and nearly fell apart numerous times
(Hoffmann 2020). After numerous debates over the merits of various proposals, the bill
eventually leading to a system of obtaining cannabis through three access points:
homegrown cultivation, a state cultivated monopoly with pharmacy retail as the method
of distribution, and cannabis social clubs. Despite the sheer political voluntarism it took
to pass this unprecedented bill and political arm twisting, the bill was passed 50-46 in the
lower house (Chamber of Representatives), and 16-13 in the upper house (Senate).
President Mujica signed the bill into law December 24th, 2013, notably without much
fanfare (Nelson 2013).
The passing of this historical legislation can be understood through a number of
viewpoints, of which researchers have argued some as more prominent than others.
Rather than pointing to one specific thing that led to the regulation and legalization of
recreational cannabis, this research suggest that a combination of factors allowed for the
bill to pass, as is the case in any country legalizing cannabis. The pathway to legalization
can never be solely top-down or bottom-up, as the story is always more complex than
that, and the bill contained elements both proponents (political elite and cannabis
activists) advocated for (Hoffmann 2020). Kingdon (1995) suggests on some occasions,
certain circumstances offer opportunities for policy issues to make their way to the
governments agenda creating a “window of opportunity”, which this research argues was
in fact the case in Uruguay (Musto 2018; Queirolo et al. 2018). A unique case of political
voluntarism – the political will by a liberal coalition and an activist President, combined
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with concerns over rising crime and the presence of a “harder drug” epidemic in pasta
base (public insecurity), and the unique political culture of Uruguay in having a past
history of state intervention in the regulation of substances (alcohol particularly), as well
as seeing drug users as sick individuals, rather than criminals, created the conditions
necessary for this bill to be passed (Queirolo 2020a; Hudak, Ramsey, and Walsh 2018;
Walsh and Ramsey 2016; Pardo 2014; Obradovic 2019).
To Tax or Not to Tax
Uruguay’s system of taxation on recreational cannabis is unique when compared
to our other two case studies, it was specifically designed to eliminate the illicit market,
as well as improve the public health outcomes of recreational cannabis users (Transform
Drug Policy 2018). Therefore, this system of taxation, is rather not a system of taxation at
all, and instead a form of price setting that allows for the cost of cannabis to remain low
in order to compete with drug traffickers. Indeed, it has been effective in keeping the
price of cannabis well below that of the illicit market (New Frontier Data 2021). Rather
than the state creating the system to be a profit seeking venture or revenue gatherer, as is
the case in the United States or partially so in Canada, it was explicitly designed not to
be. Government revenues were not a selling point of the proposals to the public, instead
each method of obtaining cannabis through state regulated access points were created to
minimize the profit incentive; a cannabis social club where users pay fees in order to
become a member and then are allotted a specific amount of cannabis each month,
homegrown cultivation which mandates that surpluses are turned over to government
regulators, and state cultivated pharmacy retail with a set price, where the pharmacies or
the government makes no profits (initially set at around $1.40/g) (Hudak, Ramsey and
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Walsh 2018). Under this system, pharmacies still receive a small part of the profit, but
approximately 70% goes to government licensed producers (Pascual 2019). Even the
method of which the government denoted the retail market would be placed and sold
from says something about the underlying goals of the system, pharmacies, or rather
public health institutions by nature. Cannabis social clubs are essentially tightly regulated
non-profit dispensaries, aimed at promoting a healthier bond between the user and
substance (Pardal et al. 2019).
The long-term viability of a regulatory system designed in this manner is up for
debate, particularly because it is difficult for regulators to predict month by month
demand due to fluctuations in membership of registry, causing supply deficits or an
oversupply of cannabis. (Queirolo 2020a). For one, it costs to enforce any policy on a
regulatory level, especially when it is designed to not produce revenue for the
government, and issues with predicting demand has proved a great challenge from the
first day of sales (Pascual 2020c). On the other hand, Uruguay’s system of regulation has
greatly increased the quality of cannabis, initial public health outcomes have been
positive, and reduced the illicit market by a significant amount (Queirolo 2020). A
potential solution to some of the more complicated issues of funding could be some form
of government subsidy or allowing for greater price fluctuations, allowing tourists to use
cannabis to raise addition revenue for maintenance of the regulatory framework, and the
addition of actual dispensaries (Hudak, Ramsey, and Walsh 2018).
Market Regulation
Table 5: Uruguay Recreational Cannabis Regulation
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Sources: Magdalena and Kilmer 2017; Hetzer and Walsh 2014; Hudak, Ramsey,
and Walsh 2018; Musto 2018; Obradovic 2019; Pardal et al. 2019; Pardo 2014;
Queirolo 2021a; Walsh and Ramsey 2016.
Uruguay maintains the strictest regulatory system for recreational cannabis when
compared to either of the case studies presented in this paper. Why this is the case can be
understood in a number of ways. First, Uruguay was significantly more concerned about
their international exposure to international economic retaliation for being outside of the
traditional practices of Single Convention on Narcotics (1961). Instead, the government
of Uruguay argued that their strict regulation of cannabis was more in compliance with
the treaty due to the state being back in the fold of supply regulation and being better able
to secure better public health outcomes than prohibition. Second, the system was
explicitly designed to avoid the negative public health externalities that come with
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legalizing recreational cannabis through strict regulation. Third, the government of
Uruguay wanted to avoid a spillover of recreational cannabis into neighboring countries,
as well as an increase in ‘cannabis tourism’ – the latter has proved to be more difficult to
achieve. Some features found in Uruguay’s regulation of recreational cannabis that are
not found in the other case studies are price setting of retail cannabis, fingerprint scanners
for obtaining cannabis supply, a national registry on all forms of cannabis supply, citizens
from other countries may not obtain any cannabis supply for recreational use, cannabis
social clubs, the ability to obtain cannabis from only one supply source, no for-profit
industry, and a strict zero tolerance policy on advertising. Other regulations like the
allowance of homegrown cultivation (particularly 6 plants) or the banning of drugged
driving are similar to the United States or Canada. Arguments can be made that the
extremely strict nature of regulation has hampered efforts to further combat the illicit
market and created a new grey market in people selling legal cannabis supply to
unregistered users and tourists, the changing of certain regulatory policies may allow the
system to function better and more in line with their initial goal of eliminating the illicit
market. It is estimated that for every one person on the registry, that person supplies
another one to two people with cannabis who are not on the registry (Queirolo 2020a)
The strict regulation of the physical spaces of cannabis supply are similar to what is
found in the United States or Canada.
The recreational cannabis market is available to any Uruguayan citizen over the
age of 18, and participants who wish to enter must register with the IRCCA, a national
regulatory body and registry of recreational cannabis users. This has been off-putting to
some recreational cannabis users in Uruguay, but the government maintains that this
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registry is purely confidential and will not be used in any way outside of ensuring
recreational cannabis is being used by those who it is intended for. Once a citizen
registers through the IRCCA, they must choose which method they would like to receive
their cannabis supply from, and this will be their only method of which they can receive
recreational cannabis. In 2019, there were 37,971 citizens registered for 17 pharmacies,
7576 home growers, and 3,962 members of cannabis social clubs in 135 clubs (Pascual
2019). In 2021, there were 43,578 citizens registered for pharmacy retail, 11,090 home
growers, and 5,315 members in cannabis social clubs. This is quite a small proportion of
the population, but it is estimated that on average, registered Uruguayans provide up to
two unregistered people with licit cannabis (Queirolo 2020a). Users can change which
method they prefer, but only a limited number of times per a specific period of time. This
also has caused controversy for a couple of reasons. First, is that naturally crops fail, or
the quality is not as good as they hoped, causing users to want to switch to a new method
of supply. Second, supply issues have been a persistent feature of the system, at times due
to the former reason, and at others because the list of people registered for recreational
cannabis distribution at pharmacies regularly fluctuates causing long periods of times
where citizens are unable to purchase recreational cannabis due to the demand not
matching the supply (Queirolo 2020a).
Once a citizen has registered and denoted their preferred method of supply, they
are allocated 10g of recreational cannabis per week, or 480g of recreational cannabis per
year. This cannabis is produced by two government approved cannabis companies (more
have been added since), ICC and Simbiois, they produce two types of cannabis (Alpha 1
and Beta 1, Alpha 2 and Beta 2 were later added as options), which are not allowed to be
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above 15% THC by law (Hudak, Ramsey and Walsh 2018). In addition to this, cannabis
flower is the only cannabis product available, but the regulations do not exclude the
potential for adding other cannabis products such as edibles or oils in the future. Licenses
to produce cannabis for the government require a $5000 deposit and are won based on a
lottery system (Pascual 2020). Approved companies provide seeds to government
regulators who distribute seeds to users who wish to participate in homegrown cultivation
or participate in a cannabis social club.
The three methods of which one can obtain recreational cannabis supply are all
highly regulated but contain many features that are found in other recreational cannabis
programs in our other two case studies, which in unsurprising as countries that have
experimented with recreational cannabis regulation has no doubt learned from one
another. For example, homegrown cultivation of cannabis is a feature of all three
countries, and cannabis social clubs were first utilized in Spain. Publicly run retail of
cannabis is also a feature in many Canadian provinces. In contrast to this, THC limits,
price-setting, a national registry for all users, purchasing limits, and limited retail are
features unseen in other countries, which could potentially produce different outcomes
than other states with legalized cannabis.
Centralization of Cannabis Policy
The regulation of cannabis policy in Uruguay is exclusively national, the laws and
regulation of cannabis are uniform across the whole of the country. The IRCCA is solely
responsible for managing, regulating, and maintaining the recreational cannabis
framework. It also maintains a national tracking system similar to what is found in
Canada. The price of cannabis is the same in every corner of the country, and laws
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surrounding obtaining access to cannabis or becoming a licensed producer are consistent
across the board. All pharmacies, in any local jurisdiction are eligible to become a legal
supplier of cannabis, and all citizens that register for the national registry and are 18 are
eligible to engage in homegrown cultivation of cannabis or establish a cannabis social
club anywhere in the country. Conversely, this has not meant that access to cannabis has
been even across the country, many areas of the country remain without pharmacy retail
due to a lack of pharmacies willing to sign on to the program and risk their relationships
with banks (Hudak, Ramsey, and Walsh 2018). Although implementation has been a
slow and cautious project, the regulation of cannabis in Uruguay has been effective in
minimizing having to enforce cannabis regulations, and consumers report good
relationships with regulatory authorities (Pardal et al. 2019; Cruz, Fernanda, Queiu).
Further education of officials on more technical aspects of cannabis policy could help in
ensuring the even enforcement of policies (Hudak, Ramsey, and Walsh 2018). The
straight-forward and centralized nature of regulation in Uruguay has made for a system
that is easy to understand, both for consumers, and producers wishing to sell to
Uruguayan market.
Conclusion
The Uruguayan government has identified the for-profit industry,
overconsumption, high-potency cannabis products and general commercialization as its
primary concerns in legalizing recreational cannabis and instituting strict regulation of
the recreational cannabis market. This contrasts a great deal with what the United States
or Canada considers ‘strict’ regulation, in both countries, the for-profit motive is in
integral part to both frameworks. Consequently, some of the policies in Uruguay have
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created new avenues for the illicit market to exploit (selling to tourists or unregistered
users of legal cannabis), undermining one of the central goals of legalization, but these
can be remedied in the future with changes in regulation. The Uruguayan system has
some considerable strengths and weaknesses, but as the market has matured, their system
has grown in popularity and shows that it should be considered as a serious alternative.
For one, initial public health indicators have been positive, the quality of cannabis has
dramatically improved over Paraguayan ‘presando’, and more than half of cannabis users
are now using legal supplies of cannabis (Queirolo 2020a). Additional funding of the
regulatory apparatus, and further education of local health and enforcement authorities, as
well as the creation of future private dispensaries with more cannabis products may go a
great deal in solving some persistent issues (Hudak, Ramsey, and Walsh 2018).
Additionally, the legalization of cannabis in Canada has crucially given Uruguayan banks
that service pharmacies where cannabis is sold access to financial capital that is less
concerned with potential economic repercussions from the United States, which was a
persistent issue at the beginning of implementation (Tegel 2018). Two Canadian
companies are already operating as legal cultivators in Uruguay (Pascual 2019).
Furthering these relationships in the future may be crucial to the success of the program
in the future. Three years into cannabis legalization being operational on the retail level,
the cannabis policies have been deemed a ‘successes by the former head of the national
drug agency (IRCCA) (Pascual 2020). With the country selling 8,818 pounds of dried
cannabis flower for a little over $5 million dollars (Pascual 2020). The risk perception
among adolescents remained stable, consumption by high schoolers did not go up, but the
average age of consumption and increases of use by adults went up consistent to pre-
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legalization trends, which has been consistent with the experiences of other countries
(Pascual 2020). Uruguay has also begun to approve more cannabis suppliers to meet
consumer demand and deal with persistent supply issues (Pascual 2019). In addition to
this, the persistent supply issues that regulators have faced in the past may start to
stabilize as the market matures, and new registries are less prevalent (Pascual 2020c).
Interestingly, the popularity of cannabis supply clubs and homegrown cultivation are
more popular than the pharmacy retail section of the law. As time goes on, policymakers
may lessen the highly restrictive nature of obtaining cannabis in Uruguay as they adjust
to regulating an increasingly normalized commodity.
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IV. CASE STUDY – CANADA
Introduction
Canada was the second country internationally to legalize and regulate
recreational cannabis, and the first G7 or G20 country to do so. Due to their international
position as a highly developed country with a considerable economy, it is the first direct
challenge to the international framework for drug prohibition. Unlike Uruguay, Canada
has deep connections to the prevailing set of international powers, including the United
States, Europe, and other Anglosphere countries. This direct confrontation with
international precedent has been of great interests of researchers, as well as big business.
Canada has deemed itself open for cannabis business, and international capital has
responded by joining this “green rush”. In 2019, Canada had 400 brick and mortar stores,
with approximately $908 million in sales, and the average distance to a cannabis store
was 34 kilometers (Statistics Canada 2019). In 2020, the Canadian cannabis market
doubled to $2.6 billion in sales, partially due to expansion in eCommerce driven by the
pandemic in addition to a broader maturation of the market (Hasse 2021). The move to
legalize and regulate cannabis as a big business commodity will surely increase the
pressure on the United States to move on national legalization as well. Unlike the United
States, recreational cannabis legalization has been the product of broad public approval,
as well as broad political support in the Parliament of Canada. In many ways, it
represents a synthesis of the recreational cannabis regulatory apparatuses that came
before it, that of U.S states and the government of Uruguay. First, this chapter will
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discuss the history of cannabis prohibition inside Canada, and the pathway to recreational
cannabis legalization. Second, this chapter will analyze the recreational cannabis policies
of Canada nationally and its provinces and territories in three categories: taxation, market
regulation, and centralization of cannabis policy. Lastly, this chapter will discuss the
future of Canada’s recreational cannabis market.
Background on Case Study
Canada’s legalization of adult-use cannabis represents a truly massive overhaul in
the realm of public policy. In the United States, state and subnational governments
adopted and implemented their own set of regulations, without input from the federal
government. In Uruguay, the unitary national government adopted their own set of
regulations. In Canada, this project was much different, due to it being an exercise in
federalism and government cooperation based primarily on the policies established over
the past one hundred years concerning both illicit substances and alcohol and tobacco. In
three years’ time, the federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal governments revised
hundreds of laws, established different authorities on cannabis policies utilizing previous
alcohol authorities to do so, and implemented programs that allowed for the cultivation,
sale, and consumption of cannabis in all of Canada’s sovereign territory. This public
policy feat was herculean task, despite the issues it naturally ran into with policy
innovation and the rushed timeline set by the federal government, proving to be one of
the most complex public policy issues since the establishment of the modern welfare state
(Wesley 2019).
Autonomy at the provincial, territorial, and municipal level, codified by the
national government has allowed for a heterogenous mix of cannabis regulations across
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Canada. Like the United States, this has allowed individual provinces and territories to
become natural laboratories of cannabis regulation. Understanding differences between
subnational governments in Canada, as well as national policies when compared
internationally will better allow this research to demonstrate that Canada has a synthesis
of policies found in the United States or Uruguay, although to be sure, Canada’s
regulation of cannabis is unique in its own right. Broadly, the goals of legalizing cannabis
in Canada have been multifaceted, much like the United States or Uruguay, and include
things such as eliminating the illicit market, freeing up law enforcement to increase
public safety, ensuring adolescents aren’t exposed to cannabis promotion or engage in its
use, and to a less extent at least initially, broader social equity for the harms during
cannabis prohibition. (Shanahan and Cyrenne 2019; Fischer, Russell, and Boyd 2020).
The History of Cannabis Prohibition in Canada
In many ways, the history of cannabis and other narcotics in Canada is not that
different from that of our other case study, the United States. This is unsurprising due to a
shared border, as well as a similar political history, political structure, close trade
relations, and similar religious affiliations. Despite these similarities, the two countries
approach to drug policies has been diverging as of recent decades, most notably in the
regulation and legalization of cannabis at the national level in 2018. The more liberal
approach to drug policies as of recent decades exemplifies a broader shift towards “harm
reduction” drug policies in Canada (Fischer, Russel, and Boyd 2020) This recent
development has highlighted the differences between the Canadian approach to cannabis
supply reform, and that of the United States, which has also begun to implement more
harm reduction drug policies, but this has been primarily at the subnational level, because
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of this it has furthered their differences in policy at that national level. Understanding the
history behind this landmark bill, and what led to the first G7 country to legalize cannabis
at this moment is crucial to understanding the development of the regulatory policies that
have shaped the current Canadian cannabis regulatory apparatus.
At the turn of the 20th century, Canada began to embark on a strict prohibitionist
policy of narcotics. This can be exemplified by the signing of the 1912 Hague
International Opium Convention and the 1925 Geneva Conventions; domestic drug
prohibition law was established in 1923 in the Opium and Other Drugs act. At first, little
attention was paid to cannabis, and its attachment to these laws was more of a sidenote
than a primary function of either the treaties or domestic law (Fischer, Russel, and Boyd
2020). Through the next three decades, the “reefer madness” and intense demonization of
cannabis spilled across the border from the United States into Canada and began to shape
the narrative in similar ways to that of the United States, including in the discriminatory
enforcement of minorities in Canada.
By the 1960s, cannabis began to be associated with that of the “counterculture” in
Canada, and its use began to spread through young people of primarily educated middleclass backgrounds (Fischer, Russel, and Boyd 2020). This expansion of cannabis use
caught the attention of the primary enforcers of drug policy, the Federal Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, and arrests began to expand as well. In 1961, the establishment of
Narcotic Control act put Canada in compliance with the strict prohibition required by the
1961 Single Convention on Narcotics. Arrests related to cannabis jumped from 1500 in
1969 to nearly 65,000 by the end of the next decade (Fischer, Russel, and Boyd 2020).
Cannabis during this time also became the primary drug of choice of Canadians, well
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surpassing that of use of other illicit narcotics. Concern began to rise that young people
were unfairly being subject to the harsh punishment of drug convictions, potentially
ruining their future economic or educational endeavors. Much like in America, the
discriminatory nature of the enforcement of cannabis prohibition was present in Canada.
This ultimately culminated with the establishment of the Federal Commission of Inquiry
into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs in 1969, or the Le Dain Commission, which was
named after its chairman, Judge Gerald Le Dain. The conclusions of the commission
found that cannabis was a rather unharmful drug in comparison to other illicit substances
and should not constitute the strict punishment that was associated with other drugs.
The commission’s findings were of little political consequence, and the broader move
towards cannabis decriminalization began to die out throughout the 1970s. This fact
largely mirrors the similar path that cannabis activists in the United States experienced, as
decriminalization activism began to die out around a similar time. Ronald Reagans 1980s
War on Drugs broadly shifted the conversation around narcotics in Canada as well,
further diminishing hopes of decriminalization of cannabis in the near future. The
divergence from a similar history of strict cannabis prohibition with that of the United
States began to shift as the 1990s was ushered in.
In 1996, drug laws in Canada were changed with the enactment of the Drugs and
Substances Act, which amended the scheduling of cannabis and reduced some of the
punishments associated with cannabis possession and use. Around the same time, use of
cannabis in the past year began to increase as well, in 1994 nearly 8% of Canadians had
smoked cannabis in the past year, by 2004 this number was 15% (Fischer, Russel, and
Boyd 2020). In the early 2000s, cultural values surrounding the use of cannabis began to
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change, and regrets over the harsh prohibition of cannabis began to rise as well. A serious
of court cases allowed for the creation of the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations,
which were established in 2001, thus creating legal access to medicinal cannabis. In
2001, the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs recommended the cannabis
prohibition be lifted, and that the sale of cannabis be regulated. In 2002, the House
Commons Special Committee on the Non-Medical Use of Drugs recommended cannabis
be decriminalized, but that its use remained illegal, similar to cannabis drug policy found
in the Netherlands. Powerful organizations around this time also began to voice their
support for lifting the cannabis prohibition, including the Canadian Association of Chiefs
of Police, the Canadian Medical Association, and various editorial boards (Fischer,
Russel, and Boyd 2020). In 2003, after the election of a liberal centrist government, bills
in support of decriminalization of cannabis began to appear but were ultimately defeated.
The election of a conservative government in 2006 functionally killed the hopes for
further cannabis legalization or decriminalization. Despite this, the approval of cannabis
decriminalization and cannabis legalization steadily continued to rise. With it, came an
expansion of the medical cannabis market, which also slowly began to further develop
through in expansion of legal dispensaries, and legal cultivators. The expansion of the
medical cannabis industry is crucial to understanding the future regulatory framework in
Canada, as well as contributing to a collective normalization of cannabis. It is notable that
since the late 1990s, Canada has been experiencing its own opioid epidemic, one that
tracks very closely to that of the United States. As the opioid crisis expanded in Canada
over the past two to three decades, so did the collective normalization of cannabis use. In
addition to the mounting opioid crisis, more attention began to be paid to the plight of
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minorities during cannabis prohibition. According to one study, Black Canadians were
nearly 3x more likely to be arrested for cannabis possession, and another study found that
Indigenous people in Canada were 9x more likely to be arrested (Timothy 2018). This is
no doubt similar to the United States and has produced its own challenges for Canada
when the process for legalization occurred, rectifying these wrongs became a priority in
addition to other priorities laid out by the national government.
Pathway to Legalization
The pathway to legalization in Canada, did not happen “overnight”, in fact it was
decades in the making (Wesley 2019). No doubt a crucial element in the step towards
legalization was the allowance of a medical cannabis apparatus by the Supreme Court in
2001 and the solidifying of this in the Marihuana for Medical Purposes Regulations.
Medical cannabis has been a precursor to legalization of non-medical cannabis in all U.S.
States, except for South Dakota and Virginia. It became the foundation for future
legalization in Canada. Prior to this, an important step towards legalization occurred in
the 1970s in the national Commission of Inquiry into the Non-Medical Use of Drugs,
ironically Justin Trudeau’s father was the Prime Minister during the time of this inquiry
(Fischer, Russell, and Boyd 2020; Wesley 2019). In 2012, the Liberal Party of Canada
passed a resolution at its Party Convention to advocate for legalizing cannabis. Justin
Trudeau was initially against the resolution, but his stance soon changed after he became
leader in 2013, maneuvering to outflank his opponents on the left (Wesley 2019). It is not
a coincidence that this occurred around the same time as Colorado, Washington, and
Uruguay legalized cannabis. In 2015, the Liberal Party of Canada campaigned on the
legalization of cannabis as a signature issue and promised if they were elected that they
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would fulfill the mandate in three years (Wesley 2019). Upon their election, the Federal
government led by the Liberal Party of Canada launched the Cannabis Legalization Task
Force, led by former Deputy Prime Minister and Attorney General, Anne McLellan.
Cannabis legalization, at the time, held majority of support when Canadians elected the
Liberal Party, but this wasn’t without some skeptics over the fine details (Tahirili 2016).
The Task Force released its report on legalization in a little less than six months after it
was established, and in April of 2017, the Federal Government confirmed their intention
to legalize cannabis in July of 2018. The Task Force was crucial in establishing the
priorities of the national government, which were public health, eliminating the illicit
market, and public safety. The bills, C-45, and C-46 were tandem bills to legalize and
regulate cannabis, C-45 established the formal rules around legalization, and C-46
concerned impaired driving (Wesley 2019). This left approximately less than a year and
half before legalization for Provincial and Territorial governments to draw up a
regulatory apparatus to implement, a factor that became crucial to understanding the
established regulations in Canada. Time and resource constraints led governments at the
subnational level to largely rely on existing machinery associated with alcohol and
tobacco regulatory and distributional systems (Wesley and Solomons 2019). Most
subnational governments accepted the McLeelan Report as the foundation of their
approach to creating a framework for legalization. After a series of rounds of public
comments and further debate, on October 17th, 2018 cannabis herb and oils were
officially legalized, and the legalization of edibles and lotions followed shortly behind in
2019 (Daley 2019). The House of Commons voted 205-82 to legalize recreational
cannabis, and the Senate passed the Cannabis Act 52-29.
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Taxation of Cannabis in Canada
Unlike taxation of cannabis in the United States, taxation of cannabis in Canada is
straightforward. All provincial and territorial governments, apart from Manitoba have
signed the Coordinated Cannabis Taxation Agreements (CCTA) which dictates that
combined rate of all federal, provincial, and territorial taxes will not exceed higher that
$1 a gram, or 10% of the selling price (Legalline Canada 2021). Taxation policy for
adult-use cannabis in Canada was ironed out by policymakers at the national level prior
to legalization of recreational cannabis. In the current framework, 75% of all tax revenue
generated from the cannabis industry is earmarked for Provincial or Territorial
governments, and 25% is for the federal government (IndicaOnline 2019). At the federal
level, the cannabis excise tax is only applied to cultivators, producers, and packagers of
cannabis. This tax is paid once companies sell to retailers, both public and private
entities. Once this tax is paid, cannabis products are provided a Provincial excise stamp
that verifies that this cannabis product was purchased through legal channels. The federal
cannabis excise tax includes two types of taxation: an ad-valorem duty, and a flat-rate
duty that is applied to the weight of the product. Another tax is levied if viable seeds or
seedlings are sold. License holders also must pay 2.3% of annual revenue, or $23,000
Canadian dollars, whichever is higher, regulatory fee to the federal government for the
cost of regulation. Micro-class license holder must pay a 1% annual revenue fee or $2500
Canadian dollars.
Table 6: Canadian Federal Cannabis Excise Taxes
Cannabis plant product

Flat-Rate duty

Ad Valorem

Flowering Material

$0.25 per gram

2.5%
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Non-Flowering Material

$0.075 per gram

2.5%

Viable seed/seedling

$0.25 per seed

2.5%

Adapted from Indica Online 2019.
Additional Sources: Hansen et al. 2020; Irvine and Light 2020.
In addition to the taxes placed on cultivators and producers, all consumers
purchasing cannabis at a retail store are subject to two ad-valorem taxes. The first is the
federal tax on all goods and services known officially as the Goods and Services Tax
(GST) that is identical in all provinces and set at five percent. The second tax is the
Provincial Sales Tax (PST), which varies from province to province, and some
governments have eliminated this tax entirely. When provinces decide to implement both
taxes, some provinces combine the two and it is known as the Harmonized Sales Tax
(HST). This allows consumers to just pay one flat rate when purchasing cannabis. In
addition to this, one province (Manitoba) has implemented a social responsibility tax on
private retail cannabis operations. It requires that dispensaries located in the province pay
6% of their annual revenue to the province (IndicaOnline 2019). Also, Manitoba has
implemented a wholesale tax of $0.75 per gram (Legalline Canada 2021).
Table 7: Canadian Ad Valorem Taxes
Province

Rate Type

PST

GST

Total

Alberta

GST

0%

5%

5%

British Columbia

GST + PST

7%

5%

12%

Manitoba

GST + PST

8%

5%

13%

New-Brunswick

HST

10%

5%

15%

Newfoundland and

HST

10%

5%

15%

Labrador
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Northwest Territories

GST

0%

5%

5%

Nova Scotia

HST

10%

5%

15%

Nunavut

GST

0%

5%

5%

Ontario

HST

8%

5%

13%

Prince Edward Island

HST

10%

5%

15%

Québec

GST + PST

9.975%

5%

14.975%

Saskatchewan

GST + PST

6%

5%

11%

Yukon

GST

0%

5%

5%

Adapted from Indica Online 2019.
Additional Sources: Hansen et al. 2020; Irvine and Light 2020; Fischer, Russell, and
Boyd 2020.
Canada unified taxation nationally with uniform taxation of cultivators and
producers, so as to not allow provinces to get the competitive advantage over other
jurisdictions and to set a price floor for the minimum amount of taxation via a federal
proportional sales tax, taxation revenue in Canada is still vulnerable to price shocks in the
same way states are in the United States. Like some states in the United States, Canada
has also combined taxation by weight at the wholesale or cultivator level, in conjunction
with taxation by price. Concerns from policymakers about the over-taxation of cannabis
leading to people turning to the illicit market have been present from the beginning, one
of the primary goals of the law was to eliminate the illicit market. In fact, Canada has
been here before with tobacco, when in the 1980s high taxes of tobacco led people to turn
to the illicit market for cheaper cigarettes (Cain 2017). Since the legalization of cannabis,
local governments have been concerned that they wouldn’t be appropriated enough
money from provincial governments to carry out enforcement of regulation (Cain 2017).
According to some government officials, this turned out to be true (Thibedeau 2019).
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There was an expectation that provinces would allocate 25% of cannabis tax revenue to
municipalities, but in some instances, particularly for larger cities this hasn’t been the
case (Thibedeau 2019).
Market Regulation
Table 8: Cannabis Market Regulation in Canada
Province/Territory

Method of

Wholesale

Age of

Personal

Homegrown

Online Sales

Permitted

Delivery

Supply

Distribution

Consumption

Possession

Cultivation

(Y/N)

only in

(Y/N

Limit

(Y/N)

private
residences?
(Y/N)

Alberta

Private

Public Only

18

30g

Yes (4)

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

(Government
only)
British Columbia

Public

Public Only

19

30g

Yes (4)

Yes
(Government
only)

Manitoba

Private

Public Only

19

30g

Prohibited (0)

Yes (Private)

Yes

Yes

New Brunswick

Public

Public Only

19

30g

Yes (4)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

(Government
only)
New Foundland and

N/A

Public Only

19

30g

Yes (4)

Labrador

Yes
(Government
only)

Northwest

Public and

Territories

Private

Public Only

19

30g

Yes (4)

Yes
(Government
only)

Nova Scotia

Public

Public Only

19

30g

Yes (4)

Yes
(Government
only)

Nunavut

Public

Public Only

19

30g

Yes (4)

Yes
(Government
only)

Ontario

Private

Public Only

19

30g

Yes (4)

Yes
(Government
only)

Prince Edward

Public and

Island

Private

Public Only

19

30g

Yes (4)

Yes
(Government
only)

Québec

Public and

Public Only

19

30g

Private

Prohibited (0)

Yes
(Government
only)
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Saskatchewan

Private

Yukon

Public and

Public and

19

30g

Yes (4)

Yes (Private)

No

Yes

19

30g

Yes (4)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Private
Public only

Private

(Government
only, and only
if no stores)

Adapted from Shanahan and Cyrenne 2019 and Lancione et al. 2020.
Additional Sources: ARCannabis Store 2021; Cannabis Business Plan 2021;
Government of Canada 2021; Government of Canada 2021a; Fischer, Russell, and
Boyd 2020; Reuters Staff 2018.
In Canada, unlike the United States, and like Uruguay, adult-use cannabis has
been legalized at the national level. This has placed the burden of enforcement,
regulation, and implementation on all three levels of government – Federal, Provincial
(Territorial), and Municipal. Federal coercion over goals allowed the national
government to disincentivize the provinces of legislating themselves a competitive
advantage, but it is worth noting that the presence of privately owned retail in some
provinces may constitute an advantage (Train and Snow 2019). Despite cannabis
legalization in Canada being presented as top-down project more generally, the burden of
responsibility has fallen to all levels of government, making cooperation paramount to
regulatory success. The licensing and regulation of cultivation, processing, and
production of cannabis is controlled federally, while the licensing and regulations
concerning the distribution, sale, and consumption fall under provincial and municipal
regulation. This is similar to the system that has been worked out between the national
and subnational governments over the past 100 years regarding alcohol for distribution
and tobacco for consumption (Shanahan and Cyrenne 2019). The federal government of
Canada has set the minimum age to consume cannabis at 18 years old, equal to the
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minimum age to consume alcohol in Canada. All provincial jurisdictions in Canada, but
one has set their minimum age of consuming cannabis to equal that of their minimum age
to consume alcohol (Lancione et al. 2020). Manitoba is the exception, setting their
minimum age to consume alcohol at 18, and recreational cannabis at 19. Alberta and
Quebec are the only two provincial governments that have maintained the minimum age
of consuming cannabis at 18, all others have raised their minimum age to 19 (Lancione et
al. 2020).
The distribution of cannabis in Canada represents a combination of features found
in the United States’ cannabis distribution system (private distribution of cannabis) and
Uruguay’s distribution system (government-supplied retail and operation of government
wholesale), with the addition of online sale and delivery, which is available in all of
Canada and is not found in some places in the United States and is prohibited in Uruguay.
Canadian cannabis companies have access to banking and interstate state trade between
subnational governments, an element that critically is not in the United States. Most
provincial governments maintain a hybrid system of distributing cannabis, with both
government operated retail stores and privately run retail stores. Quebec, Prince Edward
Island, Nova Scotia, and the Northwest Territories have an exclusively government
operated retail stores. Most online sales and delivery are operated by the provincial
government (Lancione et al. 2020; Shanahan and Cyrenne 2019). Canada, like most
states in the United States and Uruguay, allows for homegrown cultivation of recreational
cannabis, with the provincial governments determining how many plants are allowed, and
where they should be grown. All but two provinces, Quebec, and Manitoba, which have
prohibited the practice entirely, have allowed for four cannabis plants to be grown at
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home on private property, this is the maximum limit set by the federal government. All
provinces and territories, but Saskatchewan, maintained a monopoly over the distribution
of wholesale cannabis. The possession limit in public in every provincial and territorial
government has been set at 30g of cannabis, or approximately 1 ounce, similar to what
has been observed in the United States. Six subnational governments have limited
consumption of cannabis to private property, but others have allowed for cannabis
lounges or limited public use. In addition to this, Saskatchewan and Québec have limited
the maximum amount of cannabis allowed at home All governments have outlawed the
practice of driving while intoxicated by cannabis. The federal government passed a bill in
2018, Bill C-46, mandating that drivers must have below a certain level of THC in their
bloodstream (Lancione et al. 2020). The bill also allowed for on the spot THC saliva
tests, as well as allowing for provincial and municipal governments to enact stricter
regulations as they see fit. Two provincial governments, Quebec, and Saskatchewan,
prohibit driving with any detectable level of cannabis (Lancione et al. 2020). This
practice continues to be controversial, as there is no clear link between impairment and
the amount of THC in a persons’ bloodstream yet (Lancione et al. 2020).
The prohibition of advertising of cannabis products that are appealing to youth or
promote cannabis use has been legislated at the national level, unlike in the United States
which has done so state by state (Shanahan and Cyrenne 2019). Provinces and territories
have set different limits on the amount of licensed retail stores allowed in their
jurisdiction; some have set no limits at all, similar to the United States (Reuters Staff
2018). Some provinces, like Ontario, have recently allowed companies to have only one
license at a time, to ensure as many companies as possible to be involved in the cannabis
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industry (McGovern 2018). This also seems to be a feature that is mirrored in the United
States, as some states have limited potential early monopolies and banned vertical
integration. All cannabis companies must utilize the National Cannabis tracking system,
in the United States, the tracking systems are state by state. Private consumption is the
only way to consume cannabis in some provinces or territories, which is similar to
Uruguay or some places in the United States. Like the United States, municipal
governments have been granted further autonomy in most provincial and territorial
governments to ban or limit licensed cultivation or retail cannabis businesses, in addition
to being able to limit the types of consumption locally.
Centralization of Cannabis Policy
Unlike in the United States or Uruguay, Canada has established a system of
shared authority over the regulation of cannabis, and it requires that all levels of
government cooperate in order to achieve the most optimal outcome. This is not new to
Canada, for over a century, the federal, provincial, and territorial governments have
worked out a system of coordination over alcohol and tobacco (Wesley 2019; Fischer,
Russell, and Boyd 2020). The federal government has the responsibility to regulate
cannabis across the country according to its constitutional authority in the Controlled
Drugs and Substances Act and the Canada Criminal Code (Wesley 2019). The federal
powers to regulate cannabis include licensing commercial producers and processors,
establishing rules for packaging, setting maximum amounts and minimum age for
possession (Wesley 2019). In addition to this, the federal government has authority to
establish a process of criminal expungement for the harm done during the prohibition of
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cannabis, some argue that this process has not gone far enough (Timothy 2018; Power
2020).
The federal government has less power to regulate the distribution of cannabis.
Provinces and territories determine the rules on how cannabis is sold, where stores are
located, how stores operate, and who can sell cannabis. Provinces and territories also
have the flexibility to change restrictions, like, lowering possession limits, increasing the
minimum age, restricting where cannabis can be used in public, and adding requirements
or outright banning homegrown cultivation. Provinces also wield considerable
constitutional taxation powers, which makes coordination over cannabis policy even
more important to success. The allowance of the opt-out policy of homegrown cultivation
was put into place to avoid any future constitutional challenges to the law, after all,
Canada is an ethnofederal state. Other questions of sovereignty have been raised by First
Nations’ governments who claim they have been left out of the process of crafting
cannabis regulations, and that they should be allowed to craft their own policies for their
recreational cannabis market (Crosby 2019). This raises questions about how current
Canadian cannabis law may be perpetuating colonial-settler authority systems (Crosby
2019). Municipalities play a subordinate role in the process of regulating cannabis, but
depending on the jurisdiction, they have been given autonomy over zoning, and to limit
or further regulate physical cannabis businesses, similar to that of policies found in the
United States.
The Federal Task Force was instrumental to guiding the process of crafting
regulation and allowed the federal government to set the overall policy goals of cannabis
and to further harmonize policies across the whole of the country (Train and Snow 2019).
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The short timetable set by the federal government to achieve implementation played a
crucial role in shaping the regulatory framework of provincial and territorial
governments, who relied extensively on past alcohol and tobacco policies to craft their
distribution system (Train and Snow 2019). In addition to this, the allowance of online
sales and delivery of cannabis has served to solve an issue of the decentralization of
power. For subnational governments that did not want allow retail recreation cannabis,
Ottawa offered to provide online sales and delivery services, but ultimately no
governments took them up on this offer and allow provincial and territorial governments
have allowed both (ARCannabis 2021; Wesley 2019). Certainly, some municipalities will
not allow physical cannabis businesses in their jurisdiction, and delivery has allowed this
fact to be bypassed, so consumers located in these jurisdictions will not utilize the illicit
market. The breakdown of authority in Canadian federalism may serve as policy model to
the United States in the future and provide more clarity to potential pitfalls when crafting
policy in a federal system (Armstrong and Seaborn 2021).
Conclusion
In the years since legalization, cannabis in Canada has been on a roller coaster of
ups and downs. Upon legalization, international capital jumped quickly at the potential
new market in Canada, raising the valuations of companies rapidly upon legalization.
This “green rush” didn’t turn out to be the quick money or growth that was anticipated
leading to the first great cannabis crash in early 2019 (Power 2020). This is in part due to
the lack of access to retail cannabis, as the market had not had the proper time to mature
yet. Implementation has been a slow and cautious process, similar to other case study
countries. Publicly owned retail initially struggled with oversupply and undersupply
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issues depending on the jurisdiction, but these problems have lessened over time and the
glut of oversupply has begun to lessen (Lamers 2021b). In Canada, policymakers have
tried to walk the line of establishing a for-profit cannabis industry that will grow in
political strength in the future and lobby for the relaxation of regulation, and the
establishment of public institutions that should lessen the potential for more negative
public health externalities that come with commercialization (Fischer, Russell, and Boyd
2020; Rehm and Manthey 2020). When including questions of competition with the illicit
market, it makes for contradictory set of policy goals that have challenged all countries
that have regulated and legalized recreational cannabis. Despite the rocky beginning to
cannabis in Canada, the licit market has exploded over the course of the pandemic, nearly
doubling the market value of licit cannabis in Canada in one year, partially due to an
increase in stores, a rise in eCommerce, and a rise in consumption (Lamers 2021a; Javier
2021). On the other hand, COVID-19 has accelerated the number of cannabis business
failures, acquisitions, and mergers in Canada, as well as leading Canadian cannabis
businesses to reevaluate their international supply chain (Schaneman 2020). Recently, the
federal government has announced a review of industry fees in order to better fine tune
policy to compete with the illicit market (Lamers 2021). Despite attempts to crush the
illicit market, it has proved resilient in similar ways to other case study countries (Austen
2021). Unlicensed businesses continue to be a persistent issue in the Canadian system, in
addition to some international spillover into the United States (Becker 2021; Ballard
2020). The boom in cannabis shops that occurred during 2020 should further decrease the
use of the illicit market in Canada (Javier 2021). The price of cannabis in Canada has
fallen and the quality has increased since legalization but has not yet reached the point of
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parity with the illicit market, approximately 1 in 3 Canadians use the licit market over the
illicit market (Armstrong 2021). Like the United States, the market share that has been
captured from the illicit market has not been even across jurisdictions. In Canada,
provinces like Québec and Alberta have done better for different reasons, in Alberta it is
high retail density and in Québec it is low prices (Armstrong 2021). Success in Canada
may still be a long way off, particularly in social equity, as First Nations governments are
still in legal limbo and the push to expunge criminal records has faltered (Austen 2021).
Overall, Canada’s cannabis program seems to be moving in the right direction, continued
monitoring, and the timely correction of failures with continued analysis of policies
should prove helpful as the market matures.
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V. WHAT IS SUCCESS? DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
This research overviewed the broad strokes of cannabis supply reform and the
regulation of recreational cannabis in three case study countries. It explored the
differences in history concerning cannabis, the different pathways to legalization, and the
differences in the organizational, taxation, access to cannabis and regulatory structure of
each case study country. This research did not take a deep dive into some of the more
technical aspects, like physical requirements for cannabis businesses, tracking reporting
policies, testing, individual license requirements, capital requirements for licensing,
different workplace consumption regulations, cannabis employment regulations, the
various penalties for not following regulations, different types of regulatory bodies, or
taxation revenue spending. These areas certainly necessitate further research in a
comparative manner in the future, but the purpose of this research has been to lay the
groundwork for establishing what might be considered successful cannabis policy at the
national level. For those that don’t follow cannabis policy globally, it is important to note
that policies are rapidly changing by the day, and some of the above research may no
longer be relevant. Even over the past year of researching this thesis, policy changes
across countries have been numerous. The following section will focus in on social equity
questions, illicit market competition, and public health concerns in the three case study
countries. All three of these elements are crucial to crafting a successful regulatory
apparatus and have been foundational to the core goals of legalizing cannabis. Finally,
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this paper will conclude with findings and further discussion over the contradictory
nature of establishing legal recreational cannabis.
Social Equity
Achieving social equity in cannabis supply reform is contextual to every
country’s history with prohibition. In Canada and the United States, a militarized past and
racial discrimination in the policing of cannabis has made the rectifying of this fact
essential to success. In Uruguay, this is less so the case, and uneven enforcement of
cannabis laws have mostly surrounded around class status. No doubt social equity is
multifaceted and defining what constitutes social justice has been difficult to define. For
this research, this section will primarily focus on expungement of criminal records,
equitable licensing in the new cannabis industry, reinvestment in communities harmed by
the War on Drugs, and the continued criminalization of cannabis. In the United States,
approximately 15 million people have been arrested on cannabis charges in the past
decade, 46.9% of which were Black or Latino (Medical cannabis Network 2020), Black
Americans on average are 3-4x more likely to be arrested for cannabis possession (ACLU
2020; BBC 2020; Hudak 2020). In Canada, Black Canadians were nearly 3x more likely
to be arrested for cannabis possession, and another study found that Indigenous people in
Canada were 9x more likely to be arrested for cannabis (Timothy 2018). In Uruguay,
poorer citizens were more likely to be located around the ‘boca’ making cannabis more
available, but cannabis possession has been decriminalized nationally since the 1970s
which limited the amount of people arrested over those decades. Despite this, what
constituted personal possession without the intent to distribute was left up to authority
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discretion which may have contributed to people falling into the criminal justice system
over cannabis possession (Queirolo 2020a).
COVID-19 highlighted the extremely vital nature of releasing prisoners in jail on
cannabis charges, with approximately 40,000 people locked up on cannabis charges, it
had the potential of becoming a death sentence with COVID-19 rampant in U.S prisons
(Medical Cannabis Network 2020). States have engaged in a variety of ways to allow
pathways for criminal expungement, but choosing which crimes are expunged and how
easy the process will be to getting criminal charges removed is more complicated (Kilmer
2019). Ideally, automatic expungement would be the easiest solution, putting the onus on
government administration and not the individual (Hudak 2020). Unfortunately, this has
not been the case, in Canada, the national program established requires as many as six
steps and requires individuals to be fingerprinted and to retrieve records from their
arresting jurisdiction (Austen 2021). This has been a similar story in other initial
legalizing states in the United States, who were silent initially on the issue of social
justice, but as of late, states have begun to make the process easier, with Vermont and
Illinois including automatic expungement of criminalized (Kilmer 2019; Morris, Hudak,
and Stenglein 2021). New York, who recently legalized cannabis made social justice a
foundational aspect of legalization and included automatic expungement as policy feature
(NBC Channel 4 2021). These steps do not begin to address the harms caused by
prohibition like future wages lost, loss of access to education, and time spent in the prison
system, but ensuring programs for criminal expungement are well funded are a step in the
right direction.
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Equitable access to licensing is a problem both the United States and Canada
have, and both have largely underperformed initially. In Canada, analysis has shown that
companies’ executives are overwhelmingly white, concluding that two percent of
companies’ leadership is Indigenous, one percent are Black Canadians, and five percent
of board members publicly traded cannabis companies are women (Austen 2021;
Timothy 2018). In the United States, it has been a similar dynamic, with 81% of
businesses being owned by white people (Morris, Hudak, and Stenglein 2021). In
addition to this, there are many barriers in both countries to obtain a cannabis license,
limited access to capital has notoriously been a barrier in initial legalizing states in the
United States and Canada. Smaller businesses have found it difficult to compete with
cannabis companies with significant access to capital (Morris, Hudak, and Stenglein
2021). This left initial business owners reaping the profits of a new industry to be the
same elites that once propagated prohibition, with John Boehner, former Republican
Speaker of the House as the poignant example (Breslow 2019). Again, New York has
made this a focus of the establishment of its regulatory market but setting clear guidelines
to ensure small businesses can compete and that a certain proportion of licensing is given
to marginalized communities (Morris, Hudak, and Stenglein 2021). Interestingly,
provinces and states alike in the United States and Canada have enacted laws that protect
domestic cannabis businesses and limit vertical integration to preserve competitiveness,
this includes the soon to be newly legalized Mexican cannabis market, lobbying against
these features will continue to be a focus of growing businesses that wish to increase their
market share both domestically and internationally (MPP 2020; Linthicum 2020;
McGovern 2018). These features vary from place to place but is nonetheless encouraging.
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These problems are largely limited under the Uruguayan system, but it still costs money
to apply to become a producer for the state, which international companies have had no
issue doing (Pascual 2019). Crucially, Uruguay has included a license lottery to prevent
against preferential awarding of licensing, a policy other policymakers have also utilized.
Reinvestment in communities harmed by the War on Drugs has increasingly
become a feature of state legalization models in recent legalizing states, in conjunction
with programs to serve mental health, adult education, veterans’ programs, and protection
of nature resources. In the United States, money from the taxation of cannabis is often a
foundational element to selling cannabis legalization politically (Morris, Hudak, and
Stenglein 2021; Hudak 2020; MPP 2020). States like California and New York expect to
spend $50 million and $140 million on social equity respectively in the following years
(Morris, Hudak, and Stenglein 2021). In Canada, governments have been slower to move
on this front, and programs that highlight reinvestment in social equity are notably absent
(MjBizDaily 2020). It is important to note that all of the above listed programs cost
significant tax revenue, and further raising of taxes on a limited number of taxpayers will
make it difficult to compete with the illicit market (Boesen 2020). Policymakers should
consider additional funding from the general fund to bolster these important programs
and make it more likely to achieve the set-out goals of legalization.
Addressing the question of criminalization of cannabis post-legalization has been
a necessary element of crafting a regulatory framework (Kilmer 2019). Should people
still be doing prison time for the breaking of regulations, and if so, for what crimes? The
policies policymakers have crafted across three countries have varied significantly on this
issue. For example, the United States still sees a high number of arrests for cannabis,
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even in legal states (Earlenbaugh 2020). In Canada and Uruguay, the number of arrests
for cannabis policy violations has dropped dramatically, which has been encouraging
(Austen 2021; Queirolo 2020a). If prohibition has taught policymakers anything, it is that
racial enforcement of neutral policies is the key element of disproportionate impacts on
different communities. This poses a clear conundrum for the enforcement of cannabis
regulations, which communities are more likely to arrested or fined for having more
cannabis than the legal limit, more plants than allowed at home, or consumption in
public? The history of Canada and the United States make this answer clear; Uruguay
additionally shows that this is not only a racial or ethnic issue, but indeed a class one as
well. Policymakers will need to continue to analyze what violations of cannabis policy
merit criminal prosecution. After all, the promise of cannabis legalization came with a
promise of ending the criminalization of cannabis, and the wasting of enforcement
resources on enforcing cannabis prohibition. These areas of policy in crafting a
successful cannabis regulatory framework will continue to be crucial elements of
successful policy.
Illicit Market Competition
The ‘illicit’ cannabis market comes in many shapes and sizes of varying
complexity in every country and is made up of numerous different types of illicit
suppliers, depending on your geographic location. It is primarily made up of two different
types of illicit markets: the black market and the grey market. The ‘black’ market is often
cannabis that crosses international borders, or cannabis grown domestically that is either
cultivated without a license to be sold commercially (illicit dispensaries or illicit
cultivation operations) or is made up of the excesses of individuals’ homegrown
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cultivation of cannabis. The ‘grey’ market is a cannabis supply that was obtained through
legal channels and is then in turn shipped somewhere else or is driven into jurisdictions
without legalized cannabis. Or there can be a synthesis of the two where a licensed
grower grows more than is reported and sells the excess on the black market, which has
been increasingly documented (Mozingo 2020). The line between the two markets has
been increasingly blurred, but the difference between the two is not entirely important
outside of crafting regulatory policies that deal with the expansion of the illicit market.
The United States may have the most complex illicit cannabis market, which has been
established for well over one hundred years, it uses has been historically a product of the
counterculture and includes all the elements listed above in both having a vibrant black
and grey market. Competing with the illicit market of cannabis in the United States has
proved more challenging than advocates or lawmakers previously assumed, a fact which
should be unsurprising. A couple of assumptions have proved incorrect when legalization
occurred in states. The first being that consumers of recreational cannabis are irrational in
their economic purchases of cannabis and would opt for higher priced cannabis from the
licit market, rather than purchasing similar quality cannabis for lower prices and better
access from the same cannabis dealer they had been for years. (Walsh 2020). The second
was that cannabis businesses would proliferate in the United States, but this has not been
the case due to the power of local municipalities stamping out the potential for more
cannabis businesses, leading to ‘cannabis deserts’, a fact which has also extended the
Canadian cannabis market as provincial and municipal governments have limited the
expansion of cannabis businesses (Walsh 2020; Power 2020; McGovern 2018). Canadian
provinces had an uneven maturation of their legalized markets, and some provinces had
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remarkably low cannabis retail density early in legalization, in Ontaria, a province of 13.5
million, only 41 shops were present. On the other end of the spectrum, in Alberta, a
province with 4.4 million people, there were 423 stores (Power 2020). This tracks with
the slow and implementation in both United States and Uruguay, Oregon has 16.5
dispensaries per 100,000 people, and California has 1.6 dispensaries per 100,000 people,
a fact largely reflected in their illicit market participation (Verilife 2021; Walsh 2020;
Bieber 2021). In Uruguay, getting pharmacies to sign on retail have been hampered by
the USA Patriot Act and its restrictions on providing banking to legal cannabis dealers
(Tegel 2018).
The third assumption was that subnational recreational cannabis markets would
remain contained within their own jurisdictional boundaries, which was an absurd
presumption to begin with, this did not happen during cannabis prohibition in the United
States. This fact has partially been remedied in the Canadian system with the allowance
of interstate trade among the various subnational governments. In fact, states that still
deem recreational cannabis illegal have seen an upsurge in the amount of cannabis seized
from out of state where recreational cannabis is legal, and approximately 15% of all
cannabis users in the United States purchase cannabis from out of state (Walsh 2020;
Wadsworth and Hammond 2020). One positive feature of subnational legalization has
been the decrease of international cannabis making its way into the United States from
other countries, a fact recently confirmed by the DEA, but it certainly still occurs to some
extent (Jaeger 2020; Becker 2021). U.S. customs and border patrol only seized 266,882
pounds of marijuana in 2019, down from 4.3 million pounds in 2009 (Linthicum 2020).
The DEA has also acknowledged that state legalization efforts have slowed illicit market
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demand (Jaeger 2020a). Some of this cannabis has made its way to the United States via
licit cannabis sources in Canada (Becker 2021).
The issues listed above can still be remedied by policy changes primarily at the
national level. A fact less easy to deal with is that cannabis has long been a symbol of the
counterculture and anti-authority throughout its use in the United States or Canada, and
compliance with regulation will inevitably have to consider the market demands of
cannabis users if they want the most optimal outcome (Austen 2021). If the prohibition of
cannabis has taught countries anything, it should be that the enforcement of cannabis is
costly and where there is market demand, someone will be there to fill it. To remedy this,
increasing access to cannabis and cannabis licensing by providing delivery services, or
implementing a similar density of legal cannabis suppliers as illicit ones is paramount.
Certain policies significantly limit the access to cannabis either through low-density of
cannabis retailers via government policy, distance, prohibition of delivery, having to use
cash only, high taxation, not being able to order cannabis online, or homegrown
cultivation are often shrouded in the language of public health promotion, despite the
evidence pointing to these restrictions as increasing public health outcomes being
controversial or inconclusive at best. In part, this may be due to policymaker’s general
uneasiness with the regulation of cannabis as a normal commodity due to lingering
stigma over the prohibition of cannabis. In fact, just because a substance is illegal, does
not always give you an accurate assessment of the actual relative danger of the substance
considering that alcohol and tobacco cause the most deaths per year (Lopez 2017).
Increased enforcement of the strict regulatory regime policymakers have opted for in the
United States or Canada, is not the answer and would greatly decrease the chances of
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remedying the already astronomical harms of the war on cannabis. In fact, decreasing the
barriers to obtaining a license may be the solution to further dealing with the illicit
market.
A persistent issue in Canada and the United States is the presence of unlicensed
cannabis shops and cultivation operations, which have seemed to operate with impunity
due to the costly nature of pursuing and enforcing cannabis regulations (Ballard 2020).
Compounding this problem has been the difficult nature of keeping unlicensed
dispensaries and delivery services off sites like Weedmaps, with many as many as 1,700
unlicensed cannabis retailers in California alone, but this number could be potentially as
high as 3000 (Schroyer 2020; Queally and McGreevy 2019). This has been frustrating to
licit cannabis businesses which make exuberant costs just to stay open for business.
Additionally, Public retailers have not been able to sell their cannabis supply leading to
an enormous oversupply of cannabis and massive losses to government revenue. Ontario
spent nearly $80 million dollars trying to successfully implement public retail (Power
2020). Which is detrimental to the sustainability of public frameworks in Canada or
Uruguay. Additionally, public institutions must walk the line of being a commercial
entity that must advertise to provide a service and preserving the public health of the
broader population (Rup, Goodman, and Hammond 2020; Wesley and Murray 2021).
Outside of strict policies concerning licensing and access, price, policy choices,
and taxation are increasingly important elements of capturing illicit market profits. The
average price of illicit cannabis in Canada is an average of $6.37 a gram, and the average
price of the licit market in Canada is $10 a gram. 1 out of every 3 Canadians have stated
that they buy from the licit market, with the cost of regulated cannabis nearly double that
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of unregulated cannabis (Power 2020). The regulated market of Uruguay maintains lower
cost of recreational cannabis ($1.3 per gram) than the unregulated market ($3.8-$4.8 per
gram), but illicit dealers may have better quality cannabis, and more options to choose
from (New Frontier Data 2021). In the United States, more mature markets in states like
Colorado or Oregon have been able to keep illicit market participation low by keeping
parity with illicit market prices, but this has not been the case universally (Bieber 2021;
Walsh 2020). This has also had its own externalities, as low prices in one state have
fueled the illicit market of other states. Further compounding this, lower prices may serve
to decrease tax revenues if the jurisdiction is using ad valorem taxation, in addition to
potentially increasing consumption and putting small businesses out of business (Kilmer
2019; Boesen 2020). Taxation revenue, after all, has been a crucial selling point to the
broader public in the United States or Canada. Uruguay has been able to capture a
considerable size of the illicit market, with up to an estimated 50% using licit sources, but
the registry has caused many cannabis users to not sign up, thus making their
consumption illicit (Queirolo 2020a). The blocking of certain kinds of cannabis products
in Uruguay have also served to increase the illicit market, but also has improved some
public health indicators in comparison to other legal recreational jurisdictions in the
United States or Canada (Queirolo 2020). In addition to this, a new grey market has
appeared from Uruguayan citizens purchasing cannabis from licit sources to sell to
tourists (Hudak, Ramsey, and Walsh 2018).
Federal systems that rely on decentralized authority may continue to struggle into
the future on unifying policies on access, licensing, and taxation. Every jurisdiction has
its own set of priorities and political context, and according to constitutional structures,
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there may not be much the national government can do about it. With the addition of an
unregulated supply of cannabis in homegrown cultivation policies, policymakers may just
have to live with a limited illicit market for the time being. The creation of an extensive
‘grey market’ in the United States is an issue that can only be solved by national
unification of regulation and increasing access to cannabis users throughout the whole of
the United States. In addition to this, the high revenue taxation schemes states have
engaged in puts the chances of eliminating the illicit market at an even greater
disadvantage, as well as hurting cannabis businesses and consumers alike. If there are
cannabis consumers in states with laws forbidding recreational cannabis, the ‘grey
market’ and ‘black market’ of recreational cannabis will continue to be a feature of the
United States decentralized regulatory system. The appearance to countless unlicensed
cannabis businesses essentially proves that the barriers to becoming a cannabis business
at least in part are restricting the maturation of the licit market. Acknowledging the role
of cannabis consumers preferences would improve policymakers’ chances of eliminating
the illicit market, a fact that has been consistently overlooked by policymakers looking to
regulate cannabis. This is logical when considering an individual consumer may prefer to
drive a half mile down the street to their illicit dealer, pay no taxes, and return home with
little hassle rather than driving twenty or thirty miles to a bonafede fortresses equipped
with numerous security cameras, a blast proof vault, armed security guards, high taxes,
and fingerprint scanners (Power 2020).
This section does not suggest that no regulation should exist at all, instead
regulators should attempt to mold their new recreational cannabis markets to the
previously illicit cannabis market and its’ consumers, including increasing ease of access
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to of age consumers, and lowering the barriers to becoming a licit cannabis cultivator,
producer, or business more generally. Treating cannabis as a highly dangerous and
restricted commodity is no doubt a relic of the prohibitionist past, but if the stated goal is
to eliminate the illicit market, prevent discriminatory enforcement, and prevent
individuals from having to endure the justice system through regulatory enforcement,
there must be some balance to policies. Considerable future research is needed to craft
the best policies to deal with the illicit market, and policymakers should continue to
adjust regulatory policies to researchers’ findings. Policymakers should also consider
how the illicit market is changing, a trend toward larger shipments of illegal drugs and
drug traffickers utilizing the internet, including cannabis were exacerbated in 2020 during
the pandemic (Lamers 2021c).
Public Health
Recreational cannabis consumers in newly legal jurisdictions can now safely buy
and consume cannabis without the risks associated with the illicit market like criminal
violence or criminalization, pesticide usage in cultivation, as well as knowing the product
has been reliably inspected and tested. These noted benefits of a legal cannabis market
also come with negative public health externalities. These primarily make up the public
health concerns of policymakers legalizing and regulating recreational cannabis and are
largely similar across international borders and are no doubt important aspects of a
successful cannabis framework (Obradovic 2019; Kilmer 2019). They present themselves
primarily in these issues: concerns about the mental health impact of overconsumption,
curbing the impact of legalization on children and teenagers, cannabis induced
hospitalizations, preventing people from using cannabis while driving, and providing
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cannabis users with reliably tested cannabis that isn’t provided by the more dangerous
illicit market (Kilmer 2019; Fischer 2017). Legalization efforts in the United States and
Canada has significantly decreased the price of cannabis, significantly increased the
average THC potency of cannabis products, and allowed for a wide range of new
cannabis products like THC drinks (Hall and Lynskey 2020). These trends are expected
to continue as cannabis markets mature and businesses become more sophisticated. The
effective regulation of cannabis supply and distribution is and will be pivotal to
successfully managing the negative public impacts of legalization (Fischer 2017).
Analyzing the public health effects of legalization of recreational cannabis is a
multi-faceted and complicated issue. Comparing pre-legalization trends to postlegalization trends to gauge the impacts on the broader population of legalization may
identify changes due to legalization that are important to understanding recreational
cannabis’ impacts – like the different impacts of different cannabis products – but they
may not be entirely helpful in shaping regulatory policy, due to their inability to identify
a causal factor (Hall and Lynskey; Rehm and Manthey 2020; Fischer et al. 2020). It may
be too early to confidently make conclusions about the impact of legalization and
observing its impacts on the public will be a long-term project similar to alcohol and
tobacco research over the years, nevertheless, it will be important to continue to track
changes in public health indicators well into the future (Fischer et al. 2020). Legalizing
governments have largely relied on past policies in their country concerning alcohol and
tobacco regulation to make up for the newness of the industry and a lack of research on
best practices. In addition to this, policymakers have largely identified commercialization
and advertising as their primary concerns with legalizing cannabis, countering this has
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been a foundational element of the Uruguayan system, and to some extent the Canadian
system. Uruguay has also banned cannabis products that are not flower in order to better
preserve public health, due to the belief that different cannabis products with higher THC
content may have different externalities than cannabis flower, but the research on this is
still new and has mixed results (Fischer et al. 2020). Canada has attempted to balance
their for-profit industry with broader public health concerns by utilizing a combination of
public and private institutions, making for a contradictory set of priorities between
commercialization and public health (Fischer, Russell, and Boyd 2020). The United
Nations recently called for a ban on all cannabis advertising mimicking this same
sentiment (Feuer 2021). Policymakers in the United States have attempted to shape the
parameters of their private for-profit cannabis market by limiting commercialization
through several policies like advertising restrictions, possession limits, the prohibition of
some licenses like cannabis delivery or limiting the total of cannabis licenses in a
geographic area in order to better preserve public health. The new recreational cannabis
industry will experience the same incentives tobacco and alcohol companies have,
leaving regulators to grapple with new, but similar policy issues. In private models of
cannabis distribution, cannabis businesses have two avenues for expanded profits, new
customers in the form of first-time cannabis users or increasing the amount of cannabis
usage for existing users. This raises a few important public health questions as to what
consequences a significant expansion of the cannabis market will create and or what
benefit a purely for-profit system brings. To counter the profit incentive, states have
enacted regulatory polices of varied restrictiveness on access to cannabis, created public
institutions to handle distribution, and or limited the type of cannabis products consumers
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can purchase, but policymakers have largely ignored the impact of these restrictions on
eliminating the illicit market, some of these polices perpetuate the illicit markets’
continuity like the registry has in Uruguay.
Recreational cannabis is often compared to the regulatory framework of alcohol
or tobacco, but in many ways, it is much more restrictive, and in other ways it represents
a synthesis of policies between the two (distribution policies for alcohol are similar and
consumption policies for tobacco are similar). For example, all legalizing jurisdictions
with recreational cannabis have harmonized cannabis’ minimum purchasing age with that
of their alcohol regulations, apart from some provinces in Canada that have added an
additional year. Regulations meant to limit the negative public health externalities
broadly consist of purchasing limits, strict physical regulations on businesses, tracking
and employment regulations on cannabis businesses (minimum number of security
cameras, security guards, extensive background checks, vaults, ID scanners, etc.),
limiting the number of plants for homegrown cultivation, or the outright banning of the
practice, and strict licensing practices that vary on restrictiveness and who can apply by
state and country. In addition to this, all governments have enacted advertising
restrictions of varying restrictiveness and instituted bans of advertising to adolescents, but
some jurisdictions have been more lenient on this front than others – which varies like the
variety of tobacco or alcohol advertising policies that has varied across jurisdictional
lines. Uruguay has banned advertising entirely, as well as implementing strict potency
limits and the amount of cannabis available per week. To compound this, states have also
increased the penalties involved with distributing recreational cannabis to users who are
not yet of age, as well as refining their policies around what constitutes driving under the
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influence of cannabis (which has been controversial at best), but all governments have
made driving under the influence of cannabis illegal (Kilmer 2019; Lancione et al. 2020).
The idea behind these regulatory policies is that restricted access to cannabis will
decrease the ability of recreational cannabis to fall into the illicit market, limit cannabis
consumption, or prevent recreational cannabis from falling into the hands of adolescents
or teenagers, and in turn limiting the negative public health externalities associated with
legalizing and regulating recreational cannabis. Policymakers have also flirted with the
idea of THC limits in the United States and Canada, particularly because the average
content of THC in recreational cannabis has risen every year since legalization, but states
have not yet adopted this regulatory practice. It is not entirely clear as of yet if THC is the
sole intoxicant agent in cannabis. On the contrary, Uruguay has had THC limits from the
outset of their legalization and implementation. Illinois was the first state in the United
States to base taxation rates on THC content. This development was supposed to limit
consumption of high THC products by utilizing economic means, but it may just lead to
people consuming more cannabis of lower THC content.
The advent of new cannabis markets is no doubt a public health experiment with
no prior basis from which to guide policy, the effects of which are yet to be known
(Rehm and Manthey 2020). Contradictory studies on rates of consumption, teenage and
adolescent use, and car crashes while under the influence of cannabis have demonstrated
the persistent methodological challenges of analyzing the impact of cannabis legalization
(Hall and Lynskey 2020; Rehm and Manthey 2020; Fischer et al. 2020). Early analysis on
the impact of legalization in the United States has shown an increase in the number of
regular users, an increase in cannabis related hospitalizations in both children and adults
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for either physical or mental health, and the link between legalization and an increase in
traffic fatalities has been inconsistent at best (Hall and Lysnkey 2020). Early analysis on
the impact of legalization in Canada has found that there was an increase in the use of
edible and vaping cannabis products, particularly among young adults (Fischer et al.
2020). Overall consumption of cannabis in Canada also increased during 2020 (Lamers
2020a). In Uruguay, the risk perception among adolescents remained stable, consumption
by high schoolers did not go up, but the average age of consumption and increases of use
by adults went up consistent to pre-legalization trends, which has been consistent with the
experiences of other countries (Pascual 2020).
Ultimately, it may be prevalence and patterns of cannabis use that are the key
determinant linked to social and health problems (Rehm and Manthey 2020). If this is the
case, significant investment in public health education will be necessary to offset an
increase in negative public health consequences. More research is needed on key
regulatory policies that may produce better public health outcomes, such as minimum
prices, potency limits, tighter regulation of youth access, consumer warnings, etc. Better
understanding these policies will necessitate comparative analysis to make broader
conclusions. This is essential to ensuring that policies do not inadvertently increase use of
the illicit market, like has been the case thus far. Different policy models will ultimately
produce different results for public health indicators, just as hospitalizations did not rise
due to a lack of access to high-potency edibles or concentrates in Uruguay (Queirolo
2020). Policymakers will continue to feel the pressure of lowering regulations well into
the future, especially in the United States and Canada where cannabis has become an
increasingly big commodity (Fischer et al. 2020). Conclusive impacts of policies may not
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be known for a decade or more, but it is important that policymakers coordinate
internationally to create standardized public health indicators to compare differing
impacts of policies both domestically and internationally (Hall and Lynskey 2020).
What is ‘Success’
The United States, Canada, and Uruguay all represent different manifestations of
legalized and ‘seed to sale’ regulation of recreational cannabis. Cannabis legalization has
been consistently utilized as a political tool in all three countries. Policymakers in the
United States have used it to right political harms, increase the public health outcomes of
cannabis use, grow the economy, eliminate the illicit market, and increase tax revenues.
Canadian policymakers have used it as a policy platform during an election, in addition to
trying to increase the public health outcomes of cannabis use, grow the economy,
eliminate the illicit market, and later, right political harms. Uruguay has used cannabis
legalization to increase public security, increase public health outcomes, and eliminate
the illicit market, but the former turned out to not be true, the murder rate and violent
crime has actually increased since legalization (Queirolo 2020a). Interestingly, all three
countries have been experiencing some form of a drug epidemic by harder drugs prior to
legalization and regulation, to what extent this played in the role of legalization is
undetermined. No doubt countries and subnational jurisdictions’ experiences with a
medical cannabis program have shaped their future recreational cannabis industries to an
understated degree.
All three countries have approached this unique public policy issue in manners
that are consistent with their international position, history with cannabis and other
substances, and their pathways to legalization, which includes public approval and the
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views of policymakers in each country. The United States represents the most
decentralized form of recreational cannabis regulation, Uruguay represents the most
centralized form of recreational cannabis regulation, and Canada represents the middle
ground or a synthesis of the two. The United States and Canada share a history of strict
criminalization and demonization of cannabis consumers, as well as other narcotics,
while Uruguay has a history of practicing harm reduction policies which has led to the
normalization of treating drug users as individuals who must be cared for and dealt with
in the public health realm. The diffusion of cannabis regulation in the United States
represents the most “bottom-up” or grassroots influence, which ultimately culminated in
the ballot initiatives that laid the groundwork for cannabis legalization and regulation as a
response to the lack of will by policymakers both federally and in the states. Uruguay
represents the most ‘top-down’ or elite influence of cannabis regulation, which occurred
despite public approval being strongly in favor of the status quo of cannabis
decriminalization, and not for regulation and sale. Again, Canada represents the synthesis
of the two, grassroots mobilization and broader social pressures lead Trudeaus’ Liberal
party to adopt the legalization and regulation of cannabis to its’ party platform, which
ultimately culminated in legalization. In addition to this, Canada’s history as a federal
nation has allowed for its provinces to devise its own schemes of regulating cannabis,
while the national government provides guidance. This may have occurred in the United
States, and may still in the future, if the national prohibition is lifted.
In the United States, recreational cannabis legalization and regulation has been
driven by the profit incentive, outside of the territory of Washington D.C which has still
not allowed for dispensaries, with private enterprise being the sole cultivator and
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distributor of recreational cannabis products. In Uruguay, the regulatory apparatus was
established to counter the profit incentive completely, relying on a combination of state
backed cultivation distribution, non-profit cannabis social clubs, and homegrown
cultivation. The Canadian system combines these elements in the form of having a
combination of publicly owned recreational cannabis cultivation and distribution, as well
as privately owned recreational cannabis cultivation and distribution in addition to
homegrown cultivation and mail delivery. All three case studies strictly regulate the age
of consumption, licensing requirements, physical distribution requirements, and the
amount a consumer can grow or purchase at one time. In this light, it is unsurprising that
all three countries have faced similar, albeit unique challenges considering their different
systems of governance over cannabis, in establishing a recreational cannabis market.
Without taking the demands of consumers seriously, the illicit market will persist in the
regulatory gaps left by arbitrarily restrictive policies, which has been the case in all three
case studies.
The research presented in this paper demonstrates the difficult nature of
regulating cannabis while attempting to satisfy all interested parties’ goals. It may seem
as simple as legalizing recreational cannabis, but cannabis as a public policy issue is
unique in the public policy realm, and the regulation of alcohol and tobacco has shown
that legalization is a long-term process. The uniqueness of cannabis as a public policy
issues partly stems from the substance carrying such a long history of prohibition and
criminalization particularly in a racialized context, the elaborate culture that has sustained
cannabis use, the vibrant illicit market that refuses to be shuttered, and partly because it
arguably may be the easiest psychoactive drug to produce and can virtually be grown
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anywhere on the planet, in addition to arguably being safer to consumers than either
alcohol or tobacco. This public policy issue has proved to be the definition of a
competition of priorities and broader goals. Each of the case studies in this paper
demonstrates how each country has attempted to address different goals through
regulation and taxation that have been crafted to address concerns around adequate
taxation, ‘strict’ regulation, public health, competing with the illicit market, and social
justice concerns in order to create a comprehensive regulatory apparatus that satisfies all
concerns stake holders wish to be addressed due to the contradicting impacts of different
policy goals. This research asserts that a truly successful cannabis regulatory apparatus
may only be successful in the eye of the beholder depending on what they see as the
primary goals of legalizing cannabis, and furthermore may be country specific based on a
countries’ history and political system. Despite this assertion, attempting to balance all
these priorities is paramount to an objectively successful cannabis regulatory program in
the pursuit of achieving a model from which other countries can replicate or modify to
their own priorities.
Countries like the United States or Canada that allow for decentralization of
cannabis policy with long histories of delegating authority to local jurisdictions may find
it more difficult to create the conditions necessary to eliminate an illicit market. As the
War on Drugs has shown, when profit is at stake, people will find a way to deliver on that
demand. For this reason, decentralization of cannabis regulatory policy proves to be a
challenging issue, any variation in restrictiveness of establishing legal recreational
cannabis ventures incentives illicit market growth, either from intra-country trafficking of
cannabis, or international trafficking of cannabis. Any subnational jurisdiction that
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increases the costs to establishing cannabis enterprises, thus raising the cost of cannabis
to the consumer, runs the risk of being pushed out of the market by less regulated
subnational jurisdictions within their own country, simply because the porous borders
will allow so, and because any amount of law enforcement could not even begin to stop
this. This has been especially prevalent in the United States as states with legalized
cannabis have flooded the market of states where cannabis is not legal, making huge
profits while doing so. Another example is the proliferation of unlicensed cannabis
dispensaries both in the United States and Canada that offer a greater deal of benefits to
consumers (like lower prices and diversity of products) than ones that comply with the
regulatory apparatus, making competition with the illicit market ever more difficult.
Furthermore, local zoning controls have stunted the proliferation of dispensaries and
small-time cannabis entrepreneurs, denying their jurisdiction the potential of economic
growth in the form of jobs and increasing the costs of legalization in the form of
continually having to enforce cannabis legislation and regulation. This may lead to
increasing the costs in another way by continuing to expand the carceral state via
cannabis violations, a trend which continues post-legalization. Another persistent issue
seems to be the continued disproportionate enforcement of cannabis laws on historically
marginalized communities especially in the United States, it seems to be the case that if
there are laws to be enforced on cannabis, enforcement of these laws will fall
disproportionately on marginalized communities, whether they be from lower economic
classes or racially or ethnically marginalized communities particularly because this
enforcement is at the discretion of individual officers. Arbitrary law enforcement of
cannabis in these communities’ post legalization continues the same mistakes found in
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prohibition, unnecessarily exposing communities to the harms of the carceral system and
all the social, economic, and psychological penalties that come with it.
Overregulation of cannabis institutions seem to be a persistent issue across all
three case studies, but from a public health lens, this is understandable due to the industry
still being new and there being real impacts on public health from which to be concerned.
There are certainly externalities to be concerned about, such as the rising levels of THC
in cannabis, drivers driving while under the influence, an increase of usage by teenagers
or children, mental health crises, hospitalizations due to the over consumption of
cannabis, and accidental ingestion of edible cannabis by children. Despite all this, over
regulation of cannabis seems to be a relic of its prohibitionist past, and any real chance of
displacing the illicit market will take the form of targeted regulation of the industry.
Limiting the public health impact needs to prioritize public health education, in the same
way the alcohol and the tobacco industry is being combatted through these channels in
addition to targeted and time-tested regulations. This is paramount because the
responsibility of ensuring broader public health largely falls on individuals. Strategies of
regulation that follow the alcohol or tobacco industry models fail to grasp the ease of
which it takes to cultivate quality cannabis, or the depth of the challenge it would take to
displace people from doing so.
This research does not suggest that recreational cannabis legalization and
regulation needs to be the wild west, rather, more targeted regulation is needed, in
addition to increasing the access to cannabis by responsible consumers. For example,
increasing the number of small-time cannabis entrepreneurs would greatly combat the
issue of the illicit market, as well as improving the access to cannabis businesses by
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marginalized communities. Certainly, this targeted regulation includes severe penalties
for dealing cannabis to teenagers or children, in the same way alcohol or tobacco
regulators and distributors target this same issue, but to what extent should countries
perpetuate the carceral system? Enacting strict regulation of physical cannabis businesses
incentives that only those with access to capital can participate in a market that contains
an absurd amount of costly regulatory barriers, particularly concerning your physical
establishment. Proponents of this argue that because cannabis is a lucrative profit-making
substance, measures must be taken to ensure the safety of businesses and consumers to
prevent this substance from falling into illicit cartel hands. This argument loses its weight
when considering that cannabis prices will continue to fall as more people have access to
homegrown cultivation and the proliferation of small-time cannabis businesses, as well as
corporate sized industrial cultivation and competition continues to drive the price of
cannabis down. Cannabis has never been the product of corporatization or the
mainstream economy, and it is not surprising that the culture that has propped it up for
nearly one hundred years is resistant to being pulled into this apparatus. Cannabis use has
predominantly been associated with the counterculture, and some consumers who use
cannabis recreationally refuse to participate in a system that it had explicitly been
excluded from.
Another pressing issue is that of taxation, and there is good evidence that high
taxation disincentives teenage use due to price sensitivity, in addition to discouraging the
over consumption of cannabis by adults, such studies have been done on alcohol and
tobacco and are numerous. The argument for high taxation as a tool to disincentive use
also fails to pass the smell test when considering the history of cannabis prohibition,
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teenagers and adults alike have always had access to cheap cannabis through the illicit
market, if anything, bringing the whole market into a licit one will decrease the
availability of cannabis to teenage users. High taxation of cannabis will continue to be a
sticking point to consumers, and selling cannabis legalization as method to increase
government revenues hasn’t seemed to convince many users that they should make the
switch, jurisdictions or countries attempting to regulate cannabis should consider a
graduated taxation system over a long period of time in order to slowly move the illicit
market into a fully licit one, and potentially consider no taxation at all at least for a period
of years to compete with the already untaxed illicit market. Uruguay has been the most
successful with this strategy due to their setting of cannabis price ceiling at levels found
below their illicit market, they arguably have had the biggest buy in of their consumer
base to make the switch to the licit market (a statistic that is fairly difficult to calculate in
general), it is hard to tell if the causal factor for this is price sensitivity or if the licit
market of cannabis in Uruguay is actually that much better than anything available on the
illicit level. Cannabis legalization should never be a government revenue seeking project,
these attempts are misguided and will fail despite what politicians have sold the public,
rather any taxation should be focused on ensuring a quality consumer product,
enforcement of drivers driving under the influence, individuals trafficking cannabis to
children, public health education, and mental health services. Social equity reinvestment
programs will continue to be an important aspect of legalization, and policymakers
should consider subsidizing this with general revenue funds. Pushing out the illicit
market is a long-term project that cannot be undertaken lightly, or dealt with by
arbitrarily regulating cannabis, experimentation in policy and learning from the mistakes
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and successes of other countries is paramount and will eventually produce research that
dictates the best regulatory practices.
In many ways, the economic organization of cannabis has mirrored past and
current debates over the organization of the wider economy globally. Policymakers have
had to decide who should own the means of producing a cannabis supply. Additionally,
questions over what level of government should regulate cannabis are in no shortage, and
these questions present themselves differently in every country researched. Regulations
on who can apply for a license and how much capital is necessary to join the licit market
varies within borders and across borders. In Canada, we have already seen the rise of
corporatization of cannabis, which has raised billions of dollars in investment. Despite
this, we have also seen the inclusion of protectionist and anti-monopoly policies to the
potential rise of big cannabis in both Canada and the United States. Policymakers’
interpretation of how a cannabis supply should be organized varies and largely has relied
on past experiences with alcohol, tobacco, and medicinal cannabis, with some new
policies to address a new industry. These include traditional hierarchal for-profit
enterprises, publicly traded cannabis companies, publicly owned institutions that limit
commercialization and for-profit elements of production like advertising, private retail by
a public health institution in pharmacies, socially owned non-profit cannabis clubs, forprofit cooperatives, non-profit dispensaries, and the individual, which is presumed to not
be for-profit. National and subnational governments have largely identified
commercialization and the for-profit nature of the industry as areas of concern. Due to
this, they have largely relied on a combination of for-profit and non-profit methods of
cannabis supply. Conversely, commercialization and innovation in cannabis products
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and ways to consume cannabis may be necessary to the successful capture of illicit
market profits. In addition to this, access to cannabis has been restrained in ways not
common to other commodities, and certainly doesn’t mimic the experience of ease of
access to cannabis in the illicit market.
Policymakers have largely relied on ‘strict regulation’ and restriction of access to
serve public health concerns politically. Ironically, it has often been accompanied with
access to a cannabis supply that is unregulated in homegrown cultivation. Enforcement
covering the regulations of homegrown cultivation are unenforceable on a broad scale,
contradicting strict regulation. On the contrary, Uruguayan officials require homegrown
cultivators to register and track their cannabis supply, turning over excesses to the
government to remedy the unregulated nature of this method of supply, but it is
undetermined if this is completely successful. This constitutes a recognition that cannabis
is not dangerous enough to be regulated, but that the for-profit nature of the industry
merits ‘strict regulation’. Policymakers would be wise to increase the access to non-profit
supplies to cannabis, alongside for-profit industries to maintain a balanced set of access
that is absent of the profit incentive. Additionally, access will be crucial to the success of
eliminating the illicit market, and arbitrary restrictions do not increase the odds of
accomplishing broader goals, targeted regulation does. Policymakers have largely relied
on the personal responsibility of citizens abiding by public health concerns to not give or
sell cannabis to adolescents, drive while high, or over consume cannabis, with the threat
of punishment. This highlights the crucial need for public health education campaigns on
the responsible consumption of cannabis. This, of course requires revenue, in addition to
the revenue needed for social justice programs that policymakers have highlighted as
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crucial to the success of reform. In addition to regulation enforcement funding, research
on best policy practices, criminal expungement programs, and general administration also
require money. Contradicting this, the over-taxation of cannabis makes uncompetitive
with the illicit market. Finding the correct formula is paramount to building a sustainable
industry.
Policymakers may just have to accept that a certain portion of the illicit market
may be unable to be broken down in the short term. This tracks with the general spirit of
cannabis legalization, that the criminalization of cannabis was unwarranted and law
enforcement focusing on this is a waste of resources when larger crime problems are at
stake (such as combatting a “hard” drug epidemic). Focusing funds on all, but the worst
cannabis offenders may be inefficient and counterproductive. Or policymakers may have
to utilize a tax code that graduates over time and utilizes general funds for political
priorities, which are no doubt important and desperately needed. As time goes on, future
generations will have less stigma around the licit cannabis. Additionally, the illicit market
relies on an informal network of relationships, which may further break down in the
future as young citizens grow having never known an illicit market.
It is important to note the stark differences between Parliamentary and
Presidential systems of governance when analyzing cannabis legalization. The
Parliaments of Canada and Uruguay have been proactive in ending the War on Drugs,
while the United States Congress has been remarkably democratically unresponsive to
the population’s will, this has resulted in a patchwork of unsustainable subnational
legalization and regulation which has created enormous problems for the industry.
Certainly, the way the United States has gone about organizing legalization and
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regulation should not be emulated in any future country wishing to legalize and regulate
cannabis. On the other hand, Canada and Uruguay both contain policies that should be
emulated, and due to them being different systems of government (federal compared to
unitary) policymakers now have options. Despite this, there are obvious flaws to both
systems, but this is expected in the early years of legalization and regulation and will be
worked out further in the future.
So, what is success? The short answer is, we do not know yet, but the
accumulation of research mentioned in this paper is starting to point in specific
directions. Success is indeed obtainable with enough trial and error, but in the short term
due to the new nature of the industry it has been much harder to grasp. Success seems to
be contextual to political and country specific conditions and priorities and achieving a
balanced set of contradictory priorities has been difficult in the initial implementation for
all countries. In this research’s assessment, the ideal organization of cannabis supply
reform includes numerous elements that will increase the chance of ‘success’.
First, taxation must be nationally coordinated as it is in Canada, as well as low
enough to incentive participation in the licit market, but high enough to fund regulation
bodies, disincentives youth use, public health education, social equity programs, and
research on individual policies in different legal cannabis jurisdictions. The United
States’ system of subnational over-taxation and its failures are the most explicit of
examples. Second, countries must do away with regulations that arbitrarily restrict access
to cannabis, like the banning of delivery or policies that in way or another stunt the
growth of cannabis dispensary proliferation, Canada and the United States have both
struggled with this, but Canada less so to exponential degree. As much as policymakers
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may not want to hear it, there are cannabis users in all of their jurisdictions and will find
one way or another to obtain this thus increasing illicit market participation. Third, there
needs to be a better balance between local autonomy and national authority, there is room
for limiting the number of dispensaries if there is an increase in access to cannabis
delivery, preferably through online ordering that can be bought from any legal enterprise
within a countries’ borders such as in Canada. Fourth, as this paper has iterated many
times over, there needs to be further research over the impacts of specific jurisdiction
policies when controlling for all other variables to produce the best policies possible,
Canada and Uruguay as well as certain subnational governments in the United States
have invested considerable resources into doing exactly this. Fifth, countries need to
decrease the economic barriers for potential cannabis entrepreneurs with lower amounts
of capital from which to expend, this includes decreasing licensing fees and costly
physical security requirements. Sixth, cannabis as a commodity needs at least some
element of the profit incentive involved in order to increase the growing demands of
higher quality cannabis, higher THC levels, and the growing demand for the wide variety
of cannabis products, a fact Uruguay has struggled with thus far. Finally, there needs to
be national coordination of cannabis policies that disincentives intrastate competition by
subnational governments and a framework that allows for the licit interstate trading of
cannabis, this will further limit the illicit market’s ability to fill the gaps where the licit
cannabis frameworks lack. Most notably, this is a fundamental issue hampering the
United States system.
Despite this, it does seem as if all countries agree that the commercialization of
cannabis is cause for concern. Due to this, the best possible outcome can be produced by
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allowing for a type of “mixed economy” that balances both private incentives for profit,
and public institutions role of doing away with the profit incentive to preserve public
health. As has been shown in the research above on the three case studies, this can be
achieved through a variety of cannabis access combinations. This research will conclude
with a simplified version of policy suggestions that may help policymakers accomplish a
multitude of contradictory goals. These are: lowering barriers to licensing and consumer
access (including adding the option of delivery), ending arbitrary regulations that don’t
serve public health or help in eliminating the illicit market, improving intragovernmental
cooperation, an increase in public health and awareness campaigns, graduated taxation
over time, and combining multiple methods of cannabis supply that contain for-profit and
non-profit elements as well as increasing access to different types of cannabis products.
In conclusion, these policy recommendations are just an initial assessment based on
governments’ first decade of experience with a seed to sale recreational cannabis regime,
there are no guarantees that conditions will remain the same in the future and that these
recommendations will remain relevant. These three case studies will become the defacto
models of future legalizing nations, whether they wanted to be or not, a trend we have
already begun to see in Mexico, Israel, New Zealand, and Colombia where policymakers
have proposed policies that are found in all three case study countries. Certainly, the
research of cannabis and cannabis policy must continue to grow in order to achieve the
most optimal outcomes for all governments involved.
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